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There may be no other Louisiana statute which has so affected
the development of an area of the law as has the Direct Action Statute.
The only real challenger for the honor is the fountainhead of tort
liability itself, article 2315 of the Civil Code. But within the specific
field of insurance law, the Direct Action Statute has a unique role.
Certainly no student of Louisiana insurance law can count himself as
knowledgeable on the subject without a thorough understanding of the
Direct Action Statute. So far as the author can determine, no one
has undertaken to provide a complete discussion of the statute in any
other forum. Cognizant of the wisdom of the aphorism regarding fools
who rush in where angels fear to tread, the writer has nonetheless
had the temerity to attempt such a treatment in the present article.
The discussion will follow the outline displayed at the outset of
the article, and the reader who seeks specific information on one of
the sub-topics is urged to consult the pages dealing with that topic.
For the more courageous and adventuresome, the complete story
begins with the history of the present statute.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF DIRECT ACTION

The present right of a victim of the tortious conduct of an insured to proceed directly against the insurance company in Louisiana
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*

Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

[Editor's note: This article is part of a forthcoming text on Louisiana Insurance
Law, to be coauthored with W. Shelby McKenzie. His work on Louisiana uninsured
motorist coverage may be found in Louisiana Uninsured Motorist Coverage-After Twenty
Years, 43 LA. L. REV. 691 (1983). The author gratefully acknowledges the support of
the Section on Insurance, Negligence, Compensation and Admiralty Law of the Louisiana State Bar Association in the preparation of this article.]
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is the product of a lengthy legislative and judicial process.' At its
most basic, it is an application of the principle of contract law that
a third-party beneficiary may sue to enforce a contract made for his
benefit even though not himself a party to the agreement. But since
insurance is a special contract subject to its own rules, it will not
suffice simply to say that the Direct Action Statute in Louisiana is
an early example of a stipulation pou autrui.' There are important
factors at work in this part of the law that must be taken into account,
and that task cannot be accomplished without an overview of the
historical development of the concept of direct action.
At about the turn of the century, when insurance was still in its
infancy in American jurisdictions, the concept of direct action was
unknown. The language of the insurance contract itself was controlling, and the character of the insurance policy itself contradicted any
possibility of direct action. In keeping with the principle of indemnity,'
an insurance contract provided indemnification for loss by the insured
rather than coverage of the liability of an insured to a third person.
Liability of the insured to the victim was certainly an issue, since
no indemnification of the insured would ever be demanded if the insured were not liable to the victim. But payment by the insurer was
for the purpose of making the insured whole for loss he had suffered,
and thus only an actual loss through payment of a judgment to a third

1. Some of the stages in this process may be observed in the commentaries found
in Purvis, Legislation Affecting Insurance, 17 LA. L. REV. 64, 65-67 (1956); Comment,
The Louisiana Direct Action Statute, 22 LA. L. REV. 243 (1961); Comment, Direct
Action-Insurance Contracts, 13 LA. L. REV. 495 (1953); Comment, Direct Rights of
Action Against Public Liability Insurers: Louisiana Act 55 of 1930, 11 TUL. L. REV.
443 (1937); Comment, Public Liability Insurance: The Injured Person's Right of Recovery
When the Policy Holder Fails to Give Immediate Notice to the Insurer, 10 TUL. L. REV.
69 (1935); Note, Liability Insurance-PersonalDefenses-Right of Wife to Sue Husband's
Insurer-LouisianaAct 253 of 1918 as Amended by Act 55 of 1930, 10 TUL. L. REV.
312 (1936).
2. In fact, the analogy to third-party beneficiary agreements breaks down at
several points. Ordinarily, the promisor (the insurer) does not have to perform in favor
of the beneficiary (the victim) if the stipulator (the insured) has breached his agreement with the promisor. Thus, if the insured should fail to give timely notice of an
accident to the insurer, the insurer arguably could deny coverage to the victim. But,
as we shall see, this has not been the rule in Louisiana. Moreover, the supreme court
has at least once specifically rejected the analogy. Esteve v. Allstate Ins. Co., 351
So. 2d 117 (La. 1977).
3. ". . . insurance is aimed at reimbursement, but not more. The principle that
insurance contracts shall be interpreted and enforced consistently with this objective
of conferring a benefit no greater in value than the loss suffered will be referred
to . . . as the principle of indemnity." R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW,
S 3.1(a) at 88 (1971). That insurance contracts of this type ultimately became "liability"
policies, rather than "indemnity" policies, is not a departure from this principle. They
simply became "indemnity" policies for the victim instead of the insured.
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person based upon legal liability would trigger the coverage of this
"indemnity" policy.
In some instances, the policy would call for "indemnity against
liability," and it was held that a judgment against the insured created
a sufficient liability to give the judgment creditor a right to the insurance proceeds. Probably as a reaction to such holdings, insurers
frequently included "no action" clauses in policies. Such clauses limited
coverage under the policy to loss "actually sustained and paid by"
the insured, sometimes with the addition that the payment was pursuant to a judgment rendered after trial on the merits. It followed,
rigidly but logically, that if the insured were insolvent and perhaps
declared bankruptcy (and thus never paid any amount on the judgment), no "loss" was suffered and no amount was collectible by the
victim from the insurer.
This seemed an unfortunate result. The fund created by the payment of premiums for the coverage was not being used, although the
evil that suggested its creation in the first place had occurred: uncompensated injury to the victim of the insured's conduct. It was at
this point that the insurance contract first became infused, through
legislative and judicial action, with important public policy considerations that would guide its interpretation from then until the present.
Louisiana first acted on the question in 1918. Act 253 of that year
made it a misdemeanor for a company to issue any policy "against
liability unless it contains a provision . . .that the insolvency or
bankruptcy of the assured shall not release the company from the
payment of damages for injury sustained or loss occasioned during
the life of the policy." In such a case, i.e., the insolvency of the insured, "an action may be maintained within the terms and limits of
the policy by the injured person or his or her heirs, against the
insurer."4 A little-noted companion measure was introduced and failed
4.

In pertinent part, Act 253 of 1918 provided:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana.
That, after the passage of this act, it shall be illegal for any company to issue
any policy against liability unless it contains a provision to the effect that the
insolvency or bankruptcy of the assured shall not release the company from the
payment of damages for injury sustained or loss occasioned during the life of
the policy, and, in case of such insolvency or bankruptcy, an action may be maintained within the terms and limits of the policy by the injured person or his
or her heirs, against the insurer company.
Section 2. Be it further enacted, etc., That the issuance of any policy against
liability which does not contain the clause above specified shall be a misdemeanor,
punishable by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) and not more than five
hundred dollars ($500.00) or imprisonment of not less than one month and not
more than twelve months, or both at the discretion of -the judge.
The criminal sanction for violation of Act 253 was retained in Act 55 of 1930 and,
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to pass. Senate Bill 109 of that same year provided that no policy
could be issued unless it contained the provision that the insurer would
pay to the person entitled thereto all loss or damage sustained during
the life of the policy, making that a direct obligation by the insurer
to the victim enforceable "by direct action" against the insurer. Early
commentators noted the absence of the qualifying phrase "within the
terms and limits of the policy" and suggested that the unsuccessful
bill would have imposed a form of absolute liability.' But probably
more significant was the "direct action" concept which lost out in the
legislative wars to the more limited "direct action if insolvent" concept.
The first interpretation of the 1918 statute was in Edwards v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co.,' decided in 1929. The plaintiff claimed that
one Monahan had injured him through negligent operation of a motor
vehicle, and he was awarded a judgment on that claim. Monahan
appealed devolutively but not suspensively, and the plaintiff attempted
to execute on the judgment. The execution was returned nulla bona.
The plaintiff then tried to garnish the fund represented by insurance
proceeds available to Monahan and held by the defendant, but he was
unsuccessful. Then he brought an action directly against the insurer
on the basis of Act 253 of 1918.
The insurer's defense rested primarily on two points. The insurer
had received no notice of the incident until eleven months after its
occurrence. Accordingly, it claimed that the terms of the policy requiring "immediate written notice" from the insured had been violated.
Under the circumstances, it argued, the claimant had no action "within

for that matter, in the enactment of the new Insurance Code in Act 195 of 1948, although
deleted in favor of a comprehensive criminal sanction for any code violation. Obviously, the criminal sanction was nowhere near as worrisome for the insurers as what
ultimately occurred as a sanction, which was reading that provision into policies rather
than imposing a fine for its omission.
5. Comment, Public Liability Insurance: The Injured Person's Right of Recovery
When the Policy Holder Fails to Give Immediate Notice to the Insurer, 10 TUL. L. REV.
69 (1935). The same source traces the Louisiana statute of 1918 to a similar New York
law.
6. 11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (Orl. 1929). The Edwards decision did not escape
criticism. See Comment, supra note 5, at 76-77. See also Lawrason v. Owners' Auto.
Ins. Co., 172 La. 1075, 136 So. 57 (1931), in which the supreme court appeared to accept
a similar view. The defendant claimed that its policy providing coverage to an insured
for tortious conduct was not an "accident" policy and thus could not be governed by
the venue provisions with regard to such policies. The court held that the inclusion
in the policy of the language of Act 253 of 1918 made the policy "inure to the benefit
of the injured party, and [made] it, in effect, one of accident insurance in favor of
the person injured when the accident [was] caused by the insolvent or bankrupt." 172
La. at 1079, 136 So. at 58. Thus venue under the "accident" policy provision was proper.
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the terms and limits of the policy." Had Monahan paid the judgment,
he probably could not have recovered under the policy because of
his failure to notify. The court was correct in noting that the question was not whether Monahan could recover, but whether the plaintiff could. The court expressed doubt that the legislature could have
meant that the plaintiffs right to recover under the policy was dependent upon the actions of another person over whom he had no control (Monahan). The court's reasoning, as we shall see, ultimately would
be reflected in the language of the statute itself:
We think it was the purpose of the statute to create, immediately
upon the happening of the accident, a cause of action in the injured
party against the insurer, if any, of the party at fault. Of course,
the right to present and enforce this cause of action is conditioned
upon the obtaining of a judgment against the party at fault and
upon unsuccessful efforts to collect that judgment, but these are
conditions with which it is within the power of the injured party
to comply.7
The insurer also argued that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the
insured had to be judicially established, in addition to a showing of
the inability to execute a judgment. Such an interpretation of the
statute was deemed "unreasonable" by the court and rejected. The
court held that an unsatisfied execution of a judgment was proof of
the statutory requirement of insolvency or bankruptcy, giving rise
to the right of direct action authorized by the statute.
In the next legislative session, Act 55 of 1930 was enacted, virtually codifying the decision in Edwards. As introduced, the bill proposed the addition of two concepts: (1) that a judgment against the
insured which had become executory was prima facie evidence of insolvency, and (2) that, at their option, the injured person or his heirs
had a "right of direct action" against the insurer within the terms
and limits of the policy. A Senate committee proposed, and the full
body adopted, amendments which provided that the act was to have
no effect on the terms of an insurance policy if the terms were not
in violation of Louisiana law and that any action brought under the
statute was subject to "all of the lawful conditions of the policy contract and the defenses which could be urged by the insurer to a direct

7. 11 La. App. at 178, 123 So. at 163. Not all Louisiana judges were immediately
taken with the sweep of the statute. In Lacy v. Lucky, 19 La. App. 743, 140 So. 857
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1932), the victim alleged that the insurer had furnished the tortfeasor with insurance protecting him (the tortfeasor) against loss or damage and that
thus the insurer was liable to the victim. The court upheld the sustaining of an exception of no cause of action filed by the insurer, on the ground that the victim had
not alleged that the policy provided him (the victim) with any coverage.
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action brought by the insured," provided those conditions were not
in violation of state law.8
One must speculate that there was something in these amendments for both sides. The codification of Edwards was helpful from
the victim's standpoint. In the first place, it obviated judicial establishment of insolvency, other than by making a judgment executory. Even
the requirement in Edwards that the judgment be returned nulla bona
was not included. More importantly, the injured person could at his
option omit the action against the insured altogether and proceed
directly against the insurer in the parish where the accident occurred
or the parish of the insured's domicile.' However, the insurers apparently gained legislative sanction of the concept that this direct action was more a matter of procedure than of substance. The direct
action was subject to all lawful conditions of the policy and the
defenses which could be urged by the insurer to an action brought
by the insured for indemnity. This could be seen as, and perhaps was,"

8. In pertinent part, Act 55 of 1930 provided:
Section 1. That, after the passage of this act, it shall be illegal for any company
to issue any policy against liability unless it contains a provision to the effect
that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the assured shall not release the company
from the payment of damages for injury sustained or loss occasioned during the
life of the policy, and any judgment which may be rendered against the assured
for which the insurer is liable, which shall have become executory, shall be deemed
prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the assured, and an action may thereafter
be maintained within the terms and limits of the policy by the injured person
or his or her heirs against the insurer company. Provided further that the injured person or his or her heirs, at their option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer company within the terms, and limits of the policy, in
the parish where the accident or injury occurred, or in the parish where the assured
has his domicile, and said action may be.brought either against the insurer company alone or against both the assured and the insurer company, jointly and in
solido.
Provided that nothing contained in this act shall be construed to affect the provisions of the policy contract if the same are not in violation of the laws of this State.
It being the intent of this act that any action brought hereunder shall be subject
to all of the lawful conditions of the policy contract and the defenses which could
be urged by the insurer to a direct action brought by the insured; provided the
term and conditions of such policy contract are not in violation of the laws of
this State.
The bill first had been reported favorably without amendments and then recommitted
to the same committee, which then proposed the amendments which became the last
two paragraphs. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE
OF LOUISIANA, 5th Reg. Sess. at 187 (June 5, 1930).
9. The venue provisions were the subject of later amendments. See text at notes
83-91, infra.
10. See Comment, Direct Rights of Action Against Public Liability Insurers: LouisianaAct 55 of 1930, 11 TUL. L. REV. 443, 446 (1937), which took that view and asserted
that the effect of the amendment was to require compliance by the victim with those
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an overruling of the holding in Edwards that an eleven-month delay
in notification of an accident could not bar the victim's recovery as
it would have barred the insured's. Indeed, there hardly could have
been any other meaning to the amendment.
Perhaps it was somehow a matter of destiny that Act 55 of 1930
first should be subjected to the tender ministrations of the judicial
process at the hands of the same appellate judge who had written
the Edwards opinion. In Rossville Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis Sheen Transfer Co.," the court upheld the act against constitutional attacks based upon multiplicity of objects and impairment of
contracts, giving it retroactive effect by applying it to a policy
apparently issued prior to enactment of the statute. The court saw
no "substantial right" of the insurer which was interfered with, since
liability still rested on proof of fault on the part of the insured.
Very quickly, insurers discovered that the statute was a force to
be reckoned with. They may have hastened that result by some
spurious initial arguments. In Rambin v. Southern Sales Co., 2 the insurer argued that since the direct action by the victim was maintainable only under "the terms and limits of the policy," a clause in
the policy not permitting the action except upon proof of insolvency
of the insured could be enforced. In other words, the act passed in
1930 had changed nothing. Understandably, the court interpreted the
statute to prohibit such a result; otherwise, the 1930 amendment would
have been rendered nugatory. The court held that the expression
"within the terms and limits of the policy" referred to. . . the amount of the policy, the character of the risk, and the
time in which suit [might] be brought, and such like provisions.
The insurer [could not] insert "terms and limits" in a policy that
would contravene the right of the injured party to bring a direct
action, as provided by the act. 3
'At least part of the court's reasoning was that the direct action conferred no greater right on the victim than the insured already had,
and thus the insurer really had nothing to complain about. Its remarks
policy terms that did not "deprive the third party [victim] of his right of direct action
against the insurer."
11. 18 La. App. 725, 138 So. 183 (Orl. 1931). Accord Gager v. Teche Transfer Co.,
143 So. 62 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932).
12. 145 So. 46 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932); see also Bougon v. Volunteers of Am., Inc.,
151 So. 797 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934); cf. Graham v. American Employers' Ins. Co.,
171 So. 471 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937) (statute prevails over policy as to "no action" clause,
but not as to coverage questions; statute does not make insurer liable when insured
is not; statute "does not furnish substantive rights ....
Its benefits are procedural
in nature." Id. at 476.).
13. 145 So. at 50.
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are particularly interesting since subsequent cases appear to have
violated the principles upon which the holding was based.
The remedy in each case [insolvent insured, solvent insured] is
absolutely equal in so far as the result is concerned, and neither
is superior to or greater than the other.
[The insurer's] obligation to pay in the event of damage caused
by its principal cannot be said to be impaired by the fact that
payment may be demanded directly14 by the injured party, instead
of indirectly through the insured.
...

Despite an early isolated ruling or two to the contrary," it also became
quickly apparent that the Edwards holding -violation of a policy term
requiring notice of the accident by the insured would eliminate
coverage for the victim-would not be regarded as legislatively overruled. First, the cases defined "immediate" notice as required by
policies to be "reasonable" notice, in order not to deprive the victim
of coverage." And then notice, reasonable or not, became largely immaterial as the Edwards rationale regained authority. 7 This process
took quite a while, but by the time West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc.18 was
decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1950, a divided court could
announce that even notice more than a year after the accident without
any plausible excuse for the delay would not defeat coverage for the
victim. For a more detailed discussion of the expression "within the
terms and limits of the policy," the reader is referred to the later
section in this article on that subject.19
Coverage "within the terms and conditions of the policy" also
quickly led the court into what was to become one of the most important and complex issues under the statute. There was now general
agreement that the victim could pursue his remedy directly against
the insurer without naming the insured at all. There were indications
that the statute did not confer substantive rights on the victim and

14. Id.
15. Howard v. Rowan, 154 So. 382 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934) (notice after a "reasonable"
period is required; notice delayed for 44 days is a violation, defeating any coverage
by victim); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 F. Supp. 458 (W.D. La. 1942) (an eightmonth delay is a violation, defeating any coverage by victim).
16. Jones v. Shehee-Ford Wagon & Harness Co., 183 La. 293, 163 So. 129 (1935)
(twenty-six days after incident is reasonable compliance with immediate notice requirement); Jones v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 185 So. 509 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939)
(similar).
17. Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 211 La. 19, 29 So. 2d 177 (1946);
cf. Davies v. Consolidated Underwriters, 199 La. 459, 6 So. 2d 351 (1942).
18. 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950).
19. See text at notes 93-119, infra.

19831

DIRECT ACTION STATUTE

1463

statements that the liability of the insurer rested upon the liability
of the insured. But would that mean that the insurer had all the
defenses against the victim's suit that the insured would have had
in the same suit? The statute itself provided that in a direct action
by the victim, the insurer would have all the defenses "which could
be urged by the insurer to a direct action brought by the insured."
That statement did not directly answer the question, however, since
a direct action by the insured against the insurer would not concern
"personal" defenses which the insured might have against the victim.
Thus the courts were asked to rule on the question of whether
a victim who could not sue a tortfeasor because of an immunity to
suit and liability could nonetheless sue and recover against the tortfeasor's insurer. ° Such suits were permitted, and for the first time,
it could be said that the statute conferred substantive rights on the
victim which he would not have had against the insured.2
There were no amendments to the Direct Action Statute between
1930 and 1948. In the latter year, the legislature compiled the various
insurance statutes into an insurance code, in which the statute was
included as section 14.45. One small but significant change was made
in the revision. In place of the opening language "it shall be illegal
for any company to issue any policy," the statute now provided, "No
policy or contract of liability insurance shall be issued or delivered
in this State ... ."22 This was certainly a legislative response to confusion which had arisen, especially in the federal courts,2 over the
20. Harvey v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 6 So. 2d 774 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942)
(insurer could not plead insured husband's immunity from liability to wife); Edwards
v. Royal Indem. Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935) (similar, although tort occurred
prior to marriage); Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935) (insurer could not
plead immunity of father to suits from children in case in which father was deceased
and administrator of succession was actual defendant); Rome v. London & Lancashire
Indem. Co. of Am., 181 La. 630, 160 So. 121 (1935), on remand, 169 So. 132 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1936) (insurer could not plead governmental immunity of insured, although
case might have turned on proprietary versus governmental capacity; the latter overruling Loustalot v. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n, 164 So. 183 (La. App.
Orl. 1935), which had held that when the entity acted in its governmental capacity,
the immunity could be raised by the insurer); Messina v. Societe Francaise, 170 So.
801 (La. App. Orl. 1936) (insurer could not raise defense of immunity for hospital; court
did not determine whether hospital was immune as governmental entity or as charitable
entity).
21. Other defenses, not "personal" to the insured, were nonetheless permitted
to be raised by the insurer. These developments are too complicated to be discussed
in this review, and the reader is urged to pursue the inquiry in a later section in
this article. See text at notes 120-165, infra.
22. 1948 La. Acts, No. 195 (printed as a separate volume). The other change effected by Act 195 was to change the phrase "during the life of the policy" to "during
the existence of the policy."
23. See generally Comment, Direct Action-Insurance Contracts, 13 LA. L. REV. 495
(1953); text at notes 56-57, infra.
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application of the Direct Action Statute to policies issued in other
states. The legislative response must have been thought to be incomplete, for the legislature returned to the statute two years later
in Act 541 of 1950, adding the following important language: "This
right of direct action shall exist whether the policy of insurance sued
upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not and
whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct
action, provided the accident or injury occurred within the State of
Louisiana.""4 This language in turn became the point of departure for
a new series of decisions dealing with the extraterritorial effect of
the statute. These decisions culminated in the fascinating case of Webb
v. Zurich Insurance Co., 25 holding, despite the above language, that
a right of direct action existed if the policy was issued or delivered
in Louisiana or if the accident or injury occurred in Louisiana.26
In 1956, the statute was amended again, the last amendment of
any real importance. Act 475 of that year:
" specified that the "heir or heirs" of the victim included the
designated beneficiaries under article 2315 for survival and
wrongful death actions,27
" added the insurer's domicile or principal place of business as possible venues,
" expressed the intent that all liability policies "within their terms
and limits" are executed for the benefit of all injured persons to
24. A companion act, Act 542 of 1950, added La. R.S. 22:983(E) to provide:
No certificate of authority to do business in Louisiana shall be issued to a foreign
or alien liability insurer until such insurer shall consent to being sued by the
injured person or his or her heirs in a direct action as provided in [LA. R.S.
22:655], whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in
the State of Louisiana or not, and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided that the accident or injury occurred
within the State of Louisiana.
As introduced, both bills (Senate Bill 199 and Senate Bill 201) contained an additional
phrase in the proviso concerning occurrence of the accident or injury in Louisiana,
viz, "or the injured person or his or her heirs are residents of this State." This phrase
was deleted from each bill in the legislative process.
In the same year, earlier in the session, the legislature adopted La. S. Con. Res.
No. 13, declaring that it was never the intent of the legislature by its 1948 amendment to "repeal, amend, limit or in any wise restrict" the Direct Action Statute.
25. 251 La. 558, 205 So. 2d 398 (1968).
26. See text at notes 54-82, infra.
27. Probably a codification of the view taken in Benroth v. Continental Cas. Co.,
132 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. La. 1955), that a widow was an "heir" for purposes of the Direct
Action Statute because she was a beneficiary under article 2315 of the Civil Code.
In Benroth, the widow was also an "heir" for succession purposes, but in many instances, she would not be.
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whom the insured is liable,28 and
* stated that the purpose of such policies is to give protection and
coverage to "all insureds, whether they are named insureds or
additional insureds under the omnibus clause, for any legal liability
said insured may have as or for a tort-feasor [sic] within the terms
and limits of said policy."29
In 1958, the Direct Action Statute was re-enacted without substantive change in a revision of the Insurance Code.3" And finally, in 1962,
the venue provisions were expanded by Act 471 of that year to include the general venue rules of article 42 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. 3'
A vetoed legislative act also plays a role in this history. In 1962,
the bill which became Act 471, altering the venue provisions, reenacted the remainder of the statute, including the phrase "provided
the accident or injury occurred in Louisiana." Another bill (House Bill
935) also passed, re-enacting the statute without the changed venue
provisions but deleting the proviso about location of the accident or
injury. The latter bill was vetoed. Opinions differed as to the reason
for passage of the bill and the reason for its veto. Arguably, the bill
was introduced to delete what had been regarded in some cases as
limiting language -authorizing a direct action only when the accident
or injury occurred in Louisiana. If that is true, its veto would suggest that the governor disagreed with the removal of the limitation.
However, the writing justice in Webb v. Zurich Insurance Co.3 opined
that the bill was vetoed simply to avoid any conflict with Act 471
of the same year (the venue bill).
The latter opinion seems improbable on two accounts. First, the
titles to the two bills (change of venue in one, deletion of the proviso
in the other) reveal no conflict in substance, and they both could have
been signed and easily reconciled. Second, even if there were a con-

28. Probably a codification of the view expressed in such cases as Lewis v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. La. 1952) and Edwards v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co. 11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (La. Orl. 1929). See note 6, supra.
29. Probably a codification of the statements and interpretations in such cases
as McDowell v. National Sur. Corp., 68 So. 2d 189 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953), appeal
dismissed, 347 U.S. 995 (1954).
30. 1958 La. Acts, No. 125.
31. Prior to the amendment by Act 471 of 1962, venue was provided in the parish
of the accident or injury and the domicile of the insured or insurer or "their principal
place of business in Louisiana." The amendment provided venue in the parish of the
accident or injury and in the parish "in which an action could be brought against either
the insured or the insurer under the general rules of venue prescribed by Art. 42,
Code of Civil Procedure."
32. 251 La. 558, 577 n.17, 205 So. 2d 398, 405 n.17 (1968).
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flict and assuming that the governor agreed with the deletion of the
limiting language in the proviso, it would stand to reason that he
would sign House Bill 935 and veto the other. The venue changes
were not that drastic or important and were probably introduced
because of the recent adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure. They
could well have waited for another legislative session.
Be that as it may, the deletion of the proviso was vetoed without
announced reason.3 Since the 1962 session, there have been no further successful attempts to amend the statute.
This brief summary of the legislative and jurisprudential history
of the Direct Action Statute will permit the reader to understand
the specific principles developed in the following sections. For the last
twenty years at least, the main focus of the interpretive process has
shifted to the judicial arena, where there has never been a dearth
of difficult problems to solve.
RELATED PROBLEMS OF JURISDICTION, RIGHT OF ACTION, AND VENUE
UNDER THE DIRECT ACTION STATUTE

There has been much consternation over the years caused by confusion over the superficially related but disparate problems of (1)
jurisdiction, (2) availability of right of direct action, and (3) venue. By
subjecting the problems to separate analytical discussion in this section, it is hoped some of the confusion will be dispelled.
Of course, not all of the problems foreseen in this section are present in each law suit. Nonetheless, any analysis of a problem in this
area should proceed along the following lines:
" Does a Louisiana court have the legal power and authority to
render a judgment against the insurer as a legal person or, at
least, the power to render a judgment limited to property of the
insurer in this state? These are questions of jurisdiction over the
defendant, either on a personal or quasi in rem basis.
* If a Louisiana court does have jurisdiction, does the plaintiff have
a right of direct action 4 against the insurer? This is primarily
a matter of interpretation of the Direct Action Statute itself.
33. LOUISIANA LEGISLATURE, RESUME OF ACTS, RESOLUTIONS, VETOED BILLS 171,
183-84 (1962), which contains a list of veto messages, but no message is included for
House Bill 935.
34. This is the language of the statute, but one should be careful not to characterize
this authority of the plaintiff to proceed directly as a "right of action" in the procedural sense. It is more accurately a "cause of action" because it grants to the plaintiff a remedy for the harm revealed by his pleadings which-but for the statute-he
would not have.
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And, assuming an affirmative answer to the first two inquiries,
where does a proper venue exist in Louisiana for such an action?
This is also primarily a matter of interpretation of the statute
and the articles of the Code of Civil Procedure to which it refers.
None of these questions is directed at a related matter often mixed
into such cases: what substantive law should a Louisiana court apply?
If a Louisiana court has jurisdiction over an insurer; and if the plaintiff may proceed by direct action against the insurer; and if the suit
has been brought in a proper venue, that Louisiana forum sometimes
may be faced with a genuine choice of law question. However, such
a question is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, except in so
far as some of these considerations may affect the decision on applicability of the Direct Action Statute.
Also, the above questions are not concerned with whether a court
has subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is rarely
a problem in Louisiana state courts, where the statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction is broad. 5 There was a period of time in the
past when there were problems in the federal courts involving the
Direct Action Statute. In this context, the subject matter jurisdiction
of the federal courts is based upon diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount." Injured Louisiana citizens frequently had sought to
invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts in Louisiana to
sue the insurers of other Louisiana citizens. Had such an action been
brought by a plaintiff against the tortfeasor himself, there would have
been no diversity and no subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts
took the view that a suit under the Direct Action Statute against
a foreign insurer presented diversity of citizenship and the statute
created substantive rights which the federal court was bound to
enforce under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 7
The United States Supreme Court approved this view in Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert' in 1954. Federal courts became
popular forums for such suits, since jury trials were less common in
state courts, delay was minimal, and the state operated under a system
of appellate review of fact and law in civil cases. But in 1964, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to eliminate diversity jurisdiction in
such cases by providing thatin any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract
35. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2.
36. 28 U.S.C. S 1332 (1976): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between (1) citizens of different States; . .
37. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
38. 348 U.S. 48 (1954).
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of liability insurance ... to which action the insured is not joined
as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of
the State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State
by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State where
it has its principal place of business.39
With this amendment, the bulk of the ordinary proceedings against
liability insurers under the Direct Action Statute returned to Louisiana state courts.
Jurisdiction
The Direct Action Statute does not attempt to, nor does it unintentionally, confer jurisdiction of any kind on Louisiana courts. Although
occasionally the cases recognize this simple proposition, many times
it seems ignored or poorly understood. Had we firmly had this principle in mind from the outset, a good deal of the confusion in this area
of the jurisprudence could have been avoided. The Direct Action
Statute announces a permissible type of procedure (suit against an
insurer directly) and an appropriate venue for such a suit. But it
assumes without any direct expression on the subject that the issue
of jurisdiction over the insurer already will have been determined.
Obviously, if Louisiana does not have personal jurisdiction over the
insurer or quasi in rem jurisdiction over the insurer's property, it
can make no constitutionally binding pronouncements about the applicability of the Direct Action Statute or venue or anything else."
It is often said, and indeed the Code of Civil Procedure provides,
that personal jurisdiction is "based upon" service of process on the
defendant or on his agent for service. 1 Such an agent is either
designated by a person or by the law itself to receive process in
actions brought against an individual or entity in a Louisiana court.42
In the context of the present discussion, designation of agents for
service of process is the usual method under which personal jurisdiction is claimed.
We may assume that where the insurance company is a domestic
insurer (i.e., it is organized under Louisiana law and is domiciled here),
39. Pub. L. No. 88-439, S 1, 78 Stat. 445, 445 (1964).
40. This discussion is certainly not intended as an exhaustive analysis of the complex questions of personal and in rem jurisdiction, in part because the author is not
qualified to engage in such a discussion. But it is intended to demonstrate the rudiments
of resolving these questions so that the discussion may move forward to the more
specific questions of applicability of the Direct Action Statute and appropriate venue.
41. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 6; Jones v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 10 (La. App.
3d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 So. 2d 586 (La. 1981).
42. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 5251.
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service of process and acquisition of personal jurisdiction thereby will
cause no particular problems. But where the insurer is a foreign insurer, some additional considerations enter the picture. Primary among
these is the question of whether the insurer has sufficient "minimum
contacts" with Louisiana to permit this state to designate, within the
acceptable constitutional parameters dictated by due process, an agent
for service of process upon whom service sufficient to acquire personal jurisdiction may be made. It is axiomatic that Louisiana would
violate basic notions of due process of law by a bootstrap scheme which
would appoint an agent for service of process for an insurer having
no contact whatever with the state, and then announce personal
jurisdiction over that insurer upon service on that agent.
Thus, following the gradual expansions in the constitutional cases
concerning due process, Louisiana has announced the bases on which
it will designate agents for service as to foreign insurers and, in turn,
permit the acquisition of personal jurisdiction by service on these
agents.'" For example, Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3474 designates
the secretary of state as the agent for service of process for the "public
liability and property damage insurer" of a vehicle driven here by
a non-resident or his authorized agent or employee as to causes of
action "growing out of any accident or collision" in which the vehicle
so driven may be involved."
This statute serves the intended purpose for the great majority
of actions against insurers, since automobile liability insurance is the
predominant variety of insurance which is at issue in these cases.
However, Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:985 also provides a basis for
acquisition of personal jurisdiction over a foreign insurer that is not
limited to automobile coverage:
Every foreign or alien insurer shall appoint the secretary of state
to be its true and lawful attorney in this state upon whom . . .
all lawful process in any action or proceeding against such insurer

43. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1977 & 1981), the so-called long arm statute, is not
helpful in this respect. It extends personal jurisdiction to a nonresident as to a cause
of action "arising from" the nonresident's transacting any business in this state or
contracting to supply services or things in this state, among other grounds. But a
claim against a nonresident insurer because of a policy issued to a tortfeasor does
not "arise from" the insurer's transacting business here or contracting to supply services here. It "arises from" the tort. See McKeithen v. M/T Frosta, 435 F. Supp. 572
(E.D. La. 1977); Hall v. Scott, 416 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
44. Louisiana has extended its personal jurisdiction over those who operate,
navigate, or maintain a watercraft in this state in LA. R.S. 13:3479 (Supp. 1954). But
this statute does not purport to reach the insurers of those persons, as does the statute
concerning those who operate a motor vehicle here. See McKeithen v. M/T Frosta,
435 F. Supp. 572 (E.D. La. 1977).
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may be served, which shall constitute service on such insurer. Such
appointment shall continue in force so long as any contract or other
liability of such insurer in this state shall remain outstanding."
There is little doubt that, at the very least, this provision is aimed
at extending personal jurisdiction over a foreign insurer as to a loss
occurring in this state. But the statute is broader and by its terms
could extend even to causes of action arising out of state. The Louisiana decisions show a tendency to make this acquisition of personal
jurisdiction broad enough to include even "transitory" causes of
action."
Thus, insofar as acquisition of personal jurisdiction through service of process on the secretary of state is concerned, a Louisiana
court may have such jurisdiction even though the policy in question
was issued outside Louisiana and the injury occurred outside
Louisiana. 7 But the fact that Louisiana may have jurisdiction does

45. LA. R.S. 22:1253(A) (Supp. 1968) makes a similar provision as to foreign insurers transacting business here without a certificate of authority to do so. Such conduct is
equivalent to an appointment by such insurer of the Secretary of State . .. to
be its true and lawful attorney, upon whom may be served all lawful process
in any action, suit or proceeding . . . arising out of such policy or contract of
insurance, and the said transacting of business by such insurer is a signification
of its agreement that any such service of process is of the same legal force and
validity as personal service of process in this state upon it.
In theory, this extension of jurisdiction is more limited than that in LA. R.S. 22:985
(1950), since this statute provides for "any action ... out of such policy" (presumably
the one written while the insurer was transacting business here without a certificate).
See generally McKeithen v. M/T Frosta, 435 F. Supp. 572 (E.D. La. 1977). LA. R.S.
22:985, on the other hand, does not qualify "any action" with specific reference to
a policy written here.
46. See Morrison v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 249 La. 546, 187 So. 2d 729 (1966)
(LA. R.S. 22:985 was constitutional grant of personal jurisdiction over New Hampshire
insurer, qualified to do and doing business in Louisiana, which had issued fire policy
in Mississippi on Mississippi residence, delivered in Louisiana; plaintiffs were Louisiana residents and fire loss was in Mississippi); Smith v. Globe Indem. Co., 243 So.
2d 882 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971) (LA. R.S. 22:985 gives Louisiana court discretion to
exercise personal jurisdiction over New York insurer authorized to do business in Louisiana; suit concerned workers' compensation claim of Louisiana resident for injury suffered in Tennessee while working for a Tennessee employer under a Tennessee contract of employment). See also Note, Civil Procedure-Applicabilityof Direct Action
Statute and Foreign Insurance's Statutory Consent to Suit, 52 TUL. L. REV. 610 (1978).
47. This was the situation in Esteve v. Allstate Ins. Co., 351 So. 2d 117 (La. 1977)
(plaintiff was a Louisiana resident injured in Florida in a collision with a vehicle owned and operated by a Florida resident; the policy was issued and delivered in Florida
by an insurer foreign to Louisiana but authorized to do business here; the Louisiana
court had personal jurisdiction after service of process under LA. R.S. 22:985, but no
right of direct action on the basis of the Direct Action Statute).
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not answer the question of whether the plaintiff may proceed directly
against the insurer. 8
One further problem area in jurisdiction should be mentioned. This
is an effort by the plaintiff to obtain jurisdiction over the insured
by the attachment of the "debt" or "obligation" owed to him under
an insurance policy not issued or delivered in the forum state. This
is actually something of a substitute for a statutory right of direct
action. This concept was first utilized in the celebrated New York
decision of Seider v. Roth. 9
A New York resident was injured in Vermont at the hands of
a resident of Quebec, insured by Hartford under a policy issued in
Canada. Hartford was a Connecticut corporation authorized to do
business in New York. New York had no direct action statute. Thus
Hartford could not have been sued directly in the New York courts,
regardless of whether there might have been jurisdiction over Hartford there. Although the plaintiff certainly had a right of "direct
action" against the tortfeasor, there was no jurisdiction over him in
the New York courts because the injury occurred in Vermont. The
plaintiff argued successfully that the New York courts could obtain
jurisdiction over the tortfeasor (as to whom the "direct action" already
existed) by the attachment procedure. What plaintiff actually achieves
by such a procedure is the convenience of suing in his own state on
a cause of action arising in a second state against a resident of a third
state.
An attempt to use this concept in Louisiana was rejected in Kirchman v. Mikula.' The case was one in which Louisiana probably had
jurisdiction over the insurer under 22:985, but it would not have
granted a right of direct action because the policy was issued in New
Jersey and the accident occurred there. The court saw plaintiff's effort
as one to accomplish the result of a direct action statute (making a
fund directly available to him by jurisdiction over the insured up to
the amount of that fund, or policy) in circumstances in which the Direct
48. Compare Morse v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 301 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1974) (the court had jurisdiction over the foreign insurer under LA. R.S. 22:985, but
it had no authority to proceed directly since policy was not issued or delivered here
and accident did not occur here) with Farrell v. Wilbert, 369 So. 2d 1087 (La. App.
1st Cir.), cert. denied, 371 So. 2d 1342 (La. 1979) (the court has jurisdiction over foreign
insurer under LA. R.S. 22:985 and authority to proceed directly since injury occurred
in Louisiana).
49. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). Seider was followed
in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), adhered to en banc, 410 F.2d
117 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); Rush v. Savchuk, 311 Minn. 480,
245 N.W.2d 624 (1976), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); and to a limited extent in Forbes
v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973).
50. 258 So. 2d 701 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
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Action Statute clearly would' not apply. Other Louisiana cases have
rejected the concept,51 and ultimately, the United States Supreme
Court held the acquisition of jurisdiction over the insured in such a
fashion to be unconstitutional.2
Louisiana thus guessed correctly about the validity of the attachment cases such as Seider, but perhaps for the wrong reasons. New
York probably adopted the Seider approach for the convenience and
protection of its own residents, in part because it did not recognize
a statutory direct action against the insurer itself. With the attachment procedure, New York could at least put the "fund" itself at issue,
even though it could not put the insurer in the law suit as a defendant.
Louisiana, on the other hand, has long extended to its residents
the advantages of broad personal jurisdiction over foreign insurers
and the right of direct action in specific instances. Because of this,
we had very little experience with the attachment procedure in this
context as a substitute for the right of direct action. The court in
Kirchman thus rejected the concept, noting that Louisiana has made
a fund directly available to its injured residents, but within the
"minimum contacts" of (1) accident or injury within the state or (2)
policy issued or delivered here. The court seemed to have viewed the
Direct Action Statute as the limit to which Louisiana was willing to
go in making the fund available.
Thus the court's rejection of the Seider approach was based more
on the ground that Louisiana had expressed itself on direct approach
to the insurance "fund" in other ways than it was on the ground that
there could be constitutional doubts about the validity of the proceeding. Be that as it may, it appears settled that a Louisiana resident who does not have a right of direct action against an insurer
over whom the Louisiana court has personal jurisdiction cannot obtain
the effect of such an action by having the court assume quasi in rem
jurisdiction over a policy covering a nonresident.53
51. Grinnell v. Garrett, 295 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 300 So.
2d 181 (La. 1974) (same facts as Kirchman, except that plaintiffs failed to join the
insurer in the lawsuit; Louisiana had personal jurisdiction over the insurer, but it
would not have granted direct action; the court rejected use of the attachment procedure to establish jurisdiction over nonresident tortfeasor).
52. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977).
53. At least prior to the expressions of the United States Supreme Court in the
two cases cited in the preceding footnote, Louisiana might have attempted to make
its grant of a statutory direct action coextensive with its exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign insurer. We have seen in note 48, supra, examples of cases in
which Louisiana courts have recognized statutory limitations to a direct action against
insurers as to which there are no constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction.
Were it not for Rush and Shaffer, one could have said there might be no constitutional
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Availability of the Direct Action
Assuming proper jurisdiction over an insurer, under what circumstances will Louisiana authorize a claimant to proceed directly
against that insurance company as a defendant? As we have seen,
this is a matter of statutory interpretation.
As originally enacted, the Direct Action Statute almost certainly
extended only to policies issued in Louisiana. It hardly could have
been otherwise, since the announced sanction was a criminal penalty
and Louisiana probably could not apply a criminal penalty to conduct
outside the state. The 1930 amendments made no substantive change
on that point, but the cases decided under the statute following that
date began to extend the right of direct action not only to policies
issued here' but also to policies issued elsewhere as to injuries which
occurred here.5 At the time, the statute made no specific reference
to direct action in cases in which the injuries occurred here.
Although the Louisiana courts tentatively bad expressed the
notion that the direct action statute was available to litigate out-ofstate contracts covering in-state injuries, the federal courts seemed
not to have had the same view,"6 though even they were not in complete accord among themselves. 7 At this juncture, the legislature passed the Insurance Code in Act 195 of 1948, containing what it may
have thought to be a minor revision of the Direct Action Statute.
The phrase which had been "it shall be illegal for any company to
issue any policy" became:
limits. If there were personal jurisdiction, there could be a right of direct action if
Louisiana statutes provided it. Even in light of Rush and Shaffer, one might still contend the validity of this proposition. Rush involved quasi in rem jurisdiction through
attachment. If Louisiana achieves its personal jurisdiction through LA. R.S. 22:985 or
LA. R.S. 13:3474, could it grant a right of direct action on that basis? See Esteve v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 353, 356 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
54. Gager v. Teche Transfer Co., 143 So. 62 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932) (so far as
opinion reflects, policy issued in Louisiana); Rossville Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis
Sheen Transfer Co., 18 La. App. 725, 138 So. 183 (Orl. 1931) (same).
55. Robbins v. Short, 165 So. 512 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936) (injury in Louisiana;
policy issued in Missouri contained "no action" clause; court held Direct Action Statute
was procedural in nature, deprived the insurer of no substantive right, and thus could
be applied by the forum state even though the contract was governed by a different
provision under Missouri law; court seemed unaware of fact that the Louisiana statute
did not by its terms grant a direct action when the injury occurred here); Stephenson
v. List Laundry & Dry Cleaners, 182 La. 383, 162 So. 19 (1935) (injury in Louisiana;
policy issued in Texas).
56. See Wheat v. White, 38 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. La. 1941) (statute not applicable
to insurance contract issued in Mississippi).
57. Rogers v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. La. 1945) (statute
applicable, as merely procedural, to contract issued in District of Columbia when injury occurred in Louisiana).
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No policy or contract of liability insurance shall be issued or
delivered in this State, unless it contains [a right of direct action]
58

Very shortly after the amendment, in Belanger v. Great American
Indemnity Co., 9 a federal district judge ruled in a diversity case that
a direct action was available only as to policies issued or delivered
in Louisiana and not in actions on out-of-state policies concerning instate injuries. His reasoning was two-fold. First, the state decisions
holding the contrary were decided under Act 55 of 1930, which had
been repealed by the legislature, with full knowledge of the cases,
in the revision which produced the above language."0 Second, application of the Direct Action Statute to an out-of-state contract would
be unconstitutional, depriving the insurer of substantive rights.
As we have seen, the legislature acted promptly (perhaps in
response to Belanger) to clarify the Direct Action Statute by adding
the perplexing language of Act 541 of 1950." 1 This amendment stated
that the right of direct action existed whether the policy "was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not, and whether or not
such policy [contained] a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana."
The legislature also passed Act 542 of 1950, requiring foreign insurers
to consent to a direct action in order to obtain a certificate of authority
to do business here, with the same proviso as contained in Act 541.2
Given the ambiguity of the amendment, the change eliminated
neither the confusion over the meaning of the statute nor its constitutionality. The opening portion of the statute now mentioned
policies "issued or delivered" in Louisiana, but the amendment
specified the right of direct action existed whether the policy was

58. 1948 La. Acts, No. 195, S 14.45.
59. 89 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. La. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 188 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1951).
60. The writing judge did not note, however, that Act 55 of 1930 also did not
contain any reference to injuries occurring within the state but this had not prevented
the state courts from applying the statute to out-of-state contracts covering such injuries. He opined that the 1948 amendment resulted from the legislature's recognition
of the "risk" inherent in the "possibility of Section 14.45 being declared unconstitutional as applied to out of state liability policies," and thus the amendment "specifically limited its application to policies issued in Louisiana." 89 F. Supp. at 738.
61. Senate Concurrent Resolution 13 of 1950, passed early in the session, stated
that it was "never the intention" of the legislature in enacting Act 195 of 1948 "to
repeal, amend, limit or in any wise restrict the application of Act 253 of 1918 as amended
by Act 55 of 1930 in so far as that Act [provided] a direct action against liability
insurers."
62. Now appearing as LA. R.S. 22:983(E) (1950). This is not a grant of personal
jurisdiction over such insurers, but rather their agreement that they consent to be
subject to the Direct Action Statute.
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"written or delivered" in Louisiana or not, provided the accident or
injury occurred here. Read as a whole, the statute now could have
called for application of the direct action (a) only to cases of in-state
injury, regardless of the place of issuance or delivery of the policy
or (b) to cases in which either the policy was issued or delivered here
or the injury occurred here. To the extent it was read to continue
to apply the direct action to out-of-state contracts, constitutional problems also might be presented.
Belanger and the legislative amendments opened a brief period
of total confusion as to the application of the statute. One federal judge
first ruled that the statute could be applied to out-of-state insurance
contracts 3 and then changed his mind. 4 Another federal judge in the
same district agreed with that original position, 5 but many other
judges disagreed."
In such cases, there appeared to be a trend toward concluding
that there were constitutional problems with applying the statute to
outof-state contracts. These decisions were not as concerned with
the specific language of the statute as with the validity of its application to out-of-state contracts. No matter what the reading chosen for
the statute, it was clearly the minimum legislative intent that it be
applied to out-of-state contracts and in-state injuries.
At the same time, a line of cases was developing involving out-ofstate injuries and in-state contracts. Here, the constitutional problems
were less serious or perhaps non-existent, but the interpretation of
the statute itself was essential. In many instances, the 1950 amendment was interpreted as denying application of the statute to out-ofstate injuries altogether.67
63. Bouis v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 91 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. La. 1950) (he did
so by applying Acts 541 and 542 of 1950 retroactively to cure the problems expressed
in Belanger, after determining that the statute was procedural only in nature).
64. Bayard v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1951) (statute
is substantive in nature).
65. Buxton v. Midwestern Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. La. 1952) (aided by
the application of LA. R.S. 22:983(E) and out-of-state insurer's consent to direct action proceedings under that statute).
66. Bish v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 102 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1952) (the
judge who had changed his mind, adhering to his second position); Mayo v. Zurich
Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 106 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. La. 1952) (same); Fisher v.
Home Indem. Co., 198 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1952); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Eunice
Rice Milling Co., 198 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1952).
67. Weingartner v. Fidelity Mut. Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1953) (1950 amendment read at face value, meaning no application to out-of-state injuries regardless of
place of contract; Rives, J., specially concurring and offering opinion that 1950 amendment was an attempt to reach out-of-state contracts, not an attempt to deny application to in-state contracts); Hidalgo v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 205 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1953).
In the state courts, the same position was adopted with almost no discussion what-
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The constitutional objections to an application of the statute to
out-of-state contracts when an in-state injury had occurred were removed in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.68 The plaintiff was a Louisiana citizen injured in Louisiana by a product purchased here. The defendant was an insurer authorized to do, and doing, business here, and it had consented to be sued by direct action
under 22:983(E). The policy in question was issued and delivered in
states other than Louisiana. The defendant objected to both the Direct
Action Statute itself and the consent statute on constitutional grounds,
when applied to out-of-state policies. A unanimous court upheld such
an application of the statute, emphasizing Louisiana's interest in protecting those injured within its borders.69 The court found no denial
of equal protection, since domestic and foreign insurers were treated
alike on the question of availability of a direct action. Since the statute
was effective before the policy at issue was written, the court found
no impairment of the obligation of contract by application of the
statute. The court also found no violation of due process requirements
because of the importance of Louisiana's interest in persons injured
here and, for the same reason, no basis in the full faith and credit
clause to deny Louisiana the right to enforce its direct action statute.
Subsequent to Watson, there has been no serious contention that Louisiana can not apply the statute to cases involving in-state injuries
and out-of-state contracts.
But there remained after Watson the problem of statutory interpretation, one largely without constitutional overtones. Could the
legislature by its 1950 amendments have intended to deny the right
of direct action on in-state contracts when the injury occurred out
of state? This question was answered in the celebrated decision of
Webb v. Zurich Insurance Co." Several prominent Louisiana citizens
died in an airplane crash in Michigan, allegedly through the negligence
of another Louisiana citizen who was piloting the plane. A policy covering the operation of the plane had been obtained in Louisiana from
the defendant's agent here. Zurich had successfully urged in the courts
below that no direct action could be brought against it because the
1950 amendments to the statute had limited the direct action to in-

soever. Kay v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 158 So. 2d 422 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 245 La. 578, 159 So. 2d 288 (1964); Nicholson v. Atlas Assur. Corp., 156
So. 2d 245 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 La. 461, 158 So. 2d 612 (1963); Honeycutt
v. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 130 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Blount
v. Blount, 125 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
68. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
69. Justice Frankfurter concurred, preferring to rest his decision on the constitutionality of the consent statute. 348 U.S. at 74.
70. 251 La. 558, 205 So. 2d 398 (1967).
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stances of injuries within the state." The supreme court undertook
to review the entire history of the Direct Action Statute on the point
and concluded that despite the plain language of the proviso enacted
in 1950, the legislature had no intent to limit the direct action remedy
to in-state injuries.
The majority opinion deserves brief comment, particularly since
it has remained the standard by which the applicability of the Direct
Action Statute is measured. The most charitable thing that can be
said of the opinion is that it announced what the writing justice believed the legislature "must have meant" or "could have enacted"'"
as opposed to the meaning to be derived from the plain language of
the enactment. In order to reach this conclusion, the majority had
to dispose of the contention by the defendant that it was attempting
to amend the statute judicially.
The majority took the view that the predecessors to the 1948 and
1950 statutes, although mentioning only issuance of the policy and
not the place of injury, had been applied by some courts to out-ofstate policies so long as the injury occurred in Louisiana.73 Against
this background and the refusal by the federal court in Belanger to
apply the statute to an out-of-state contract even with an in-state
injury,7 4 the court saw the 1950 amendment as an effort to extend
the direct action remedy to claims involving out-of-state contracts on
the relatively safe constitutional ground of in-state injury.7 5 It was
thus able to conclude that the proviso applied only to out-of-state contracts and should not be interpreted as narrowing the applicability
71. Plaintiffs apparently did not contend that since the actions were wrongful
death actions for the loss they suffered, the "injury" occurred in Louisiana, although
the "accident" occurred in Michigan. Such a contention, if successful, would have obviated the discussion of applicability of the statute altogether. Cf. Hebert v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 400 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
72. I.e., constitutionally. As the decision in Watson v. Employers' Liab. Assur.
Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), demonstrated, Louisiana could apply its direct action statute
to out-of-state contracts so long as in-state injuries were at issue. But the real question was whether the Louisiana legislature meant that and only that by its proviso
added by Act 541 of 1950. It could have stated more simply and directly that the
right of direct action exists on a contract written outside the state so long as the
injury or accident occurred in the state. Then there would have been no doubt that
the applicability of the statute to in-state contracts was not affected by the extension
to out-of-state contracts under certain circumstances.
73. See notes 55 & 57, supra.
74. See text at note 59 and following, supra.
75. See Taylor v. Fishing Tools, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. La. 1967); Note,
Insurance-Conflict of Laws-Direct Action, 15 Loy. L. REV. 174 (1968). Perhaps, this
is also demonstrated by the deletion from the bill during the legislative process of
an alternative ground for application of the statute which might have been thought
to be doubtful from a constitutional standpoint: residency of the injured person or
his heirs in Louisiana.
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of the statute to in-state contracts with an in-state injury requirement. The court dismissed the 1962 gubernatorial veto of a bill to
delete the proviso on the ground that the veto's purpose was simply
to avoid conflict with a bill changing venue under the statute and
the veto did not show disapproval of the view the court now
expressed.6
When all was said and done, the court reached the conclusion as
to application of the statute which has continued to the present. The
direct action is available to a claimant when either of these two facts
is present:
" the policy was issued or delivered in Louisiana or
77
" the accident or injury occurred in Louisiana.
Invitations to extend the applicability of the statute to insurers over
whom Louisiana has personal jurisdiction when the policy was issued
out of state and the injury occurred out of state have been declined.
In Esteve v. Allstate Insurance Co.,78 the plaintiff was a Louisiana resident injured in Florida while riding in a car owned by another Louisiana resident and operated by a third Louisiana resident. The other
involved driver was a Florida resident insured under a policy issued
in Florida by Allstate, an insurer foreign to Louisiana but authorized
to do, and doing, business here. There was apparently no dispute as
to the existence of jurisdiction in the Louisiana courts over Allstate.
Rather, the issue was whether there was a right of direct action
against Allstate under the foregoing facts. Both lower courts had re79
jected any right of direct action in plaintiff against Allstate.
Plaintiff argued in the supreme court that the existence of personal jurisdiction over Allstate in the Louisiana courts also should
determine the question of a right of direct action. We have seen earlier
that the questions are separate, but Louisiana might have been able

76. 251 La. at 578 n.17, 205 So. 2d at 405 n.17.
77. Subsequent to Webb, a right of direct action was denied when neither of these
facts was present. Cambre v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 585 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 434, 435 (La. 1976), Morse v. Hartford Cas. Ins.
Co., 301 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); see also Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Barge
W-701, 654 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1981) (accident in Gulf more than three miles offshore;
policy written in London and delivered in Texas).
78. 351 So. 2d 117 (La. 1977).
79. Esteve v. Allstate Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977). Judge
Lemmon dissented on the ground that plaintiff could bring her direct action in either
Louisiana or Florida as a third-party beneficiary under the insurance contract. He also
noted in an appendix that either Louisiana or Florida would permit a direct actionbased in tort, inferentially accepting the proposition that Louisiana would grant a direct
action in a case involving an out-of-state contract and out-of-state injury. 343 So. 2d
at 356-58.
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to so provide had it chosen to do so. Since it had not, plaintiff's argument on that point was summarily dismissed. Plaintiff also argued
that the Direct Action Statute itself should be broadly construed to
include her claim, but the court held that Webb represented the maximum extent to which the statute could be given application." Decisions subsequent to Esteve have maintained the Webb boundaries,"'
and no serious effort has been made to test the constitutional fringes
of the direct action provision by equating the direct action remedy
with the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over an insurer.
Venue
Assuming the existence of jurisdiction over the insurer and the
availability of the direct action against it, proper venue for such an
action has not proved difficult to establish. Since 1930, the statute
consistently has provided proper venue in the parish in which the
accident or injury occurred."' From 1930 until its amendment in 1956,
the other proper venue under the statute was the parish of the
domicile of the insured. In 1956, the domicile of the insurer or its
"principal place of business" was added as a proper venue.' 5 Finally,
80. See note 53, supra.
81. Justice Tate concurred, arguing that the real issue was whether LA. R.S.
22:985 gave the Louisiana courts jurisdiction over Allstate on a foreign cause of action to decide whether plaintiff had a direct action under Florida law. Since he determined that Florida law would not permit the plaintiff to proceed directly against an
insurer without joining the insured and she had not done so, Justice Tate could agree
with the result reached by the majority. He also agreed that the Louisiana Direct
Action Statute would not cover her claim, but he found this issue to be irrelevant.
351 So. 2d at 121-22.
82. See Vincent v. Penrod Drilling Co., 372 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
83. See Richburg v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 74 F. Supp. 442 (W.D. La.
1947) (when accident occurred in any of the parishes falling within a federal district,
venue was proper in that district within appropriate division; accident did not have
to occur in parish in which court happened to sit).
84. It was held, rather rigidly, that the domicile of the actual defendant, the insurer, was not a proper venue. E.g., Miller v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 199 La.
515, 6 So. 2d 646 (1942); Note, Venue of Direct Action Against Tortfeasor's InsurerLouisiana Act 55 of 1930, 4 LA. L. REV. 455 (1942). This result was ultimately overcome by legislative amendment. See 1956 La. Acts, No. 475; Grand v. American Gen.
Ins. Co., 241 La. 733, 131 So. 2d 46 (1961).
85. 1956 La. Acts, No. 475. As to the meaning of "principal place of business,"
see Aetna Ins. Co. v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 124 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960).
The flawed nature of this amendment led to some confusion. The amendment left the
venue provision reading:
The injured person . . . shall have a right of direct action against the insurer
...in the parish where the accident or injury occurred or in the parish where
the insured or insurer is domiciled, and said action may be brought against the
insurer alone or against both the insured and insurer, jointly and in solido, at
either of their domiciles or principal place of business in Louisiana.
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in 1962, following the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
venue provisions were amended to read as they do today, providing
a proper venue in (1) the parish in which the accident or injury
occurred or (2) any parish in which an action could be brought against
the insured or the insurer under article 42 of the Code of Civil
Procedure." Article 42, in turn, .contains the general rule that a defendant may be sued at his domicile, with a designation of domicile by
law for nonresidents and foreign corporations.
The only real problem posed by the venue provisions as they
presently stand is the question of whether the reference to article
42 of the Code of Civil Procedure "picks up" the various supplementary venue provisions of that code, some preferred and some alternative. This problem was first addressed by the supreme court in Surridge v. Benanti 7 As is commonly the case, the battleground was
nominally proper venue, but the real issue was prescription. If venue
is proper, mere filing of suit interrupts prescription. If improper, only
service will interrupt prescription.88 If that service comes after the
prescriptive period has expired, the plaintiff is without authority to
proceed to the merits.
In Surridge, the accident happened in Jefferson Parish, the tortfeasor was domiciled in St. Bernard Parish, and the foreign insurer
was deemed to be domiciled in East Baton Rouge Parish. The suit
was filed in Orleans Parish. The "principal place of business" of the
insurer had been deleted as a proper venue by the 1962 amendments,
and it appeared that only the first three parishes would be proper
venues under the statute and article 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
To withstand the anticipated plea of prescription, plaintiff argued that
Orleans Parish was also a proper venue under article 77 of the Code
In Finn v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 141 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962), suit
was brought in the parish in which the accident occurred against both the tortfeasor
and the insurer. Neither of the defendants had a domicile or principal place of business
in the parish of suit. Defendants contended that a suit against both of them could
be brought only in the domicile of one or the other. The court rejected the argument,
holding that the "jointly and in solido" language applied to all possible venues. Act
471 of 1962 clarified the language and codified this result.
86. 1962 La. Acts, No. 471. See Hobbs v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 339 So.
2d 28 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 896 (La. 1977) (proper venue
in parish of tortfeasor's domicile is not lost by tortfeasor's death).
87. 261 La. 282, 259 So. 2d 324 (1972). There was an inference in Lavergne v.
Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 208 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968), that as to
the foreign insurer, only those venues enumerated in the Direct Action Statute would
be proper, without reference to the Code of Civil Procedure. The inference was criticized
in Tate, Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-68 Term-Civil Procedure,
29 LA. L. REV. 269, 274-276 (1969).
88. LA. R.S. 9:5801, repealed by 1982 La. Acts, No. 274 (effective Jan. 1, 1983).
Its substance is now found in LA. CIv. CODE art. 3462.
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of Civil Procedure. That article provides that "[an action against a
person having a business office or establishment in a parish other
than that where he may be sued under Article 42, on a matter over
which this office or establishment had supervision, may be brought
in the parish where this office or establishment is located."
The court properly held that the language in the Direct Action
Statute referring to the "general rules of venue prescribed by Art.
42" must be interpreted to include the so-called exceptions to the rules
of general venue provided in the following code articles. Thus plaintiffs technique was correct. However, despite an ingenious argument
that "person" in article 77 meant "corporation" and that "corporation"
in turn meant "insurer," the court held that article 77 would not provide an additional venue in the case. Plaintiff had not shown that an
office in Orleans had supervision over the policy in question.
The court in Davis v. Hanover Insurance Co., 9 however, confused
matters somewhat, reaching the right conclusion for the wrong
reasons. Again, prescription was the real issue although venue was
the point under discussion. The accident happened in Jefferson Davis
Parish. Plaintiff was a guest passenger, and the domiciles of the two
potential tortfeasors were Calcasieu and Vermilion Parishes. Their insurers were Hanover and Travelers, both deemed to be domiciled in
East Baton Rouge Parish. Suit against the two insurers was filed in
Calcasieu Parish before the prescriptive period expired, but the insurers were served through the secretary of state after the period
expired. As the court of appeal correctly noted, if venue was proper
in Calcasieu, the suit was not prescribed. On the other hand, if venue
was improper, the suit was prescribed.
The insurer argued that under article 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, concerning suits against solidary obligors, venue would only
be proper in Calcasieu if the tortfeasor domiciled there were made
a defendant, which he was not.9" The plaintiff argued that since the
reference in the Direct Action Statute was only to article 42 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the legislature did not intend to refer to
or incorporate any of the other venue articles. In effect, plaintiff
argued -that venue was proper as to the insurer in any venue which
was proper as to the insured under article 42. Since the insured could
always be sued at his domicile, it was clear under this argument that
venue was proper in Calcasieu.
The court accepted plaintiff's argument, holding that the "excep89. 289 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
90. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 73: "An action against joint or solidary obligors may
be brought in any parish of proper venue, under Article 42, as to any obligor who
is made a defendant."
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tions" to venue were not incorporated. Thus it overruled the plea of
prescription as to Hanover (the insurer of the Calcasieu domiciliary)
and Travelers (whose insured was a Vermilion domiciliary). The result
is clearly correct, but the decision should not have been based on
non-incorporation of the supplemental venue rules. The court simply
should have said that application of the rule of article 73 that one
solidary obligor could be sued in a parish of proper venue as to another
if that other also was named as a defendant would be counter to the
consistent and clear public policy behind the Direct Action Statute.
The whole thrust of the statute is to authorize a suit against the insurer without joining the insured. Application of the general rule of
article 73 to the specific situation of the Direct Action Statute would
frustrate that policy altogether. The court simply should have said
that the 1962 amendment was inartfully drawn and the drafters should
have given specific reference to the non-application of article 73.91
The court's opinion itself reflects the problems with using article
42 and ignoring the other articles. The court overruled the pleas of
prescription and improper venue as to Travelers as well. Travelers'
insured was domiciled in Vermilion. Thus, as to Travelers, if only
article 42 was used, the only proper venue would have been in Jefferson Davis, Vermilion, or East Baton Rouge. The only way to conclude that venue in Calcasieu was proper as to Travelers was to use
article 73: Travelers could be sued in Calcasieu because a "joint or
solidary obligor" (Hanover) was made a defendant there.
Very recently, in Meyers v. Smith,92 the supreme court appeared
to prefer the strict construction given the Direct Action Statute by
the Hanover opinion over its own earlier view in Surridge. The accident in question had occurred in St. John the Baptist Parish, and suit
was filed in Jefferson Parish against four defendants. The only
arguable basis for venue in Jefferson Parish was article 77 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, as applied to an insurer defendant said to be
"handling this claim" out of its office in Jefferson Parish. The two
lower courts had disagreed as to the plea of improper venue, with
the appellate court sustaining it and ordering' the case transferred
to St. John the Baptist Parish. In a three-judge plurality opinion, the
supreme court held that the Direct Action Statute should be read
literally to offer only those venues specified as proper in article 42
91. Article 73 is primarily aimed at defeating collusive joinder in an attempt to
establish venue. This is shown to some extent by the second paragraph of the article:
"If the action against this defendant is compromised prior to judgment, or dismissed
after a trial on the merits, the venue shall remain proper as to the other defendants,
unless the joinder was made for the sole purpose of establishing venue as to the other
defendants." See Greene v. Engolio, 257 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
92. 419 So. 2d 449 (La. 1982).
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of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court did not overrule Surridge,
choosing to treat its discussion of the issue as dicta.
There is no sound basis for the court's conclusion that the
legislature intended by its reference in the Direct Action Statute to
ignore the supplementary venue articles of the Code of Civil Procedure. While it is not implausible to argue that the peculiar wording
of the 1962 amendment to the Direct Action Statute limits venue to
Article 42 only, such an argument is inconsistent with the traditional
legislative treatment of the Direct Action Statute. Plaintiff should be
able to proceed in a proper venue under the terms of the Direct Action
Statute itself or under the complete venue provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
MEANING OF THE PHRASE "WITHIN THE TERMS AND
LIMITS OF THE POLICY"

One of the most important observations which can be made about
the Direct Action Statute is that its language and its judicial interpretations almost entirely remove the insurance contract from governance by the established principles of contract law. The contract
becomes one infused with important public policy concerns, and candidly described as written for the benefit of a non-party: the person
injured by the blameworthy conduct of one of the contracting parties.
Nowhere is this concept made clearer than in the interpretation of
the language of the statute granting a direct action to the injured
person "within the terms and limits of the policy."
We have seen in the section on the historical development of the
right of direct action that this phrase first entered the statute at its
inception in 1918 and referred only to the right which an injured party
had to sue the insurer after the insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured. When the true right of direct action without reference to the
solvency of the insured was proposed in 1930, it also was limited by
the phrase "within the terms and limits of the policy."
The 1930 legislature no doubt was aware- of the decision in
Edwards v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,93 decided in 1929. So far as the
opinion in the case reflects, the insurer had not received notice of
any incident involving its insured until eleven months after the incident, probably when suit was filed. After the plaintiff had successfully litigated the claim against the insured and had the execution returned nulla bona, he sought to recover from the insurer. To the insurer's defense that the "terms and limits of the policy" had been
violated by the lack of "immediate written notice" of the incident as
93.

11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (Orl. 1929).
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required by the policy, the court responded with announcement of
the principle which guides interpretations of the statute to this day.
It noted that if the insurer's position was accepted, the right given
to the injured party by the statute would depend upon the conduct
of the insured, over whom the injured party had no control. The court
opined that the legislature did not intend to make the right contingent
in that fashion. It observed:
It is quite true that Monahan's failure to give notice to his insurer would have prevented his recovery from the insurer, had
he himself paid the judgment . . ., but that is because Monahan
had so contracted. As between parties to a contract, the contract
itself is the law of the case. Here, however, the law of the case
is not found solely within the four corners of the policy of insurance, but is contained primarily in the statute to which we
have referred. 4
Committee amendments were offered to the bill in the 1930 legislature
and were adopted. These amendments are still found in the body of
the statute and provide the following limitation to the true right of
direct action proposed by the bill:
Provided that nothing contained in this act shall be construed
to affect the provisions of the policy contract if the same are not
in violation of the laws of this State.
It being the intent of this act that any action brought hereunder
shall be subject to all of the lawful conditions of the policy contract and the defenses which could be urged by the insurer to
a direct action brought by the insured; provided the term and
conditions of such policy contract are not in violation of the laws
of this State."
Perhaps this was an effort to overrule Edwards on the point that
an insurer could not raise policy violations by the insured in a suit
brought by the injured party. If so, the effort was undermined by
a fifth column within the statute itself. The "terms and conditions"
of the policy could be urged as a defense, but not if they were "in
violation of the laws of this State." And if they frustrated the whole
foundation of the right of direct action, were they not "in violation"
of Louisiana law? If there were legislators sponsoring the amendments
who thought they were overruling Edwards on the point, they forgot
to notice the important paragraph in Edwards quoted earlier. The
contract was not just a contract any more. Its terms could not be
used, standing alone, to deny a right of direct action directly or indirectly.
94.
95.

11 La. App. at 178, 123 So. at 163.
1930 La. Acts, No. 55.
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This position was made clear in the early cases interpreting the
phrase "within the terms and limits of the policy." In U-Drive-It Car
Co. v. Freidman," the insured had signed a statement following the
accident admitting that he was solely to blame for the accidentY When
sued directly by the plaintiff, the insurer contended that the statement violated the obligation of the insured under the policy to cooperate fully in the defense of the matter, as well as the obligation
not "to voluntarily assume any liability" without the consent of the
insurer. Citing Edwards, the court held that such a breach of the
obligation might be raised to defeat the insured's claim for indemnity
against the insurer after paying a judgment, 8 but it could not be raised
to defeat the claim of the injured person.
The breach of the insurance contract most commonly urged, both
in the earlier and more recent cases, is the failure of the insured to
give the insurer notice of the accident. In a very early case, such
a breach was held to bar a direct action against the insurer by the
injured party.9 However, the court's authority was a case refusing
to permit indemnity and enforcement of the contract in a suit between
the insured and the insurer after the insured had paid a judgment.' 0
The supreme court was able to duck the question in an early case
by interpreting the policy to require "reasonable" notice of the accident and determining that no breach of the requirement had been
proven;' but even in that case, there were indications that proof of
such a breach would not bar the direct action. As this line of cases
96. 153 So. 500 (La. App. Orl. 1934). The writing judge was the same one who
had decided Edwards. He candidly conceded that the decision had drawn considerable
criticism. He repeated his remark in Bougon v. Volunteers of Am., 151 So. 797, 802
(La. App. Orl. 1934), concerning such criticism:
We realize that the current of judicial authority is usually right, and therefore
that we are probably wrong, but, if so, the mists of misunderstanding have not
cleared, and we are still enveloped in the Plutonian darkness of error, for we
arise from a reconsideration of that case with a new and more abiding faith in
itscorrectness.
97. The insured was a person who under modern policies would be described as
an omnibus insured, driving the insured vehicle with the permission of the named
insured.
98. The court quibbled with the insurer's characterization of the statement as
an "assumption of liability." The court suggested that he "merely admitted fault on
his part" and did not assume any liability. However, it then treated the case as one
in which he had actually assumed liability, and it addressed the question of breach
of the insurance contract.
99. Howard v. Rowan, 154 So. 382 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934) (delay of 44 days). There
is an approving analysis in Note, Public Liability Insurance: The Injured Person'sRight
of Recovery When the Policy Holder Fails to Give Immediate Notice to the Insurer, 10
TUL. L. REV. 69 (1935).
100. Dennis Sheen Transfer v. Georgia Casualty Co., 163 La. 969, 113 So. 165 (1927).
101. Jones v. Shehee-Ford Wagon & Harness Co., 183 La. 293, 163 So. 129 (1935)
(26 days).
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was developing, insurers did not help themselves by technical
arguments that although they had received notice, it was not the right
kind of notice." 2
Finally, in West v. Monroe Bakery,"3 the supreme court faced the
issue squarely. Suit had been filed only against the insured, one day
short of a year after the accident. About a week later, the insured
sent a copy of the petition to the insurer, which claimed that was
the first notice of the accident which it had received. The insurer
was made a party by supplemental petition some four months later.
The court reviewed all the prior cases and concluded that with very
few exceptions, the consistent holding of the decisions was that the
Direct Action Statute conferred... substantive rights on third parties to contracts of public liability
insurance, which become -vested at the moment of the accident
in which they [were] injured, subject only to such defenses as the
tort-feasor himself [might] legally interpose. The facts in each case
[might] be different, but . . . the result [had] been the same-the
upholding of the statutorily granted right against the insurer
regardless of a stipulation to the contrary between the insurer
and the insured in the policy contract and regardless of dilatory
conduct on the insured's part in giving notice.'
Thus the court rejected the insurer's denial of coverage on the ground
of the insured's failure to notify of the accident.
This was an interesting way of phrasing the collective holdings.
The court recognized the immediate vesting of "substantive rights"
notion of Edwards and concurred in the earlier judicial limitations
102. In Davies v. Consolidated Underwriters, 199 La. 459, 6 So. 2d 351 (1942), the
notice issue concerned an optional omnibus insured coverage no longer found in Louisiana policies. A named insured could establish "optional" coverage under the policy
for a driver using the car with his permission by notifying the company within 30
days of such use and an accident. The court rejected the contention that the information conveyed by the named insured to the company through its local agent was merely
the required notice-of-accident and not the optional-coverage notice. He conveyed and
the company acknowledged by letter the occurrence of an accident while the vehicle
was being driven by his nephew.
103. 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950) (three justices dissenting). Prior to West,
the court had decided Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 211 La. 19, 29 So.
2d 177 (1946). In that case, the accident had occurred in March, but the potential
claimants told the insured that they would not be pursuing the matter. In June, they
told him they would pursue the matter, and he promptly informed the insurer. The
delay between incident and report was 82 days, but under the circumstances, the court
found no evidence of fraud or collusion and rejected the argument of no coverage.
However, the issue was said to be one which had to be determined on a case-by-case
basis, leaving open the possibility that some delayed notices of accident might defeat
coverage as to the injured party.
104. 217 La. at 191, 46 So. 2d at 123 (emphasis in original).
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on the authority of the insurer to raise those defenses to the direct
action that it could raise in an action by its own insured. Although
the insurer could raise the defense of policy breach against its own
insured, the nature of the direct action in the injured person had been
interpreted to deny this defense in a direct action suit. But the court
also added that the injured person's right of direct action was subject to the defenses which the tortfeasor himself could interpose, a
phrase not found in the statute or, indeed, in any previous case. No
doubt the court simply was attempting to make the point that since
the tortfeasor could not raise his own breach of a contract with the
insurer as a defense in a suit against him by the injured person,
neither could the insurer in a suit by the injured person. However,
the court's language also could be read to mean that the insurer could
use any defense in the direct action which the tortfeasor could have
used, a proposition which was problematic then 1 5 and now.' °6
The West decision did not enjoy immediate popularity.' 7 What
seemed finally to emerge as the rule applied by the appellate courts
was a hybrid of the West rationale and some factors mentioned earlier
by the supreme court in its decision in Jackson v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co."°8 In suggesting a case-by-case approach to
the question of failure to notify, the court in Jackson reasoned that
one should consider the time when the involved parties became aware
that substantial injury had been done, or that a claim would be made;
the time when the injured party discovered the existence and identity
of the insurance carrier; prejudice to the insurer's defense by the

105. By this time, the courts already had begun to hold that certain personal
defenses of the insured were not available to the insurer. See note 20, supra. These
cases were exactly contrary to the concept expressed in the West opinion. The court's
statement in West is probably dicta, since no question of defenses available to the
tortfeasor was under discussion.
106. See text at notes 120-165, infra.
107. West was followed in Churchman v. Ingram, 56 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951),
a case involving a claim of failure of the insured to cooperate with the insurer. It
was cited as controlling in Kimball v. Audubon Ins. Co., 103 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1958), although the court also noted, after statement of the holding, that there
was nothing in the record of the case to deprive plaintiffs of the right of direct action,
suggesting again that some types of failure to notify might be sufficient to support
a denial of coverage. And it was rejected in New Zealand Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 123
F. Supp. 642 (W.D. La. 1954), holding that it could apply only to breaches of the policy
by the insured subsequent to the accident, not to those breaches preceding the accident.
To some extent, West may have been codified by the 1956 amendment to the statute
declaring that all liability policies "within their terms and limits are executed for the
benefit of all injured persons . . . to whom the insured is liable." 1956 La. Acts, No.
475. One of the justices who dissented in West later thought so. See Futch v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co., 246 La. 688, 700, 166 So. 2d 274, 278-79 (1964).
108. 211 La. 19, 29 So. 2d 177 (1946). See note 103, supra.
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delay; good faith of the insured and the injured party; and any circumstances indicating fraud or collusion. The combination of the two
supreme court opinions has led the appellate courts to uphold the
denial of coverage argument only when prejudice to the defense or
fraud has been established, a difficult burden in most cases. There
was no prejudice when the insured discovered for the first time seven
months after the incident that he might have coverage and promptly
notified the insurer."9 Nor was prejudice shown when there was a
five-month delay in notice of the filing of suit, at least when suit was
still pending and the insurer had received actual notice of the accident and had investigated it.' 10 Even in the extreme case of lack of
notice until the insurer was named in an amended petition five years
after the accident, no prejudice was established.'" Fraud or collusion
also is difficult to establish, and indeed, there is no reported case in
which coverage has been denied on that basis."'
It has been suggested that prejudice might be established when
the insurer can demonstrate that the failure to give notice was not
of the incident but of the suit itself, so that the insurer's opportunity
to defend itself was affected."' The strength of this proposition is
doubtful. Some of the cases which might support it involve actions
by the insured against the insurer, usually for indemnity or attorney's

109. Reid v. Monticello, 44 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950). The suit was still
pending at the time of notice, and the insurer was not even made a party to the suit
until five months after notice.
110. Miller v. Marcantel, 221 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969) (not truly a direct
action suit; ruling came on propriety of dismissal of third-party demand of insured
against insurer to provide defense and indemnity; court applied reasoning earlier applied to right of injured party to proceed against insurer and not be denied coverage
on the basis of a non-prejudicial breach of the contract).
111. Chennault v. Dupree, 398 So. 2d 169 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981) (the original action
was still pending). In Champion v. Panel Era Mfg. Co., 410 So. 2d 1230 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1982), the lenient Louisiana rule on failure to notify, rather than the strict Texas
rule, was applied to a suit against a Texas manufacturer, a Texas primary insurer,
and an excess insurer foreign to both Louisiana and Texas. Interest analysis was used.
112. O'Neal v. Southern Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 325 So. 2d 887 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1976) (denial of coverage possible on basis of conspiracy between injured party and
insured to defraud insurer, but "not one scintilla of evidence" to support it); King
v. King, 253 La. 270, 217 So. 2d 395 (1968) (later inconsistent statement more favorable
to insured's wife, who was the claimant; no proof of fraud); Freyou v. Marquette Cas.
Co., 149 So. 2d 697 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), and authorities there cited (altered statement did not prove fraud); American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gresham, 195 F.2d 616 (5th
Cir. 1952). See also Elba v. Thomas, 59 So. 2d 732 (La. App. Orl. 1952) (no showing
of failure to cooperate because insured husband failed to testify to refute damaging
testimony about his intoxication).
113. Note, Insurance-DirectAction-Breach of Notice Requirements as Defense, 24
LA. L. REV. 118 (1963).
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fees after completion of an earlier suit by the injured party against
the insured."' The policy reasons which support an expansive view
of the Direct Action Statute are not present in such cases, and thus
it is not surprising that the courts are willing to enforce the insurance
contract as written between the two parties to the agreement. In other
cases, the court has rejected arguments based on facts that even more
directly affect the insurer's opportunity to defend itself, such as the
insured's failure to appear for trial"5 or the lack of notice to an excess
insurer until after the lower court judgment has become executory." 6
There is one decision involving a true direct action which supports the proposition that when the failure to give notice of suit is
such that the insurer is being asked to pay a claim to the injured
party as to which there is no opportunity for defense, prejudice is
established. In Hallman v. Marquette Casualty Co., 7 an omnibus insured had an accident and the named insured informed the insurer.
The insurer investigated and decided to deny coverage if any claim
was pressed. A claim was finally brought, but only against the omnibus
insured. Neither the insurer nor the named insured was named, and
no notice of any kind was given to the insurer. That suit proceeded
to a default judgment which became final but was never paid. A few
months later, plaintiff learned of the insurance policy and brought
an action directly against the company. The insurer defended on the
ground that it never had been given an opportunity to defend the
suit on the merits. Since the judgment against the omnibus insured
was final and presumably the only request was that the insurer pay
it, there would be no opportunity to litigate the question of liability
on the merits."8
114. Branzaru v. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971) (insured hired own counsel, defended suit against him, and lost; notified insurer after
trial but before appeal delays had elapsed; insured could not enforce indemnity against
insurer because of breach of policy requirement of notice); Payton v. St. John, 188
So. 2d 647 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966) (insured cannot recover attorney's fees from insurer
after successful defense of action if insured violated policy terms as to notice). But
see Barnes v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 308 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975) (notice
to uninsured motorist carrier more than two years after incident did not establish
prejqdice sufficient to permit denial of coverage; direct action cases cited as authority).
115. Futch v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 246 La. 688, 166 So. 2d 274 (1964) (she was
beyond the subpoena power of the court).
116. Fakouri v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 378 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
The court noted that the policy in question specifically provided that "no action" would
lie against the insurer until the ultimate liability of the insured was determined by
final judgment. Notice came when the delay for suspensive appeal had run, but not
when the delay for a devolutive appeal had run. Moreover, the excess carrier stipulated
to the adequacy of the defense provided by the primary carrier at trial, but counsel
for the excess carrier was the same as counsel for the primary carrier.
117. 149 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
118. The opinion does not discuss an interesting possibility. Suppose that the claim-
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The court agreed with the insurer, rejecting coverage. It saw the
issue as res nova and cited no Louisiana cases at all, not even West.
The decision seems eminently fair, although the troublesome fact of
actual notice to the insurer of the incident itself remains. Some day,
a court might seize upon such a fact to impose upon the insurer the
burden of keeping watch on the involved party after the insurer's
investigation, in order to determine whether a suit is actually brought.
Such an extension of coverage would leave the prejudice defense
available only in cases of no notice of accident or suit, actual or implied, until after trial on the merits is complete.
It is sometimes said that the reason for the rule requiring proof
of actual prejudice before denial of coverage is to prevent insurers
from using the notice requirement to evade the fundamental protective purpose of the contract and to assure payment of liability claims
up to the policy limits for which they collected premiums." 9 This is
a reasonable position, and it is quite consistent with the public policy
behind the statute. But we should not lose sight of the effect on the
level of those very same premiums, payment of which is now made
compulsory as to all drivers, if we do not afford the insurer an opportunity to assert a defense on the merits. If, as in Hallman or
equivalent situations, the insurer is completely denied the opportunity
to make whatever defense it might deem appropriate, this denial cannot help but be reflected in increased premiums for the group which
purchases liability insurance. Such an increase is justifiable when some
policy violations occur but they do not seriously jeopardize the insurer's ability to defend itself and, indirectly, all of us who purchase
liability insurance. It is not justifiable when that ability is completely
eliminated.
DEFENSES PERSONAL TO THE INSURED

One of the most confusing but at the same time most important
principles governing the application of the Direct Action Statute is
that the insurer may not assert defenses which are "personal" to the
insured. Since this concept is not found anywhere in the statute itself,
its foundation is wholly jurisprudential. The statute contents itself
with a statement, which we have encountered earlier, that in a direct
action, the insurer may raise any defenses which it could raise in an
ant had offered to retry the law suit on the merits against the insurer. Would that
not have converted the case into one of simply a long delay in notice of the accident,
but no prejudice in defending the suit?
119. Champion v. Panel Era Mfg. Co., 410 So. 2d 1230, 1237 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982);
Fakouri v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 378 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979);
Miller v. Marcantel, 221 So. 2d 557, 559 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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action against it by its insured. 2 ' Defenses "personal to" the insured
would never play a part in a suit by the insured against the insurer,
and thus the statutory provision is of no assistance whatsoever.
However, when one seeks out the parameters of this principle
in the cases, he is met with a bewildering array of pronouncements
which either give no rationale at all for the proposition or propose
conflicting reasons for its existence. The courts were required to
fashion some rule and explain it, because of the nature of the direct
action itself. Once the insurer may be sued directly without the joining of the insured, it must be entitled to defend itself against the
claim of the injured party. But precisely what defenses it may raise
is quite another matter.
It is certain that the rule conceived by the courts is of illegitimate
birth. It first appeared in a trilogy of cases in which an issue of "personal" defense was not squarely presented and probably should never
have been discussed. The first of these was Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co."' The plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven
by her fianc6. Through his alleged negligence, she was injured. Three
days after the incident, she filed suit against the gentleman. On the
very next day, they were married. Exceptions filed on his behalf in
that suit were sustained, on the ground that a wife could not institute
a suit against her husband. While that ruling was on appeal,"' she
filed a second suit, naming the husband's insurer as a defendant. The
insurer raised the immunity of the husband (its insured) as a defense
and was successful in both lower courts."' The intermediate appellate
court, however, ruled for the insurer with the most cursory of opinions, observing erroneously that the Direct Action Statute provided
that an insurer could raise in a suit by a victim whatever defenses
the insured could have raised against the victim.
The supreme court reversed. Citing the Civil Code articles on
sureties 24 and solidary co-debtors"' and their inability to raise defenses
personal to the principal debtor or the other solidary co-debtors respectively and noting earlier cases in which a plea of "coverture" was
120. See text at notes 93-119, supra, for an opinion that this statement was not
completely accurate. It should be phrased as follows: The insurer can raise those
defenses which it could raise in an action against it by its insured which do not defeat
the public policy underlying the right of direct action in the victim.
121. 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935).
122. It ultimately was affirmed in Palmer v. Edwards, 155 So. 483 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1934).
123. Edwards v. Royal Indem. Co., 155 So. 472 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934).
124. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3036 & 3060.
125. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2098.
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held to be personal to the wife, 2 ' the court concluded that the insurer was not entitled to raise the defense. The court easily could
have reached the very same result, i.e., no defense by the insurer
based on the marriage, by simply observing that the tort occurred
prior to their marriage. It would follow logically that the rights of
the victim became fixed at that point and the subsequent marriage
of the individuals was irrelevant. Plaintiff had a cause of action against
the gentleman on the day of the accident, and it should have been
governed by the law in effect on that day. The law in effect on that
day authorized her to sue the insurer of the driver, who was not then
her husband. The defense raised by the insurer was inapplicable and
should not have been considered.
The second case was Ruiz v. Clancy,12 decided by the supreme
court about four months later. The surviving minor children were
suing, among other defendants, the administrator of the succession
of their father. They alleged that his negligence had caused the death
of their mother. Their father was an omnibus insured under a policy
issued by the insurer, and the insurer raised the defense of immunity
of the father from suits by his unemancipated children. The court properly observed that the suit was not by the children against the father,
but rather by them against the administrator of the father's succession. There was nothing in Louisiana law to prevent such a suit.
Moreover, whatever rationale might support an immunity in a parent
against suit by a child had disappeared, as family harmony and
discipline could hardly be disrupted after his death had occurred. Thus,
again, an immunity of the insured was not really an issue. But, again,
the insurer and the court apparently felt that it was. Citing Edwards,
the court concluded that an immunity of the parent was "personal"
to him and was not available to the insurer.
Finally, in Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of
America,12' the parents of a child who had drowned in a public swimming pool were proceeding against the insurer of the governmental
entity which operated the pool. The entity charged a fee for entrance
to the pool. When the case was first before the supreme court, it
held that if the operation of the pool by the entity was in a private
126. Kennedy v. Bossiere, 16 La. Ann. 445 (1862) (contractual suretyship). The statement was dicta in the case, however, because the court held that there was no showing that the husband was a surety for the wife. Thus any discussion of what defenses
might be available to a surety was inappropriate, but LA. CIv. CODE art. 3036, as it
then read, did provide that a person could become a surety as to an obligation for
which the principal debtor could be discharged upon a "merely personal" defense, such
as minority or being a married woman.
127. 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935).
128. 181 La. 630, 160 So. 121 (1935).
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or proprietary capacity for profit, the urged defense of governmental
immunity would not apply. After remand, the appellate court determined that governmental immunity would nonetheless apply to the
entity on other grounds but the immunity was personal to the insured and could not be urged by the insurer.2 9 Again, there were
clear grounds upon which the court could have concluded that immunity was not an issue: the entity was acting in a proprietary, not
governmental, capacity. But, again, the court announced the "personal
to the insured" rule for certain defenses, this time governmental
immunity.
In no one of these cases was the issue of the immunity of the
insured squarely presented, yet in rapid succession, the courts had
announced the rule that certain immunities were personal to the insured in the three fields in which immunities played a prominent role.
Despite the illegitimacy of its birth, the rule grew steadily into
adulthood. Subsequent to the above decisions, immunities between
spouses,'30 between a parent and a child,' and as to governmental
129. Rome v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of Am., 169 So. 132 (La. App. Orl.
1936) (overruling Loustalot v. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n, 164 So. 183
(La. App. Orl. 1935), which had held that when the entity acted in its governmental
capacity, that immunity could be raised by the insurer).
130. Harvey v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 6 So. 2d 774 (La. App. Orl. 1942)
(tort occurred after marriage, but court made no distinction); Scarborough v. St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co., 11 So. 2d 52 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942) (same; same result); LeBlanc
v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 202 La. 857, 13 So. 2d 245 (1943) (court simply cited
Edwards and Ruiz without any further discussion on the point); McHenry v. American
Employers' Ins. Co., 206 La. 70, 18 So. 2d 656 (1944) (fact that insured was wife and
claimant was husband did not change result, even though insurer argued that husband's recovery would be community property in which wife would share); Chapman
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 45 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950) (LeBlanc, Edwards,
and Ruiz cited without discussion); McDowell v. National Sur. Corp., 68 So. 2d 189
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 995 (1945), discussed in Note,

Insurance-Action Against Liability Insurer by Named Insured, 14 LA. L.

REV.

706

(1954), in which it is observed that the insurer might have avoided liability by specifying that its liability was to any person other than the named insured; Dowden v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 158 So. 2d 399 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); see also
United States v. Haynes, 445 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971) (insurer of serviceman could
not raise immunity against federal government, which had paid the medical expenses
of serviceman's dependent wife, injured through his negligence).
131. See Deshotel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 La. 567, 243 So. 2d 259 (1971), in which
the issue was actually imputation of negligence from the driver (son) to the passenger
(father) in order to bar the father's recovery in a direct action against the son's insurer. The court observed in passing that even if there were an immunity to suit
in favor of the son without a specific statutory basis, it would be personal to the
son and not available to the insurer. See also Note, Torts-Louisiana Civil Code Article

2318-Parent-ChildImmunity-Parent May Sue Child's Liability Insurer, 46 TUL. L.
REV. 563 (1972). For a treatment of the subject on a national scale, see Hollister,
Parent-ChildImmunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489
(1982).
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entities132 have been consistently treated as "personal" to the immune
party and not available to the insurer. The rule has been extended
to the defenses of insanity, 33 charitable immunity,3 limitation of liability to the value of the vessel in maritime proceedings, 33 and probably to the exclusiveness of a remedy under the Federal Tort Claims
Act against a governmental employee. 36 However, courts have refus132. Musmeci v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 146 So. 2d 496 (La. 1963) (ingenious argument advanced by defendant that
although governmental immunity was personal to a governmental entity, the doctrine
of respondent superior did not apply to such an entity; and if the entity thus was
not liable for the act of its employee, neither was the insurer; argument rejected,
largely on practical grounds that all the money paid for insurance coverage would
be paid for nothing); Brooks v. Bass, 184 So. 222 (La. App. Orl. 1938) (same governmental entity and insurer as in Rome, this time sued over an errant golf shot; allegation of operation for profit sufficient to overrule exception as to entity, and in any
event, such a defense not available to insurer). At the present time, the immunity
itself is almost completely a dead letter in light of LA. CONST. art. XII, S 10, which
abolishes it as to all suits for injury to person or property and as to all suits in contract.
133. Von Dameck v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 361 So. 2d 283 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1978), discussed in Note, Insanity, Intent, and Homeowner's Liability, 40 LA.
L. REV. 258 (1979). The only authority cited for the proposition that insanity is a personal defense was Simmons v. Clark, 64 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953), in which
the statement is wholly dicta. Simmons involved a suit against a surety to secure
a deficiency judgment after a judicial sale of the debtor's property without appraisal.
The court held that the defense to such an action which could have been raised by
the debtor under Louisiana law was not merely personal to him and could be raised
by the surety. The reference to insanity as a personal defense was in a list for
illustrative purposes, without any cited authority.
134. Lusk v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 199 So. 666 (La. App. Orl. 1941)
(claimant was visitor to charity hospital; court held charitable immunity inapplicable
as to guests and also observed that in any event, it would not be available to the
insurer as a defense); Messina v. Societe Francaise, 170 So. 801 (La. App. Orl. 1936)
(insurer could not raise defense of immunity for hospital; court did not determine
whether hospital was immune as governmental entity or as charitable entity). Charitable
immunity itself is now also a dead letter after Garlington v. Kingsley, 289 So. 2d 88
(La. 1974).
135. Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (at least when limitation of liability proceeding and direct
action are consolidated in same action); In re Independent Towing Co., 242 F. Supp.
950 (E.D. La. 1965). The issues in these matters are very complicated and are beyond
the scope of the present inquiry. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954);
Note, Admiralty-Direct Action Against Marine Insurer-Unavailabilityof Limitation
of Shipowner's Liability as a Defense, 40 TUL. L. REV. 150 (1965).
136. Danzy v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 380 So. 2d 1356 (La. 1980) (issue
not reached in case in which claimant had settled with and released federal government for claim based on postal service employee's negligence; lower court had indicated
that exclusivity of remedy statute under Federal Tort Claims Act would not be personal to the employee and could be raised by the insurer in a later direct action against
it; supreme court held that there could be no recovery against the insurer because
the settlement released it as well, but the court indicated in a lengthy footnote, 380
So. 2d at 1359-60 n.5, that it disagreed with the treatment of the defense as not personal).
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ed to extend it to-and have thus preserved insurer defenses
involving- prescription,' 37 contributory negligence and similar affirmative defenses, statutory immunity under the state workers' compensation act" or the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,"3 and a "red letter clause" in a ship repair contract limiting
the liability of the repairer to a designated amount. 40 The reasons
why a defense "personal" to the insured should not be available to
the insurer and the distinction between those defenses "personal" to
the insured and those which are "general" are sometimes difficult to
discern. But to that task we must now turn before making some observations about the policies underlying the rule and its future
interpretations.
The development of this rule is a fascinating judicial exercise in
which the courts have wandered about from one explanation to
another, finally stumbling into a rather solid position showing sensitivity to the various conflicting public policies which underlie this
area of the law. All of this has occurred with minimal assistance from
the legislature, which more often than not simply followed the courts'
lead by codifying important aspects of the decisions.
The first rationale was offered in the Edwards opinion holding
that the immunity of a spouse to suit by the other could not be pleaded
by the liability insurer. The supreme court quoted article 3036 of
the Civil Code to the effect that a person could become a surety "for
an obligation of which the principal debtor might get a discharge by
an exception merely personal to him, such as that of being a minor,
or a married woman.. 4 It also quoted article 3060, specifying that

137. Reeves v. Globe Indem. Co., 185 La. 42, 168 So. 488 (1936) (by inference, since
the court held that if there had been no interruption, to be determined on remand,
insurer's defense of prescription was valid); Soirez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 168 So. 2d
418 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (wife argued that she could not sue husband in tort and
that prescription could not run against one who could not act; court noted she could
have sued the insurer and did not do so timely, upholding its plea of prescription).
138. Carlisle v. State, Through Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 400 So. 2d 284 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1981) (defense not personal as to co-employee; can be raised by insurer); Kelley
v. M & M Dodge, Inc., 370 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Guidry v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 359 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978) (defense not personal to employer);
Dandridge v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 192 So. 887 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) (not personal
as to employer; can be raised by insurer).
139. Nations v. Morris, 483 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1973); Hughes v. Chitty, 283 F. Supp.
734 (E.D. La. 1968), affd on other grounds, 415 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1969).
140. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Charles Ferran & Co., 443 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1971).
141. The article was amended by Act 711 of 1979 to eliminate the reference to
the personal defense of being a married woman, since it would no longer exist as
to a contract. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1979), the interspousal immunity statute, also was
amended in the same act, but the immunity as to delictual obligations was not changed.
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in such a case, the surety could not raise those defenses which were
personal to the debtor; rather, it could raise only those defenses "inherent in the debt."" Although the court never said so explicitly,
the obvious conclusion to be reached was that the insurer was either
a surety or should be treated as one, and thus its defenses would
be only those which a surety could raise.
The analogy was imperfect, as the court probably knew. The contracts of suretyship and liability insurance are similar, but they certainly are not identical. A surety has the right of reimbursement
against the principal debtor if it is compelled to pay the debt, and
an insurer does not have that right. In theory, the contract of insurance should be more expensive than a contract of suretyship as
to the same potential exposure. Moreover, the contract of indemnity
insurance which had been standard at the turn of the century and
which was more analogous to suretyship had been replaced by contracts of liability insurance, which might be (and, in fact, would be)
interpreted differently. Finally, article 3035 of the Civil Code defines
suretyship as an "accessory promise by which a person binds himself
for another already bound, and agrees . . . to satisfy the obligation,
if the debtor does not." The insured is not already bound when the
contract is written, and the insurer's agreement to pay is not conditioned on non-payment by the insured.
Indeed, later in the Edwards opinion, the court noted that the
two contracts were different, but it never explained why its earlier
use of the suretyship articles was nonetheless appropriate. Shortly
after the Edwards opinion, the supreme court seemed to back away
from the suretyship analogy and to focus more on the concept of the
insurer and the insured as being solidarily bound to the victim by
the statute. In Ruiz v. Clancy,13 the court took up this theme, mentioned in Edwards but not discussed in detail. Article 2098 of the Civil
Code provides that a codebtor in solido may plead all defenses
"resulting from the nature of the obligation" but not those "as are
merely personal to some of the other co-debtors."' 44 The court termed
the insurer, although solidarily bound, "like the principal debtor."
142. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3060: "The surety may oppose to the creditor all the exceptions belonging to the principal debtor, and which are inherent to the debt; but
he can not oppose exceptions which are personal to the debtor."
143. 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935).
144. The court did not mention that the solidarity would be imperfect, i.e., arising
for reasons other than the debtors acted as mandataries of each other. Whether this
might have made any difference in the application of article 2098 thus was not discussed.
The Edwards opinion also offered another thought, presumably in support of its
decision. It noted that if plaintiff's husband had collided with another vehicle and her
injuries were caused by the joint negligence of the two, the other driver could not
have pleaded the negligence of the husband as a bar to plaintiffs suit. While the state-

1983]

DIRECT ACTION STATUTE

1497

For good measure, the court in Ruiz also announced another explanation which has continued to be a popular rationale. The decision
in Edwards, the court said, merely recognized a difference between
those cases in which the victim had no cause of action against the
tortfeasor (and thus none against the insurer) and those in which the
victim had a cause of action against the tortfeasor but no right of
action.' 45 In the latter instances, the Direct Action Statute permitted
the victim to assert that cause of action against the insurer, although
the victim had no right to do so against the tortfeasor for other
reasons.
In the following year, in a case involving a governmental entity,
the court struck upon yet another rationale.'46 If a governmental entity
purchased liability insurance and the court permitted an insurer to
raise the immunity of the entity in every lawsuit against it, the entity would have paid its premiums for nothing at all. The spectre of
Louisiana citizens paying hard-earned money in taxes to an entity
which then paid it to an insurer but received nothing in return
understandably was not pleasing to the court. The court's indignant
but direct response to the argument was as follows:
[The insurer] has received from the New Orleans City Park
Association a valuable consideration. If the defense of immunity
from suit is available to it in this case, this insurance company
is, in truth and in fact, receiving public moneys without consideration, for we cannot imagine any case sounding in tort which might
successfully be prosecuted against it under the insurance
contract.'47
This rationale has its modern-day equivalents in the cases in which
ment was accurate, it had nothing to do with the question of whether an insurer could
raise an immunity that would be available to its insured.
145. Neither "right of action" nor "cause of action" is defined by the Code of Civil
Procedure. In this discussion, they are used in the following manner. An exception
of "no right of action" should be granted, even though the law grants a remedy against
the defendant for the harm revealed by the pleadings, when the plaintiff in question
is not authorized by law to assert it. An exception of "no cause of action" must be
granted, even though everything alleged might eventually be proven to be true and
even though the plaintiff would be the proper party to complain, in those instances
in which the law does not recognize a remedy against the defendant for the harm
revealed by the pleadings. Using these terms, our courts have held that while a wife
does not have a right of action against her negligent spouse, she does have a cause
of action; she has both against his insurer. But an injured employee has neither a
right nor a cause of action against his employer for a work-related injury, because
the Workers' Compensation Act "abolishes" the tort cause of action. Therefore, he
has neither a right nor a cause of action against the employer's liability insurer.
146. Rome v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of Am., 169 So. 132 (La. App. Orl.
1936).
147. 169 So. at 137.
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the defense of charitable immunity was denied to an insurer and, probably, in the denial of the insured shipowner's limitation of liability
rights to the insurer.
Actually, the Edwards court was closer to the true rationale than
it realized. The French writers state that the reason for the rule denying the surety the right to plead defenses personal to the debtor was
that the surety often was obtained specifically to protect the creditor
against the possibility that a debtor would plead a defense personal
to him. 4 The same writers indicate that the reason for the rule denying a solidary co-debtor the right to plead defenses personal to
another co-debtor was that such defenses were created to protect certain individuals and not to foster general policies of the law, such
as no enforcement of an obligation which had an illegal cause or was
prescribed.'49 These distinctions were expressed in the concept in the
articles of "personal" defenses on the one hand and, on the other,
those defenses "inherent in the debt" or "resulting from the nature
of the obligation."
Thus the true inquiry should be as to the public policies involved.
Certainly there is a strong policy expressed in the state's approval
and regulation of liability insurance contracts and in our Direct Action
Statute that where an insurance fund has been purchased, it should
be used to compensate the victim. There is a policy against intrafamily litigation and one that bankrupt persons are entitled to be
discharged from certain debts. There is another that employers should
not be liable in tort if workers' compensation provides a remedy
against them. There used to be others that charitable institutions or
governmental entities should not have to divert their funds to the
compensation of private claims, and there is another that persons who
carelessly help produce their own injury should be denied recovery
or should have it diminished.
The reconciliation of these conflicting policies came in the Direct
Action Statute litigation over defenses available to insurance companies. Louisiana's first statutory pronouncement, although written
in slightly different terms, was that the policy that bankrupt persons
should be discharged from certain debts need not conflict with the
policy that an insurance fund should be used to compensate the victim. Louisiana simply would not enforce a clause which permitted the
insurer to use the insured's bankruptcy as a defense. This was the
first statutory departure from indemnity insurance toward liability
insurance.1"
148. See 2 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 2, no. 2331 at 338 & no. 2376 at
352 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959).
149. Id., pt. 1, nos. 763-766 at 410-413.
150. Other states passed similar statutes, and insurers ultimately placed a similar
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The next pronouncement was much more circumspect. It was
simply that, in addition to his rights against the insured, the victim
had a "right of direct action" against the insurer. Almost certainly,
this was purely a matter of procedure. The victim could choose to
sue the tortfeasor or the insurer or both "jointly and in solido." If
there was any intent to grant substantive rights to the victim beyond
those he had against the tortfeasor, the language does not reflect it.
In fact, it reflects the contrary.
However, societal problems- particularly that of injuries to victims of automobile accidents-dictated an imperceptible shift in the
nature of the "right of direct action" from procedural to substantive
and from pure indemnity to liability in the broad sense, bordering
on financial responsibility. The shift was imperceptible but irresistible. Other states accomplished the change by statute,"' but our
changes were judicial. This accounts for the wandering and seemingly
inconsistent nature of the changes. Under the rubric of the "right
of direct action," the courts were answering the very basic question:
why do we permit contracts of liability insurance, and what do we
want them to accomplish?
Our decisions indicate that we want liability insurance to function as a mechanism to spread the costs of perils in society, although
we are not prepared to jettison completely the fault system which
has previously functioned as such a mechanism. We could have adopted
a no-fault system to spread those costs, even without the intermediary
of insurance.'52 But we have chosen rather to use liability insurance
as a sort of derivative of the fault system, relying upon its strong
points and correcting its evils. To be completely logical, we simply
would say that the insurer may be sued directly but it is only liable
provision into policies. See R.

KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW S 4.8(b) at 233
(1971).
151. Some states provided that certain policy defenses which would be good against
insureds would not be available against the victim-such as late notice or failure to
cooperate in the defense. These states continued to require that the tortfeasor be
sued and judgment obtained but they refused to permit the insurer to raise these
defenses in the second action by the victim against the insurer. See R. KEETON, supra
note 150, S 4.8(c) at 234. As for immunities available to the insured, some states respect
the provision of the policy as to whether the immunity can or will be raised by the
insurer, but others provide a direct action and make immunities such as charitable
and governmental immunities unavailable to the insurer, invalidating policy provisions
to the contrary. See ARK. STAT. ANN. S 66-3240, 66-3242(2) (1980); R. KEETON, supra
note 150, S 4.8(d) at 235-37.
152. New Zealand has such a system, and it apparently functions fairly well. Medical
expenses and wage replacement are available through a government fund, whether
the injury is traceable to employment, crime, automobile accident, or other other sources.

See T.
(1980).
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when the insured would be or is liable. However, this would immediately incorporate some defenses which were created only because
of the identity of the tortfeasor and have nothing at all to do with
an insurer. At the same time, the notion of moral blameworthiness
inherent in the fault system could not be wholly discarded. Thus we
were willing to say that an insurer could not be liable in the absence
of objectively blameworthy conduct on the part of the insured, even
though the insurer was the only named defendant.
Now the division between "personal" defenses and "general"
defenses becomes much clearer. The strength of an interspousal immunity policy, if it has any at all, rests on protection of family harmony and has no real application to a dispute between an injured
person and an insurance company. Thus it must yield to the policy
supporting compensation of injured persons. The strength of an immunity given to a parent against suits by a child, if it has any at
all, rests on protection of parental authority and discipline and has
no application to a dispute between an injured person and an insurance
company. It was unnecessary in Louisiana to abolish the immunities
as a way to eliminate the conflict, as it might have been in a state
without a direct action statute in order to give access to an insurance
fund. Besides that, abolition presents difficult questions of the duty
owed by one spouse to another or by a parent to a child. Where a
liability insurance fund had been purchased, Louisiana could avoid the
route of abolition of the immunity by calling the defense "merely personal" to the insured. It is probably not coincidental that liability insurance has now been made compulsory in a field in which those duty
questions are not difficult: operation of a motor vehicle. It is not compulsory in fields where duty questions would be very difficult, such
as homeowners' insurance." By its judicial interpretations of the
Direct Action Statute, Louisiana has been able to confine most of its
intra-family disputes to arenas in which duty determinations are
easy."
153. Thus, there is room for insurers to exclude intrafamily injuries if they wish
to do so. There is also room for ample debate about what kinds of harm we want
to spread to the insurance-buying group. If one child in the family shoots another
with a B.B. gun, should all purchasers of homeowners' insurance bear this risk in
dilution?
154. But some difficult problems remain unresolved. Once it is established that
a parent can sue a child driver's insurer without any immunity being pleaded and
without the "imputation" of the child's negligence to the parent, what expenses may
be recovered? The father's personal injury recovery was not barred in Deshotel v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 257 La. 567, 243 So. 2d 259 (1971). The father's recovery for
damage to his own property, such as the automobile, also is not barred. Scott v.
Behrman, 273 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). But should the father's recovery
for the driving child's medical expenses be barred? If they are seen as the child's
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The same process may be observed in the case of charitable and
governmental entities. The policy against involuntary diversion of
public funds or those held "in trust" for charitable purposes to the
payment of individual claims in tort has very little to do with a suit
against an insurance company. This is especially true when the entity
voluntarily has expended the funds for insurance coverage. Thus the
policy underlying the immunity must give way to that of compensation for injured persons. Again, the rubric is: defense "personal" to
the insured, not available to the insurer. In this area, Louisiana
ultimately abolished the immunities themselves, thus facing the dutydetermination questions squarely. Although the duty questions in this
context are not free of difficulty, they are probably easier than the
intra-family issues.
The issues are less clear-cut in cases such as insanity, limitation
of liability to the value of the vessel and exclusivity of remedy against
a federal employee under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Probably there
is a public policy that insane persons should not be personally liable
for their conduct, 55 but this policy need not conflict with the policy
favoring compensation of injured persons. Such compensation may
come from a curator"5 or from a fund purchased for this purpose. If
we are willing to impose liability on a parent for damage caused by
his child, even when below the age of discernment, 57 and thus on his
insurer, there is no reason not to have the same treatment for persons who have no discernment because of insanity.
The policy supporting limitation of liability to the vessel in
maritime cases is of uncertain strength and has been the subject of
considerable dispute."8 Whatever the policy may be, it has very little
expenses, perhaps their recovery ought to be barred. Some appellate decisions have
taken this view. Liedtke v. Allstate Ins. Co., 405 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 407 So. 2d 748 (La. 1981); Gaudet v. G.D.C., Inc., 383 So. 2d 1289 (La. App.
1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 256 (La. 1980). On the other hand, if they are really
the father's expenses, perhaps they ought to be treated the same as damage to the
car and their recovery should not be barred. This is the view taken by the court
in McIntyre v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 413 So. 2d 174 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
The two lines of cases are in complete conflict on the point.
155. The matter was discussed at length in Yancey v. Maestri, 155 So. 509 (La.
App. Orl. 1934), in which the court reached the conclusion that the estate of an uninterdicted insane person did not have liability for his acts. The decision has been questioned in subsequent opinions. See Von Dameck v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 361
So. 2d 283 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Guidry v. Toups, 351 So. 2d 1280, 1284 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1977) (Ponder, J., dissenting); Note, Insanity, Intent, and Homeowner's Liability,
40 LA. L. REV. 258 (1979.
156. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2319: "The curators of insane persons are answerable for
the damage occasioned by those under their care."
157. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2318; Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
158. See Biezup & Abeel, The Limitation Fund and Its Distribution,53 TUL. L.
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to do with suits between victims and insurance companies. And there
is the added factor that if a shipowner has paid for liability insurance
but the insurer is able to limit its own liability to the value of the
vessel, the shipowner has paid for coverage he does not need and
from which he will never derive any advantage.
The policy supporting the exclusivity of a remedy against a federal
employee under the Federal Tort Claims Act is even more murky
and thus its position in the "personal" defense category even more
uncertain. Certainly there is a policy supporting the protection of an
individual employee from catastrophic losses, and the substitution of
the federal government as the responsible party respects that policy.159
A proceeding against an insurer for excess over the amount realized
in a claim against the federal government is not violative of that policy,
but the scheme devised under the Federal Tort Claims Act is not
unlike that of workers' compensation schemes at the state and federal
level. The countervailing policy may be a determination that the
remedy granted under these schemes is sufficient, and no further compensation of the victim is required. If this is so, the "exclusivity" is
not aimed solely at protection of the tortfeasor. Rather, it is a statement of what society thinks are the limits of the remedy. In the classic
definition, if there is no remedy, there is no "cause of action" in tort
and thus no liability in the insured and none in the insurer.
When one turns to the defenses which are "general" and which
can be raised by an insurer, the expressed public policies are strong
and are aimed at more than protection of a single individual. There
is an interest in having claims promptly litigated, so that a fair and
accurate resolution of the issues may take place. This interest often
wins out over the policy calling for compensation of the victim, even
when an insurer is not in the picture. This policy is aimed at the
integrity of the judicial process and is not limited to the individual
tortfeasor. Thus prescription is a "general" defense that can be raised
by the insurer, or one "inherent in the debt." '
REV. 1185 (1979); Buglass, Limitation of Liability from a Marine Insurance Viewpoint,
53 TUL. L. REV. 1364 (1979); Kierr, The Effect of Direct Action Statutes on P & I In-

surance, On Various Other Insurances of Maritime Liabilities, and on Limitation on
Shipowners' Liability, 43 TUL. L. REV. 638 (1969).
159. The specific language of 28 U.S.C. S 2679(b) (1976) is as follows:
The remedy against the United States . . . for injury .

. .,

resulting from the

operation by an employee of the Government of any motor vehicle while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, shall hereafter be exclusive of any
other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against
the employee or his estate whose act or omission gave raise to the claim.
160. This is consistent with the early Louisiana cases involving true sureties. Gilbert
v. Meriam, 2 La. Ann. 160 (1847); Michelin Tire Co. v. Delcourt, 149 So. 313 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1933).
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The same is true of the defenses of contributing fault or assumption of the risk. It is the considered judgment of society that in some
instances, an injured person's right to compensation should be denied
or diminished because of his own conduct. We use this as a sanction
to encourage persons to watch out for their own safety or to be bound
by their own voluntary encountering of perils. It usually has nothing
to do with the identity of the victim.' Thus we permit an insurer
to argue that its liability can be only found to the extent of the liability
of its insured with reference to the conduct of the victim.
As indicated earlier, the policy behind the statutory immunity of
an employer or a co-employee to suits in tort under workers' compensation schemes is a societal expression that these provisions are an
adequate remedy for the harm suffered. If this is accurate, any further remedy should be denied and any coverage for such a potential
remedy is unnecessary. Thus we permit an insurer to raise the defense
and, in theory, permit the offering of policies without such coverage
at a lower cost.
The policy respecting the law made between the parties by an
agreement is also strong and should yield only when some more important interest must be protected."' Thus if the insured and the insurer have agreed upon a policy limit' 6' or upon a particular kind of
coverage,' 4 this agreement should be respected. Hence we permit insurers to raise these defenses, rather than terming them "personal"
to the insured. In fact, they have very little to do with the protection
of the insured; rather, they protect the insurer and others who purchase such insurance.
Thus we find that the judicial process has arrived at the
undeniable conclusion that in some instances, the victim has greater
rights against the insurer than he would have against the tortfeasor
himself. We have determined which instances these are by reconcil161. Except when the court determines that the duty of the defendant extends
to the protection of the victim against his own carelessness, such as is true of certain
minors. See Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1978).
162. Such as the very existence of a direct action at all, as is evidenced by the
decisions invalidating "no action" clauses in policies even though they would otherwise have been a valid part of the contract.
163. Presumably, the "red letter clause" developed in the ship repairers' insurance
contracts has been permitted as an insurer's defense because it is a sort of policy
limit. See Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Charles Ferran & Co., 443 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1971).
164. Theoretically, insurers could have avoided coverage of intrafamily harms by
specifying that the policy did not extend to bodily harm to any other insured. California, for example, authorizes such an exclusion in CAL. INS. CODE S 11580.1(c)(5) (West
1972 & Supp. 1982) as to an omnibus insured, and the statute was upheld against
constitutional attack in Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Cocking, 29 Cal. 3d 383, 628 P.2d 1,
173 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1981).
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ing the conflicting interests and policies presented. The fact that we
have chosen to do so under the rubric of "personal" and "general"
defenses does not detract from the reality of what has been done.
We have interpreted the Direct Action Statute in this fashion because
the problems of our society required that we do so.
It is also undeniable that some of this process has caused liability
insurance to be more expensive than it otherwise would have been.
No one knows whether the policyholders would have opted for this
course of action had they been given the opportunity to do so. The
courts have made the decision, and the insurers have acquiesced. From
the insurers' standpoint, the provision of additional coverage and collection therefor of an additional premium are not necessarily
undesirable, so long as they can predict potential risks with some
accuracy.
The ultimate result of the jurisprudence in this area is not very
far removed from the point of beginning in Edwards and the French
writers. We saw that the surety could not raise personal defenses
because the purchase of the surety's protection was made precisely
to reimburse the creditor if the personal defenses were raised. We
cannot say that the creditor (the injured person) has demanded the
engagement of a surety (the liability insurer) because of the possibility that the debtor (the tortfeasor) might raise a personal defense
or otherwise be unable to pay. However, society, in effect, has demanded this result in many instances to avoid the alternative of having victims go uncompensated or of leaving the compensation to the
family or society in general through taxes."5
Set-Off, or Compensation
There is an interesting problem, yet unanswered, as to the
classification of the defense of set-off, or compensation. 66' The Civil
Code provides that a surety may set off against his own obligation
any amount which is owed by the creditor to the principal debtor.'67
But the code also provides that a solidary co-debtor may not assert
such a defense when sued by the creditor, i.e., he is not entitled to
reduce his own obligation by the amount owed to a co-debtor.' 66 Since
165. The enactment and interpretation of the Direct Action Statute and the compulsory nature of motor vehicle liability insurance are evidence of those societal
demands.
166. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2208: "Compensation takes place of course by the mere
operation of law, even unknown to the debtors; the two debts are reciprocally extinguished, as soon as they exist simultaneously, to the amount of their respective
sums." Compensation is an affirmative defense, which must be pleaded by the party
seeking its application. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1005.
167.
168.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 2211.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2211.
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insurers have at one time or another been classified as both sureties
and solidary co-debtors for the purpose of asserting defenses, it is
unclear which rule ought to be chosen.
This is not idle academic discussion. Under the version of comparative negligence adopted by Louisiana, it is quite possible that as
between two parties in an automobile accident, the fault could be
allocated 60 percent to A and 40 percent to B. Suppose that both
are amply covered by liability insurance and A's loss amounts to
$100,000, while B's amounts to $50,000. The total "loss" suffered by
the two parties is $150,000. If A sues B and B's insurer, he is entitled
to a judgment of $40,000. If B should reconvene against A and A's
insurer, he is entitled to a judgment of $30,000. If no insurance were
in the picture at all, the debt of A to B would be set off against the
debt of B to A, resulting in a judgment in A's favor in the amount
of $10,000. If insurance is in the picture and if the insurers may raise
the defense of set-off which would be available to the parties, the
only amount which would leave the coffers of the insurance companies
would be $10,000 and the total amount borne by the insured parties
would be $140,000. Although this theoretically would result in lower
premiums, it would represent a departure from the customary view
that insurance should be used as a mechanism to spread the costs
of risks to society.
Incantation of the "personal" versus "general" rubric alone is not
likely to help analyze the problem, since some code articles suggest
set-off is personal (if the insurer is a solidary co-debtor only) and others
suggest it is general (if the insurer is a surety). Purists will point
out that the code also resolves the conflict, by providing that where
a surety is also a solidary co-debtor, the rules of solidarity are to
prevail over those of suretyship.'69
However, our policy analysis will produce a surer method of
reaching the same result. One very strong policy supports the use
of the insurance mechanism to the greatest extent possible to spread
the cost of compensating the victim. The countervailing policy supporting set-off is one of judicial economy and permitting a debtor to
ease his own burden by "collecting" a debt owed to him in the same
proceeding. But at least where the "debt" is within the policy limits,
there is no burden on the insured. It is not really his debt any more
but one for which we have permitted him to provide a financially solvent defendant. As to the financially solvent defendant (the insurer),
there is no "debt" owed for which there should be compensation.
Accordingly (and predictably), the policy supporting the use of the
insurance mechanism to spread the cost of compensating the victim
169.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 3045.
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should and will prevail. If the legislature reaches the problem first,
we will have a statute to that effect. If the court reaches the problem first, compensation will be classified as a defense "personal" to
the insured and not available to the insurer.7 ' The court in Edwards
foresaw the possibility fifty years ago and suggested such an answer. 1 '
OBLIGATION IN SOLIDO WITH THE INSURED
When the "real" right of direct action was first enacted in 1930,
the amendment included venue provisions and the specific statement
that "said action may be brought either against the insurer company
alone or against both the assured and the insurer company, jointly
and in solido."'172 The intention of this phrase may have been simply
to make it clear that the insured need not be named as a defendant,
although he could be if the victim so desired. The added phrase "jointly
and in solido" would then have been superfluous or, at best, simply
a restatement of what had previously been provided. But the phrase
was promptly interpreted to establish the substantive concept of
solidary liability between the insurer and the insured as to the
victim.17' This was to have very.important consequences for the interpretation of the insurer's responsibility under the insurance
contract.
The Civil Code defines a solidary obligation as one in which the
debtors are "all obliged to the same thing, so that each may be compelled for the whole, and when the payment which is made by one
'
of them, exonerates the others toward the creditor."174
There may be
a solidary obligation even though the precise nature of the obligation
of the respective debtors may differ, such as when one's obligation
is conditional and the other's unconditional or when one is allowed

170.

For an extended discussion of compensation under the comparative negligence

statute, see Chamallas, Comparative Fault and Multiple PartyLitigation in Louisiana:
A Sampling of the Problems, 40 LA. L. REV. 373, 396-401 (1980).
171. Could it be said in the instant case, if the insured were a creditor of the injured
party to the extent of $5,000, that the insurance company could interpose the
defense of set-off to the present action? The obvious answer is no, because that
would be a personal matter between the plaintiff and the insured, wholly unrelated
or in any way connected with or growing out of the provisions of the policy and
the alleged tortious acts of the insured.
Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191, 193 (1935).
172. 1930 La. Acts, No. 55, S 2.
173. Sewell v. Newton, 152 So. 389 (La. App. Orl. 1934) (Janvier, J., writing for
the court, the same judge who had played such an important role in defining the scope
of the direct action in Edwards v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 123 So. 162 (La. App. Orl.
1929) and in Rossville Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis Sheen Transfer Co., 138
So. 183 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1931)). See text at notes 6 & 11, supra.
174. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2091.
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a term which is not allowed to the other.'" Ordinarily, solidarity must
be explicitly provided for, but this rule is relaxed when the law is
the source of the solidarity." 6 One of the most important secondary
aspects of solidarity is that a suit brought against one of the solidary
debtors interrupts prescription as to all of them.'" Also pertinent and
important is the rule that if the creditor should release one of the
solidary debtors without reserving his rights against the others, they
are all discharged; if he reserves rights against them, he may not
recover against them without deducting "the part" of the debtor whom
8
he has released.

7

The type of solidarity which exists by statute between the insured and the insurer toward the victim is an unusual one, to say
the least. In the first place, it is solidarity only within the policy limits
and coverages, for beyond that, the insurer is not obligated to anyone,
solidarily or otherwise. Within the policy limits, for all practical purposes, the insurer is the only "debtor" who is liable for anything. Short
of insolvency of the insurer, the insured will never become liable for
an amount within the policy limits. If the insurer is not named in
the litigation or participating in the defense of the insured, the insured will no doubt third-party the insurer demanding a defense or
its costs as well as indemnity.
Thus the "solidary" debtors are the wrongdoer (who has no
realistic exposure within the confines of the solidary obligation) and
an innocent party (who bears all of the risk within the limits of its
agreement, but only if the wrongdoer would have borne such risk).
The insurer is not merely an intermediary used to pass the cost on
ultimately to the wrongdoer. Unlike other solidary debtors,' 9 the insurer has no right of contribution or indemnity against the wrongdoer
upon payment.. The whole point of the insurance contract is to insulate the wrongdoer from such a possibility.
If the solidarity between the insurer and the insured had been
subjected to the analysis attributed to the Romans and occasionally
surfacing in Louisiana law, it would have been termed imperfect
solidarity rather than perfect solidarity.'80 The latter is said to arise
when the solidary debtors act as mandataries of each other, as in the
signing of a promissory note calling for solidary liability to the

175.

LA. Civ. CODE art. 2092.

176.

LA. CIv. CODE

177.

LA. CIv. CODE art. 2097.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2203.
LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2103, 2104, 2106, 2161, & 3052.

178.
179.

art. 2093.

180. See Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Obligations, 35 LA. L. REv. 280 (1975).
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creditor. The former arises when two or more persons are bound for
the same debt, but from different sources or at different times. Since
the obligation of the tortfeasor to the victim is delictual and that of
the insurer is conventional, they could only be imperfectly solidarily
bound. The primary effect of solidarity would nonetheless follow for
both perfect and imperfect solidarity: require each of the debtors to
discharge the entire debt if called upon to do so.' A very important
secondary effect did not follow in the classical interpretation. Suit as
to one solidary obligor, if only imperfectly bound to the others, did
not interrupt prescription as to those others. 8'
This distinction between imperfect solidarity and perfect solidarity often has been ignored in Louisiana law and may have been rejected altogether.183 The difference with regard to interruption of
prescription has not been respected in modern times, either generallyTM
or with specific reference to the solidarity between an insured and
the insurer.18
Thus, generally speaking, a timely suit against either the insured
or the insurer will interrupt prescription as to the other. However,
even within this general rule, there are some interesting wrinkles.
The decision in Pearson v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.'
is representative of the simple case of timely suit against the tortfeasor and interruption as to the insurer. Plaintiff claimed injury while
employed by employer during work at the plant of third party. He
timely sued third party (in tort) and the compensation carrier of
employer. By a timely supplemental petition, plaintiff joined an in-

181. Flintkote Co. v. Thomas, 223 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969) (perfect solidarity); Wilks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) (imperfect
solidarity-two insurers bound for the same tort obligation).
182. One finds this actual holding only in a few early Louisiana cases in which
the endorser of a note was held to be bound in imperfect solidarity with the maker
and acknowledgment by the latter would not interrupt prescription as to the former.
Hickman v. Stafford, 2 La. Ann. 792 (1847); McCalop v. Newcomb, 2 La. Ann. 332 (1847);
Jacobs v. Williams, 12 Rob. 183 (La. 1845). The imperfect nature of their solidarity,
however, was subsequently changed by the Negotiable Instruments Law and by clauses
in promissory notes. See also Grigsby v. Morgan & Lindsey, 148 So. 506 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1933) (court considered and rejected argument that joint tortfeasors were imperfectly solidarily bound, but it stated that if they had been, service of process on
one would not have interrupted prescription as to the other).
183. See Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980) (holding that an employer
and an employee are solidarily bound to the victim of the employee's conduct; "distinction drawn between perfect and imperfect solidarily is untenable and must be rejected."
381 So. 2d at 791.).
184. See, e.g., Rhys v. Moody, 163 La. 1039, 113 So. 367 (1927).
185. See, e.g., Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
186. 281 So. 2d 724 (La. 1973).
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dividual employee of third party as a defendant. 8 ' And after prescription had run, plaintiff filed a second amending petition correcting the
spelling of. the employee's name, dismissing third party as a defendant, and naming Travelers as the insurer of the recently-named individual employee defendant. On established principles, the court
overlooked the spelling error, 88 and held that the timely suit against
the individual employee interrupted prescription as to Travelers.
After Pearson, the problem was complicated by another multipledefendant case, Trahan v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.'89 The plaintiffs were the widow and children of an individual killed in a salt mine
accident. Their initial suit named six executive officers of the company which owned the mine and their insurers, Liberty Mutual and
INA. 9 ' At trial, a jury verdict was returned absolving all defendants
of liability; the judgment entered on that verdict was affirmed,' and
the supreme court denied writs.
Within a year of the final judgment, but well over a year after
the accident, the plaintiffs filed another suit against the same two
insurance companies, alleging that a seventh executive officer was
liable for the death and was insured by them. The insurers' exception of prescription was sustained by the trial court, but the appellate
court reversed and remanded for trial.'92 The supreme court granted
writs and ultimately upheld the plea of prescription.
The case presented the reverse situation from Pearson.The obligor

187. Suppose that the amending petition had been filed more than a year from
the accident. If the third party were then dismissed because it had immunity from
tort liability as a principal under LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1950 & Supp. 1976), would the court
still hold that there had been an interruption because the insurer had notice that someone was to be held accountable for the tort, although the "wrong" tortfeasor (the third
party) had been timely sued?,In Rogers v. Payne & Keller, Inc., 392 So. 2d 109 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 396 So. 2d 1327 (La. 1981), and Gibson v. Exxon Corp.,
360 So. 2d 230 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 575 (La. 1978), the
court held that when a principal immune from tort liability was timely sued and individuals not so immune were sued after prescription had run, there was no interruption of prescription as to the latter when the principal was dismissed on a summary
judgment. However, Baker v. Payne & Keller Inc., 390 So. 2d 1272 (La. 1980), may
be inconsistent with this result. See text at note 198, infra.
188. Lunkin v. Triangle Farms, Inc., 208 La. 538, 23 So. 2d 209 (1945); Jackson
v. American Employers Ins. Co., 202 La. 23, 11 So. 2d 225 (1942).
189. 314 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975). A companion case was decided the same day, Nunez
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 356 (La. 1975).
190. The suit was brought at a time when the workers' compensation statutes permitted a tort suit to be brought against co-employees, such as executive officers of
the same employer. Such suits were prohibited by amendment in 1976 to LA. R.S.
23:1032.
191. Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
192. Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 303 So. 2d 606 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
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timely sued, in plaintiffs' view, was the insurer; this suit interrupted
prescription as to all insureds on the cause of action sued upon. Plaintiffs argued that the claim against the seventh executive officer was
the same cause of action and thus the plea of prescription should have
been overruled.
The supreme court apparently was unwilling to accept such a
broad view. The appellate court had rested its decision on article 2097
of the Civil Code. It believed that the two insurers were solidarily
liable to plaintiffs and that the first suit against Liberty had interrupted prescription as to INA and vice versa. The supreme court properly disagreed, noting that the two insurers were not solidarily liable
with regard to plaintiffs. Only the joint tortfeasors, if any, would be
solidarily liable to plaintiffs. The additional fact that a tortfeasor and
his insurer are liable in solido to the victim did not produce the final
leg of the triangle: solidarity between the insurers as to the victim.193
Since the six executive officers sued in the first suit were absolved
of any liability and thus were not obligated to plaintiff in any waysolidarily or otherwise-they could not be bound in solido with the
additional executive officer upon whose alleged negligence the second
suit was based. Without an interruption as to that additional executive
officer, there was no interruption as to his insurers.
In the Trahan decision, the court found it necessary to distinguish
an earlier appellate decision on similar facts. Simmons v. Travelers
Insurance Co."' involved a claim timely filed against four executive
officers and a liability insurer. Some time later (more than a year
after the accident), a supplemental and amending petition was filed,
naming a fifth executive officer and alleging coverage by the same
liability insurer. This officer interposed a plea of prescription as to
his personal liability. This plea was rejected by the trial court, and
its decision was affirmed by the appellate court. The appellate court,
citing Pearson,held that the fifth officer and the insurer were or could
be solidarily liable to the plaintiff and thus the initiation of the suit
against the insurer had interrupted prescription as to the officer.
The Trahan court distinguished Simmons on two grounds. First,
plaintiffs original petition in Simmons had named the insurer as a
defendant "as general liability insurer of all the executive officers" '95
of the corporation which employed the injured plaintiff, whereas in
193. See Dendinger v. Maryland Cas. Co., 302 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1962).
194. 295 So. 2d 550 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
195. The language is the court's in Trahan, 303 So. 2d at 609, and is apparently
based upon paragraph 10 of plaintiffs original petition. Although the allegation does
not contain the word "all," it does broadly allege existence of a policy "in favor of
[the employer] and its executive officers."
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Trahan, the original petition named Liberty Mutual and INA as insurers only of the six named executive officers. Second, the joinder
of the additional executive officer in Simmons had occurred prior to
trial, whereas in Trahan, the second suit followed a first trial which
had absolved all six of the individual defendants in the first suit.
A third decision of about the same vintage added to the problems.
In Anderson v. Sciambra,'" plaintiff had been injured in a fall from
a rear porch at his apartment. He timely sued the man he knew as
his landlord and that man's insurer. More than a year after the injury, the landlord revealed that he had donated the premises to his
daughter by an act recorded more than a year prior to the injury.
Plaintiff amended the petition to name the daughter as a defendant,
but the trial court sustained her plea of prescription and dismissed
the suit against her father and his insurer on the basis of non-liability.
The appellate court, however, reversed as to the insurer"' and, to
the extent of the policy limits, as to the plaintiff. The appellate court
also held that the suit against the insurer interrupted prescription
as to the daughter to the extent of the policy limits.
With the exception of Trahan, these decisions probably can be
reconciled. So long as there is a factual allegation of solidarity, a timely
suit against the insured will interrupt prescription against the insurer
(Pearson)or against an additional insured and the same insurer (Simmons). Similarly, a timely suit against the insurer will interrupt
prescription as to a potential insured (Anderson). However, when the
factual allegation of solidarity is disproved and some non-liable insureds are sued, no interruption occurs as to the insurer or an additional potential insured (Trahan). This latter result does not change
when there are multiple insurers, since multiple insurers are not bound
solidarily to the victim.
The disturbing aspect of these cases is the possibility that a claimant could sue an insurer timely, alleging coverage as to all potential tortfeasors, and then pick through the individuals, perhaps in successive trials, until the right one is found. The court's opinion in
Trahan could be taken to indicate that successive trials would not
be permitted, but there is no clear statement on the point.
Later decisions do nothing to dispell this disturbing implication
of the jurisprudence. In Baker v. Payne & Keller, Inc,"8 the family
of a deceased employee brought suit against his employer and the
196. 310 So. 2d 128 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 835
197. The policy still named the parents as insureds, but the court said
of the parents as the insureds was a mutual mistake in light of the donation
the policy "as reformed to name the daughter as the insured." 310 So.
198. 390 So. 2d 1272 (La. 1980).

(La. 1975).
the naming
and treated
2d at 131.
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employer's liability insurer (Maryland Casualty). The court held that
the exclusive remedy against the employer was in workers' compensation and dismissed the proceeding as to the employer. However,
the insurer was retained in the lawsuit, and plaintiffs were given
fifteen days to amend and state a cause of action against the insurer.
The amended petition was filed more than a year from the death of
the employee and it named certain executive officers of the employer
as defendants. Again, the petition named Maryland Casualty, this time
as liability insurer of the executive officers. The court held that the
original timely petition interrupted prescription as to the second claim,
presumably on the ground that although the insurer first had been
named in its capacity as liability insurer of a clearly non-liable person
(the employer), it was nonetheless somehow also named as the ultimate
liability insurer of defendants who might be liable (the executive officers). Trahan was distinguished, but the decisions appear
inconsistent.
Like Trahan, Baker appears to be a case in which the claimant
first timely sued an insured who was not liable to him and, only after
prescription had run, sued one who was or could be liable to him.
In Trahan, the court viewed the naming of the insurer in the first
suit as naming it only in the capacity of insurer of a non-liable person, and thus this was not a ground for interruption of prescription.
The court refused to do the same thing in Baker. The court seemed
to ignore its own statement in Trahan that "a cause of action in tort
has no identity independent from the defendant upon whose fault it
is based." If this is true, the cause of action sued upon in the second
petition in Baker was an entirely different one from that sued upon
in the timely petition.
The Trahan decision also was distinguished in Langlinais v.
Guillotte.'99 Plaintiff had timely sued an individual defendant, as owner
and operator of a vehicle, and his liability insurer. A general denial
was filed, but later, the policy limits were deposited in the registry
of the court. Still later, the defendant moved for summary judgment
on the ground that his daughter, rather than he, had been the driver
of the offending vehicle. When plaintiff amended the petition to allege
a cause of action against the father as the administrator of the child's
estate, a plea of prescription was filed. Both lower courts sustained
the plea.00 The supreme court overruled the plea, primarily on the
ground that the amendment could relate back to the filing of the
original petition because both the insurer and the father had ample
notice that in some capacity, they were to be held accountable for
the incident in which plaintiff was hurt.
199.
200.

407 So. 2d 1215 (La. 1981).
Langlinais v. Guillotte, 398 So. 2d 106 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
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The ground of distinction from Trahan was said to be that only
one law suit was involved in Langlinais and it was against the same
defendant, although in different capacities. It is true that two different
law suits were involved in the Trahan matter, but still, they were
against the same defendants (INA and Liberty Mutual) in different
capacities- originally, as insurers of some executive officers and, later,
as insurers of different executive officers.
These decisions and distinctions reveal a wavering but nonetheless
clear course toward a treatment of interruption of prescription as
primarily a matter of basic fairness and accuracy. Despite the discussion in Trahan about separate causes of action, prescription has very
little to do with the definition of causes of action. A prescriptive
statute is intended to encourage prompt resolution of disputes by
giving adequate notice to the proposed defendant and by avoiding undue prejudice to his defense of the claim made against him. Since
all of the decisions but Trahan involved the naming of additional defendants long before trial, in some instances simply in a different capacity, it is difficult to demonstrate any prejudice in the liberal interpretation of prescription statutes through the device of solidary liability between insurer and insured.
However, when, as in Trahan, plaintiff is asking for a second bite
at the apple after choosing the wrong individual "tortfeasors" in the
first suit, potential prejudice to the insurer becomes an important
factor. What the court may have foreseen in Trahan was the possibility that an insurer which had gone to trial on the merits once would
be forced to do so over and over again so long as the plaintiff could
continue to uncover potential "tortfeasors." This becomes a matter
of res judicata rather than prescription, but since Louisiana's notion
of res judicata is so narrow, sustaining a plea of prescription was the
next best alternative." 1
These decisions, then, seem to foster the public policy with which
the Direct Action Statute is infused. We have written various things
into the liability insurance contract by statute, and one of these is
the substantive nature of the solidary liability between the insured
and the insurer to the victim. Thus it is understandable that we consistently hold that when the victim timely sues the "right" tortfeasor,
he interrupts prescription as to any excess liability of the tortfeasor
and interrupts prescription as to an "answerable" defendant, such as
the insurer. This is consistent with the rule regarding sureties, who,
like insurers, agree to a contingent liability for a fee and as to whom
201. This had happened before. See Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1973),
in which the court dealt with the issues under the heading of prescription when prior
adjudication and some form of issue preclusion were the real reasons why plaintiff's
second suit was turned away.
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prescription is interrupted when the principal debtor is sued." 2 If, on
the other hand, the plaintiff sues the "wrong" tortfeasor and one so
"wrong" that the error prejudices the insurer's right to make a
reasonable defense, there is no strong policy requiring us to correct
plaintiff's mistake for him." 3
The interruption which flows in the other direction is less clearly
supportable. If an insurer is timely sued, the interruption of presciption as to the wrongdoer sued after the prescriptive period has expired
is only as to the amount within the policy limits. Since an insurer
is only liable up to the policy limits, it could hardly be a solidary
obligor with the tortfeasor as to the excess over the policy limits.
Presumably, the tortfeasor in this instance may plead prescription
successfully as to any amount over the policy limits. This leaves us
with the anomalous result that the "interruption" does not actually
threaten the later-sued wrongdoer at all. But the "interruption" could
threaten other "answerable" defendants, such as another insurer or
a vicariously liable defendant such as a parent or an employer, unless
the court abides by its position in Trahan and other cases that these
other "answerable" defendants are not solidarily bound with the
timely-sued insurer.
The conclusion that suit against the insurer interrupts prescription as to the insured within the policy limits is not consistent with
the treatment of a surety, for suit against the surety does not interrupt prescription against the principal debtor. The conclusion makes
it clear that while insurance shares aspects of suretyship and the rules
of solidarity, the latter governs the disposition of issues of prescription.
Release of Insured and Retention of Rights
That the rules of solidarity, rather than those of suretyship,
dominate the interpretation of the insurance contract is made clear
in the situation of release of the insured and retention of rights against
the insurer. If the liability of the insurer were truly contingent,
derivative, or secondary, the release of any rights against the insured
automatically would dictate the conclusion that there are no further
rights against the insurer. Were the liability of the insurer identical
to that of a surety or a vicariously liable defendant, this result would
202.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 3553.
203. See Osborne v. Callegan, 384 So. 2d 567 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff timely
sued Mr. Callegan and Allstate Insurance, only to discover several years later that
the driver was Mrs. Callegan and the two were judically separated; after amending
to name the wife as the operator and agent of Mr. Callegan, plaintiff claimed that
the first suit had interrupted prescription as to Allstate in its capacity as insurer
of Mrs. Callegan; the court rejected the argument and held that the suit against Mrs
Callegan and Allstate had prescribed).
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have to follow." 4 Yet the courts consistently have emphasized the
solidary nature of the obligation existing between the insurer and the
insured to the victim and noted that a creditor may release one of
multiple solidary obligors while retaining rights against the others.
Thus it has been held that the release of the insured does not
05
release the insurer, so long as rights are retained against the latter.
This result demonstrates again how the liability insurance contract
is so infused with public policy that it does not fit comfortably within
the traditional principles of the Civil Code. Even though retention
of rights against the insurer as a solidary obligor might be authorized
by the Civil Code, the rights of the creditor would be reduced by
"the part" of the debtor whom he released. But "the part" of the insured within the policy limits, as we have seen, is nothing, for all
practical purposes. Beyond the policy limits, there is nothing further
to collect from the retained debtor (the insurer). Thus the victim gets
the benefit of solidarity as opposed to suretyship (he can release the
insured and retain the insurer), but he need not suffer any reduction
in the "solidary" obligation.
This is not, however, as unfair as it seems. The surety's obligation is extinguished when the principal debtor is released because the
surety's right of subrogation against the debtor for any amounts paid
to the creditor is destroyed. The liability insurer, on the other hand,
has no such right of subrogation against the insured, and therefore
it suffers no loss when its "solidary co-debtor" is released. Thus the
true rationale is that no reduction of any of the insurer's liability is
needed, because unlike other solidary debtors, its rights are not
affected by the release of a "co-debtor." When added to the law's traditional encouragement of amicable settlements, this rationale is sufficient to override the "contingent" liability of the insurer for its insured's conduct and the "suretyship" result which would follow from
such a characterization.
PROBLEMS OF SETTLEMENT

The preceding sections have revealed the extent to which the in204. But see Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981), criticized in
Johnson, Developments in the Law-1980-1981-Obligations, 42 LA. L. REV. 388, 390
(1982) and Comment, Tilting Against Windmills: A Solidary Rejoinder, 41 LA. L. REV.
1279 (1981).
205. See Cunningham v. Hardware Mutual Cas. Co., 228 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1969). If the victim fails to reserve his rights against the remaining solidary debtors, however, they are lost on the authority of LA. CIv. CODE art. 2203. See Danzy
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 380 So. 2d 1356 (La. 1980) (settlement with
and release of federal government and its employee without reserving rights against
the latter's insurer released the insurer as well).
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surance contract has been modified by the interpretations given to
the Direct Action Statute by the courts over the years. We have seen
that although a direct action by the injured party is authorized "within
the terms and limits" of the policy, some of these terms and limits
are nullified by the statute. The insurer cannot expect to enforce a
"no action" clause contained in the policy, as that would completely
frustrate the primary intent of the Direct Action Statute." 6 The insurer cannot assert against the claimant policy violations such as
failure of the insured to give notice or to co-operate in the defense
of the case, absent a showing of prejudice or fraud arising from such
conduct."° Of course, the insurer cannot assert certain defenses deemed
"personal" to the insured in our jurisprudence, even though a
reasonable interpretation of the policy language might otherwise allow
them to be raised." 8 All of these results can be and have been justified
in the name of enforcement of the strong public policy expressed in
the Direct Action Statute that the policy exists primarily for the protection of the injured person or the public in general, rather than
the insured.
Some "terms and limits" of the policy nonetheless are enforceable,
especially when they are supported by interests of the insurer and
the insured which must be taken into account. Generally speaking,
an insurer is entitled to specify what coverages it undertakes and
under what conditions, so as to exclude overlapping coverage and
assist in the calculation of appropriate premiums for the risk undertaken. And generally speaking, the insurer is entitled to limit the
amount which it is required to pay upon the occurrence of the insured risk, i.e., the insurer is allowed to set the "policy limits."
The insurer's right to contain its exposure within the policy limits
in the case of settlement and the impact of the Direct Action Statute
on this right is the topic for discussion in this section. Here one finds
the clear conflict of several very strong public policies. Unlike the
outcome in the instances discussed in the preceding sections, the interest of the injured party expressed in the Direct Action Statute
here yields to other important interests.
Certainly the Direct Action Statute expresses the strong interest
of society in making available to an injured party a fund out of which
he may be compensated. Some of the language of the statute itself
may be pointed to in support of this proposition. 9 However, where
206. See text at notes 12-13, supra.
207. See text at notes 99-116, supra.
208. See text at notes 120-165, supra.
209. "It is also the intent of this Section that all liability policies within their terms
and limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons, his or her survivors
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there are multiple claimants to the insurance fund whose claims will
more than exhaust the agreed-upon limit to the fund in the insurance
contract, the interest in protecting the insured against financial
catastrophe through an excess judgment becomes acute. Moreover,
if the insurer is discouraged from amicably settling claims by the fear
that other claimants will be entitled to judgments which will make
the aggregate amount paid exceed the policy limits, it may well respond by refusing to settle any claims at all. This runs afoul of one
of the strongest policies in the law: encouragement of amicable settlement of disputes.
Problems of settlement in this context do not arise until there
are three or more claimants to the fund created by the available limits
of a liability policy. If only one claimant is involved, there can be no
question of preferential settlements or exhaustion of the fund without
accounting for the injured party's claim. The same is ordinarily true
of the claims of two injured persons. Most policies have a limit of
claims for any one accident which is twice that of the limit for the
claim of any one person." ' Thus two claims may be paid under the
applicable limits without prejudice to either.
But when three or more claimants present claims which would
carry the insurer beyond the policy limits, some adjustment of the
various conflicting interests must be made. Louisiana and other states
have imposed upon the insurer the duty to settle claims made against
it and the insured in good faith."' The insurer risks the possibility
of a judgment against it for the ultimate amount awarded to the claimant, perhaps well beyond the policy limits,1 2 if its conduct in failing
to settle within the policy limits is deemed to be negligent or in bad
faith.1 ' This is a substantial sanction, and it exists not only for the

or heirs, to whom the insured is liable .
LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950 & Supp. 1958
& 1962).
210. Claims for property damage, however, usually have a single monetary limit.
In this instance, two claims could present a problem if most or all of the fund is used
to pay one claim in preference to the other.
211. Champion v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 352 So. 2d 737 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 1050 (La. 1978); Cousins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
294 So. 2d 272 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 296 So. 2d 837 (La. 1974); Trahan v.
Central Mut. Ins. Co., 219 So. 2d 187 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969); Roberie v. Southern
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 250 La. 105, 194 So. 2d 713 (1967); Younger v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 174 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). See Comment, Duty of Insurer
to Settle, 30 LA. L. REV. 622 (1970).
212. See Ward v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 539 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1976)
(affirmed $521,375 plus interest and costs awarded by jury for violation of duty to
settle, subject to credit for $10,000 policy limit paid).
213. The precise nature of the insurer's obligation is still somewhat unclear. See
Holtzclaw v. Falco, Inc., 355 So. 2d 1279, 1283 (La. 1978) (opinion on rehearing).
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protection of the company's fisc but also for the protection of the financial interests of the insured. Thus the company is virtually required
to seek out reasonable settlements, permitting it to "buy up" the
claims against its insured at a good price if it is reasonable to do so.
At the same time, the purchase of these claims is gradually exhausting a limited supply of money, and this opens the possibility that
an unsatisfied claimant may appear and argue that his rights under
the Direct Action Statute are not being respected. The insurer's
dilemma is clear. Should it follow the course of protecting its insured's
interest through economical purchase of such outstanding claims as
it can settle, hopeful that its policy limit will nonetheless be respected;
or should it refuse to settle, on the plausible argument that it risks
excess judgments beyond the policy limits against itself if it does so
and leaves some claimant partially satisfied or totally unsatisfied? Is
there some middle ground?...
These questions have not often been presented to the Louisiana
courts, but the discussion has been vigorous when they have appeared.
The supreme court first faced the problem in Richard v. Southern
Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 15 which remains the jurisprudential rule at this writing. A two-car collision ultimately was judged
to be the fault of only one driver, a Mrs. Richard. Her daughter and
a friend were passengers in the Richard vehicle, which was insured
by Southern Farm. Claims against Southern Farm were asserted by
the daughter, the guest passenger, and the driver of the other vehicle.
The compensation carrier of the employer of the driver of the other
vehicle also asserted its right to reimbursement for the workers' compensation payments made to the other driver.
The Southern Farm policy imposed a $10,000 limit on the coverage
for claims arising from any one accident. Prior to trial of any of the
claims, Southern Farm settled with the guest passenger, the other
driver, and the compensation carrier. These settlements totalled
$6,227.39, leaving only $3,772.61 for the claim of the daughter. The
trial court awarded that amount on the basis that the policy covered
the negligent driving of the mother but the policy limit was applicable
to the claim. There was no serious contention that the settlements
were unreasonable or not made in good faith. The appellate court was
urged to hold that the Direct Action Statute and prior judicial limitations on the terms of a policy in cases such as West v. Monroe Bakery"'
214. There is an excellent discussion of the general probrem in Comment, Distribution
of a Limited Insurance Fund to Multiple Claimants, 22 LA. L. REV. 214 (1961).
215. 254 La. 429, 223 So. 2d 858 (1969).
216. 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950).
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and Futch v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.2"7 required the conclusion that
the daughter acquired a vested right to a proportionate share of the
$10,000 fund immediately upon her injury. Thus the insurer's failure
to initiate a concursus proceeding to permit judicial allocation of the
fund according to the proportion of loss suffered by each claimant
"waived" the policy limit. The court rejected this argument, noting
that the strong public policy favoring compromise would be in jeopardy
if insurers' ability to settle were so limited. 18
The supreme court granted certiorari limited to the question of
whether a liability insurer faced with multiple claims could in good
faith enter into reasonable settlements with some of the claimants,
even though payments to them might reduce or completely exhaust
the insurance fund originally available to all claimants. Properly
treating the issue as res nova, the supreme court noted that nothing
in the Direct Action Statute guaranteed one of several persons injured in an accident a fixed proportional share in the proceeds of the
policy. 1 " Again, the strong societal interest in amicable settlement of
controversies and its concomitant protection of the interest of the insured to avoid catastrophic excess judgments seemed decisive:
The [appellate] court correctly found that it should . . . follow

the general rule [respecting the policy limits] when, as here, the
settlements are made in good faith and are reasonable. For compromises are favored under the law and, by making such settlements, the amount for which the insured tortfeasor may be held
liable is ultimately reduced where the policy limits are insufficient to cover the total damages, and this is in keeping with the
responsibility of the insurer to its insured under the law. 2 °
The court added, almost as an afterthought, that no reasonable procedural vehicle existed for the insurer to have sought judicial resolution of the conflicting claims according to proportionate shares. The
existence of declaratory judgment as a means to that end was
erroneously dismissed as a possibility by the court, 21 and the concursus article of the Code of Civil Procedure appeared to require that
217. 246 La. 688, 166 So. 2d 274 (1964). See text at note 107, supra.
218. Richard v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 212 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1968).
219. 254 La. at 437, 223 So. 2d at 861.
220. 254 La. at 437-78, 223 So. 2d at 861.
221. It failed to note that Burton v. Lester, 227 La. 347, 79 So. 2d 333 (1955), which
had held that a declaratory judgment was not available when any other remedy was
available to the plaintiff, had been legislatively overruled by the enactment of LA.
CODE Civ. P. art, 1871. Thus the fact that one of the claimants had filed a damage
suit or could do so would no longer make any difference as to the availability of the
declaratory judgment vehicle.
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the insurer admit liability in order to invoke such proceedings.222 In
any event, initiation of a concursus proceeding would require all parties
to resort to litigation in order to collect anything.
With the court's pronouncement in Richard, attention shifted to
the question of whether settlements which reduced the fund to a claimant's detriment were unreasonable or made in bad faith and the
collateral question of the burden of proof on the issue. In Jack v.
Jack,223 the insurer had used all but $500.00 of the $10,000 policy limit
to satisfy other claims, leaving only plaintiff's claim to be tried. Plaintiff was awarded a judgment for that amount, but he insisted that
the insurer had the burden of showing that the settlements which
left only that remainder were reasonable. Plaintiff wanted the insurer
to produce the actual claimants and their doctors, as well as any other
information which would support the reasonableness of the settlements. The court refused to place the burden of proof on the issue
of reasonableness on the insurer, noting a presumption that "all men
act fairly, honestly, and in good faith." The court also made the telling observation that it would be difficult to conclude in any event
that "in making settlements an insurer is going to pay out more than
'
necessary."224
In Wright v. Romano,225 the court held that it was reasonable for
the insurer to pay the medical expenses of one potential claimant and
then initiate a concursus proceeding to determine the remainder of
the claims. The fact that such a settlement dictated that an amount
less than the total fund would be deposited in the registry of the
court did not make the settlement unreasonable. In appropriate instances, the reasonableness of a settlement may be so clear that summary judgment is appropriate.22
The insurance industry may have collectively held its breath,
however, in 1977 after the supreme court overruled Richard in the
original hearing in Holtzclaw v. Falco, Inc.227 Two vehicles collided,
causing damage to both and to a nearby service station owned by

222. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4652 (emphasis added):
No claimant may be impleaded in a concursus proceeding whose claim has been
prosecuted to judgment. No person claiming damages for wrongful death or for
physical injuries may be impleaded in a concursus proceeding, except by a casualty
insurer which admits liability for the full amount of the insurance coverage, and
has deposited this sum into the registry of the court.
223. 240 So. 2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
224. Id. at 436.
225. 279 So. 2d 735 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 281 So. 2d 757 (La. 1973).
226. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 348
So. 2d 1311 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
227. 355 So. 2d 1279 (La. 1977).

1983]

DIRECT ACTION STATUTE

1521

Exxon and leased to Holtzclaw. Hartford provided liability coverage
for property damage for the driver at fault, subject to limits of
$5,000.00. Hartford settled with the owner of the other vehicle and
with Exxon and its insurer, exhausting the policy limits completely.
The lessees of the service station filed suit for damages, but the court
of appeal reversed a judgment against Hartford on the authority of
Richard."
On original hearing, the supreme court majority took the road
not traveled in Richard. It held that the insurer's authority to settle
claims under the contract could not override the right of the claimant
under the Direct Action Statute to access to the insurance fund. The
court concluded that a victim's right to reimbursement became fixed
at the time of the injury and, as a litigious right, was property of
which the injured person could not be deprived by a settlement over
which he had no control. There were three dissents.
On rehearing, the court reversed itself and reinstated the decision of the court of appeal. Restoring Richard to authority, the court
held that the insurer may enter into reasonable and good faith settlements to be credited against its policy limits even though such settlements exhaust the insurance available to other claimants. The
dispute then reverted to the customary question of whether the settlements were reasonable and in good faith.
The majority opinion on original hearing had not reached the question of good faith because it believed the statement made to the jury
about the right to exhaust the policy limits was erroneous. However,
on rehearing, the majority reached and decided the question in the
insurer's favor. The accident had occurred in March, and about a
month later, the insurer wrote to all the potential claimants asking
that they submit the amount of their claims, together with supporting documents. Only Exxon responded. About four months after the
accident, the insurer wrote the same parties again, giving them thirty days to respond. The letter noted that if there was no agreement
on the claims, the policy amount would be deposited in the registry
of the court for distribution.
Holtzclaw gave the second letter to his attorney, but apparently
he never replied. Settlements were reached with all the others a full
five months after the second letter was sent, but Holtzclaw did not
participate. Under the circumstances, the court concluded that plaintiff had not shown that the insurer acted unreasonably or in bad faith
in reaching these settlements.
The result in Richard and Holtzclaw thus leaves the insurer with
228.

Holtzclaw v. Falco, Inc., 341 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
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the right to diminish or even exhaust the insurance fund with
reasonable, good faith settlements. Several of the justices in Holtzclaw
apparently were willing to support a middle ground, guaranteeing to
the unpaid claimant not his full claim but a proportionate share of
the proceeds according to the ratio of his claim to the total potential
claims.' This has a certain attractiveness to it. It would still encourage
settlement, since the claimant might get more of his claim paid through
that route than he would through litigation and award of a proportionate share of the fund. It would give the claimant a portion of a
loaf rather than none of it, if the insured should prove to be insolvent; and it would offer protection to the insured against at least a
part of an excess claim which might be brought by the unpaid
claimant.
However, on balance, the fixed proportionate share solution would
create more problems than it would solve. A guaranteed share of the
settlement proceeds would effectively eliminate in many instances the
insurer's ability to negotiate the release of its insured from multiple
exposures beyond the policy limits. In addition, the inability to determine the "share" of each claimant would preclude settlement with
fewer than all claimants, since a mistake in evaluation would expose
the insurer to judgment in excess of its policy limits. There are as
many variations of this theme as there are accidents resulting in exposure beyond the policy limits. However, for one example, suppose
A was the driver and B and C were guest passengers in an automobile
involved in an accident with an automobile driven by D at an uncontrolled intersection. A had the statutory right of way, but there is
a serious issue whether his speed and inattention were contributing
causes of the accident. D has automobile liability insurance with a
single limit of $25,000 applicable to the accident. A's claim has a judgment value of $25,000, which may be defeated by his contributory
negligence. B's claim is worth $25,000. The cause of C's disabling condition is in dispute, and his claim may have a judgment value of as
little as $15,000 or as much as $30,000. Without a definitive judgment,
how could the insurer determine the proportionate share of each claimant? If he were guaranteed a proportionate share, B would have
little incentive to participate in a settlement with A and C unless
he received the lion's share of the proceeds. However, if all claims
could not be settled, it clearly would reduce the insured's excess exposure to settle any two of the claims, even if such settlements ex229. If the policy limits are $10,000, there are four potential claimants, three of
these claims are settled for a total of $10,000, exhausting the fund, the fair value
of all four claims taken together would have been $20,000 and that of the unsatisfied
claimant alone would be $4,000, then he is entitled to $2,000 (the same share of the
fund as his claim was of the total claims).
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hausted the policy limits. More importantly, this right to settle with
fewer than all claimants usually gives the insurer the necessary
leverage to negotiate settlement with all claimants.
Moreover, the insurer faces difficult procedural obstacles in
carrying out the proportionate-share concept. A concursus proceeding
ordinarily will not be available.23 A declaratory judgment proceeding
might be a solution, but it is discretionary and might not be permitted where other remedies are available. 31
Perhaps most importantly, there is no clear authority for granting a claimant a guaranteed share of the fund. Ordinarily, the property of the debtor (the insurer) is the common pledge of all the
creditors, 2 and only a specific grant of mortgage, privilege, or other
preference will permit one of the debtors a guaranteed portion of the
fund.233
The real problem is that the interests of the individual and collective injured parties are in substantial conflict with the interest of
the insured, which the insurer is bound to protect to the extent compatible with the Direct Action Statute. Even the result reached in
Richard and Holtzclaw does not completely protect the interest of the
insured. His insurer is able to protect his interest by buying some
claims at a cheaper price than might result through litigation and thus
230. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4652, which requires an insurer to admit liability
and deposit the policy limits in order to initiate a concursus proceeding. Comment
(c) to the article states that the reason for the requirement is to prevent an abuse
of the proceeding by the tortfeasor or his insurer so as to deprive claimants "of their
right of separate suits against the tortfeasor or his insurer, to select the jurisdiction
and the venue, and to a trial by jury." One decision appears to approve the use of
a concursus proceeding by an insurer despite a failure to admit liability, but its strength
may be doubtful. In Wright v. Romano, 279 So. 2d 735 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied,
281 So. 2d 757 (La. 1973), the tortfeasor was the employer of an entity which was
insured by Travelers and INA. The tortfeasor himself was insured by Fireman's Fund.
Fireman's Fund had paid a very small portion of its $50,000 limits for the medical
expenses of one claimant. After the first of multiple claims was filed, Fireman's Fund
answered and deposited the remainder of the policy limits in the registry of the court
to initiate a concursus proceeding. It specifically refused to admit liability of its insured, arguing that its duty to represent its insured would be violated by doing so.
The court upheld the validity of the concursus proceeding. It should be noted, however,
that all three potential claimants were before the court and counsel had stipulated
that the matters could be consolidated. Thus the evil at which article 4652 was written was not present. Moreover, because of the presence of substantial coverage by
Travelers and INA for the employer as a sort of "excess" for the tortfeasor himself,
the insured had no real exposure and his interests were not compromised by the concursus proceeding by his insurer.
231. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1871.
232. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3183.
233. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3184. See, for example, LA. R.S. 9:4581 (1950, which explicitly provides a privilege on fire insurance proceeds for the vendor of a movable.
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is able to reduce his exposure on those claims to nothing at all if
the insured is released in the settlement. But the exhaustion of the
fund leaves him with no protection at all on the outstanding claims.
He is almost totally dependent 3 4 upon the wisdom of his insurer's
course of action, although his own financial interests are at stake.
The insurer must consider not only the amount of the claims involved
but their possibility of success. In most cases, it should work toward
a reasonable settlement of those which are probably valid, so long
as the amounts claimed are not extravagant. It will thus leave for
litigation the ones it has a chance of winning. But of course, the "loss"
of these cases after the policy limits are exhausted is not a "loss"
at all to the company, but only to the insured.
The insured is a party at interest in the exhaustion-of-fund dispute
and should be separately represented. The insurer has a conflict of
interest here even more clearly than it does in the ordinary situation
in which an excess judgment is a possibility. So long as the decisions
in Richard and Holtzclaw remain the standard, the insurer can follow
its own reasoned judgment in making settlements and expect to be
protected against any awards beyond the policy limits. But if a future
decision should arrive at the fixed-proportionate-share concept, insurers
will have to re-examine their settlement practices. It might then be
worthwhile to bear the cost of additional counsel for the insured and
to urge the court to consider a declaratory judgment in favor of the
insured and the insurer, dividing the claims within the policy limits.
It is not a good approach for the insurer to play safe as against
the victims by refusing to settle any claims, leaving all matters to
be determined by litigation. There is no risk of the policy limit being
exceeded in favor of the claimants, but there is the serious risk of
a judgment in favor of the insured against the insurer for failure to
make reasonable settlements within the policy limits. So long as there
is a substantial sanction against unreasonable failure to settle, the
insurer must be wary of absolute no-settlement stances. And concomitantly, it must be protected against awards over the policy limits
when it aggressively pursues settlements which diminish or exhaust
the fund. Moreover, abject refusal to settle will contravene the strong
policy favoring settlements. The decision to limit the claimants to the
fund available has made an impact on other areas of insurance law.
The liberal interpretation of uninsured motorist coverage and the rapid
rise in the amount of coverage purchased by drivers for harm caused
by uninsured or underinsured motorists can be traced in part to the
limitation enforced on the liability fund. If the unsatisfied claimant
234. Unless there should be a clause providing that no settlement may be made
without his consent.
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will be unable to receive reimbursement through the liability coverage
or the tortfeasor himself, he is entitled to provide in advance for that
eventuality in his own (or someone else's) uninsured motorist
coverage. 3 ' This of course raises other interesting questions beyond
the scope of this section. If the unsatisfied claimant is either dilatory
or recalcitrant in pursuing a possible claim to settlement against the
liability carrier, can he justifiably claim that the tortfeasor was "uninsured" or "underinsured"? 3.
AVAILABILITY IN OTHER ACTIONS AND TO OTHER CLAIMANTS

The question has arisen from time to time whether the right of
direct action granted by 22:655 is available in a proceeding other than
an ordinary tort action and to a claimant other than one seeking
redress for personal injury. The statute itself, referring to the "true"
right of direct action, states simply that "the injured person ...shall
have a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and
limits of the policy." The more limited right of direct action after insolvency or bankruptcy, on which this "true" direct action is based,
speaks of "payment of damages for injuries sustained or loss occasioned during the existence of the policy" and an action after insolvency by the "injured person." Its sanction was aimed at issuance
of a contract of "liability insurance" which did not provide for these
rights of action.
There is little doubt that the legislators were thinking of ordinary
tort-induced injuries resulting from automobile accidents, and the great
bulk of the actions brought directly against insurers are the result
of automobile accidents, even today. But obviously tort remedies arise
from many sources other than automobile accidents. Moreover, some
causes of action may be a mixture of "tort" and "contract," to the
point that it is unclear which remedy predominates.
The first extension of the right of direct action beyond the individual physically injured by the conduct of the insured was to the
category of legal persons suffering property damage. 3 ' The next ex235. If there are multiple claimants to that fund, the policy reasons which suggest
that the liability insurer should not be bound beyond the policy limits do not necessarily
apply. There may be a stronger argument for the proportionate guaranteed share where
uninsured motorist claims are at issue. See Manieri v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co.,
350 So. 2d 1247 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Wilkinson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 298
So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), appeal dismissed, 309 So. 2d 657 (La. 1974); McKenzie, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Insurance,39
LA. L. REV. 825, 829-30 (1979).

236. See generally McKenzie, Louisiana UninsuredMotorist Coverage-After Twenty
Years, 43 LA. L. REV. 691 (1983).
237. Department of Highways v. Lykes Bros. S.S., 209 La. 381, 24 So. 2d 623 (1945).
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tension was in the automobile context. Despite earlier appellate decisions to the contrary,"8 several courts of appeal 39 and, finally, the
supreme court 4 ' held that an insurer which had paid its own insured
the amount of his loss (such as under collision or medical payments
coverage) and became subrogated to his rights241 could proceed in a
direct action against the liability insurer of the alleged tortfeasor.
In each case, the rationale was similar. Subrogation to the rights
of the insured as the creditor of the tortfeasor was not forbidden by
the Direct Action Statute or by any pertinent Civil Code article.
Absent such a prohibition, there was no reason why the insurer should
not be entitled to whatever rights its own insured might have had.
This was a reasonable interpretation of the statute, and it probably permitted Louisiana to avoid the circuitous and inefficient method
of "loan receipts" to accomplish the same purpose.242 If Louisiana per-

238. National Retailers Mut. Ins. Co. v. American F. & C. Co., 51 So. 2d 842 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1951) (although the court permitted the suit by the insurer, which it
ultimately disallowed, to interrupt prescription running against the assertion of the
claim by the insured himself); World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. American Auto. Ins.
Co., 42 So. 2d 565 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
239. Motors Ins. Corp. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 52 So. 2d 311 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1951); Fidelity Guar. Fire Corp. v. Varisco, 44 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1950) (the court hedged by noting that the tortfeasor was also a defendant and the
insurer admitted that it would have to pay plaintiff if its insured were liable)..
240. Home Ins. Co. v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 222 La. 540, 62 So. 2d 828 (1952);
See also Carlson v. Eckert, 73 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) (court recognized
that its decision in World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 42 So.
2d 565 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949), had been effectively overruled and that the subrogated
insurer could proceed directly against another insurer, but the court held that the
claim was prescribed when the only timely action was brought against the insurer
by the subrogor, who had settled his claim, and thus there was no interruption of
prescription).
241. Probably conventional subrogation rather than legal subrogation under LA.
CIv. CODE art. 2161, since the latter often has been denied to insurers. See Courtney
v. Harris, 355 So. 2d 1039 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term--Obligations, 39 LA. L. REv. 675 (1979). In support of its decision, the court in Motors Ins. Corp. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp.,
52 So. 2d 311 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951), cited a statement from Corpus Juris Secundum
and three Louisiana cases which would lead one to believe that legal subrogation
occurred upon the payment, regardless of the policy language. The three Louisiana
cases do not support the proposition, however, since they all apparently involved express language in the policy antedating the payment and calling for subrogation upon
such a payment.
242. A loan receipt is a technique by which an insurer could pay its own insured
by means of a "loan" collectible only if the insured ultimately won a law suit against
the tortfeasor or his liability insurer. In this way, the insured could discharge its obligation to its own insured and not risk the prejudice which might befall it if it appeared
as plaintiff in a subrogation case. Had Louisiana refused to permit a direct action
by a subrogated insurer, the "loan receipt" device might have become more promi-
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mits (as it does) an insurer to be subrogated to the rights of its insured against an individual tortfeasor (including, obviously, a right
of direct action), there is no reason to deny the same right as against
an equal adversary -another insurer.
The extension of the right of direct action by subrogation did not
change the type of action for which such right existed; it only
authorized additional persons to assert that same right. It remained
to be seen whether "liability" insurance would be interpreted so broadly as to include any loss suffered by a claimant or whether it would
be limited to those instances in which the loss was traceable to tortious conduct on the part of the nominal insured. In an early case,
a direct action was denied to a bank depositor against the bank's
"blanket bond" surety.2 The depositor alleged that he had delivered
certain bonds to a bank employee for safekeeping but that they were
converted by the employee to his own use. The court saw the action
as one wholly in contract and concluded that the plaintiff, as a nonparty to the contract, had no rights under it. It characterized the
Direct Action Statute as applicable to "accidents and damages for the
injuries sustained or the losses occasioned thereby. ''2" It should be
noted that the plaintiff was under a significant handicap in pleading
the case. If he convinced the court that his was a "tort" claim and
thus possibly under the Direct Action Statute, his claim might have
been prescribed. Saving the claim from prescription by arguing it was
in contract probably cost him the right of direct action against the
surety.
There was a similar result in another case involving a blanket
bond issued to a bank, when the dispute was between the bank and
its depositor over a misplaced deposit.4 The court concluded that no
right of direct action could lie against the surety, since the matter
was wholly one arising out of the contract between the bank and its
depositor.
It slowly developed that the courts' view of the scope of the Direct
Action Statute was that its reach was coterminous with recovery in
"tort." As we know, this may cover a multitude of sins. One court
inadvertently stated that the Direct Action Statute applied only in
cases of recovery under Civil Code article 2315.241 So long as one
nent. As it is, it has virtually disappeared. See Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America
v. Robinson-Slagle Lumber Co., 147 So. 542 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933), for a discussion
of the concept.
243. Tyler v. Walt, 184 La. 659, 167 So. 182 (1936).
244. 184 La. at 665, 167 So. at 184.
245. Lacour v. Merchants Trust & Savings Bank, 153 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1963).
246. Gray & Company, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 292 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).

1528

2LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43

understands this article in the broad sense as the fountainhead of all
tort recovery in Louisiana, this would give it a broad field of application indeed."7 But if narrowly construed, the remark could lead to
an exclusion of causes of action arising under articles 2317 through
2322 of the Civil Code. No one has seriously contended that the latter argument should prevail.
Understandably, the requirement that the claim sound in tort has
been liberally construed. Thus a right of direct action has been
recognized against the errors-and-omissions insurer of a clerk of court 8
and an insurance agency,2' 9 against a legal malpractice insurer,2 - and
in a products liability claim combining a redhibition theory with tort.25 '
In each instance, it was argued that the claim might also or might
only sound in contract, but the court correctly observed that the same
act might permit a remedy in contract and in tort. As to the latter,
the Direct Action Statute permitted the aggrieved party to proceed
directly against the insurer. Even tort claims against marine insurers
may be brought by a direct action,5 2 despite a specific statutory pro23
vision to the contrary.
The only aberration in this trend of liberal interpretation of the
extent of the Direct Action Statute is the treatment of contracts of
re-insurance. In Fontenot v. Marquette Casualty Co.,"54 an appellate
court, when first faced with the problem, construed the contract of
re-insurance entered into between an insolvent liability insurer and
its re-insurer as "liability" insurance rather than "indemnity"
insurance.255 As such, the re-insurer was held subject to the right of
direct action by the persons injured by the conduct of the driver insured by the now-insolvent insurer. The result was criticized,2"' and
247. See Langlois v. Allied Chem. Co., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
248. Ralston Purina Co. v. Cone, 304 So. 2d 735 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974):
249. Gray & Company, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 292 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
250. Vessel v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 874 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
251. Champion v. Panel Era Mfg. Co., 410 So. 2d 1230 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); see
also Davis v. Poelman, 319 So. 2d 351 (La. 1975) (direct action permitted against liability insurer of depositary, even though court seemed to base the depositary's responsibility on a nontort basis).
252. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954); See Coleman v. Jahncke
Serv., Inc., 341 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1965); Lovless v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp.,
218 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1955).
253. LA. R.S. 22:611 (1950).
254. 235 So. 2d 631 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
255. This is the original direct action problem seen from another viewpoint. The
shift from "indemnity" insurance to "liability" insurance as to the injured party was
demonstrated by the enactment of the Direct Action Statute. Here the question is
whether a reinsurer undertakes to indemnify an insurer for the loss it actually suffers
or undertakes to stand ready to pay its liabilities yet unrealized.
256. Note, Insurance-Reinsurance-DirectAction Against Reinsurer on Insolvency
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the supreme court reversed. 57 In its opinion, the supreme court emphasized that most re-insurance was against actual "loss" by the insolvent insurer and not "liability" of that insurer." 8 There is in the
Louisiana statutes a prohibition against no-direct-action clauses in reinsurance contracts, but it is limited to situations in which the reinsured amount is in effect entirely removed from the financial structure of the first insurer. 59 The supreme court agreed with the reinsurer that the pertinent statute granted the right of direct action
only when the re-insurer agreed "to assume and carry out directly
with the policyholder any of the policy obligations of the ceding
insurer. ' ' O
The wisdom of the supreme court's decision could be debated at
some length, but the consequences of the result probably were blunted
by the enactment at about the same time of the Insurance Guaranty
Association Law." 1 Its purpose is to protect the claimants having
rights against insolvent liability insurers by establishing a fund to
satisfy those claims. In theory, a claimant would find it unnecessary
to attempt to reach a re-insurer, if it existed, and thus the motivation to attempt to change the decision of the supreme court in Fontenot
is low. Thus we may expect that Fontenot probably will remain the
law, although its importance is radically diminished by the establishment of the fund.262
AVAILABILITY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The fact that the Louisiana Direct Action Statute is one of a very
few such statutes in the United States makes it inevitable that difof Reinsured Liability Insurer, 45 TUL. L. REV. 648 (1971). The author's criticism was
directed at the preference granted by the decision to some of the insurer's creditors
(those falling with the provisions of the Direct Action Statute), when the proceeds
of the reinsurance contract were probably intended for all of the creditors.
257. Fontenot v. Marquette Casualty Co., 258 La. 671, 247 So. 2d 572 (1971).
258. This is consistent with the position taken in the very early case of Egan v.
Fireman's Insur. Co., 27 La. Ann. 368 (1875), in which the court held that reinsurance
was for the benefit of the parties to the reinsurance contract, not third persons. However,
even though the courts have been unwilling to grant injured persons access directly
to the reinsurer, the public interest in the injured person's rights has not been totally
ignored. In Sears v. Parkchester Apts. Inc., 338 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976),
an adjuster would not disclose the insurer until the adjuster was sued and only then
disclosed an insurer which turned out to be the reinsurer. When the real insurer was
finally sued, prescription had run. The court held that the suit against the reinsurer,
even though it could not be sued directly under Fontenot, interrupted prescription
as to the insurer.
259. LA. R.S. 22:941(B)(2) (1950).
260. LA. R.S. 22:943 (1950).
261. LA. R.S. 22:1375-22:1394 (Supp. 1970).
262. See Ursin v. Insurance Guar. Ass'n, 396 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 1st Cir.), aff'd,
412 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1981) (excess insurer not entitled to make a claim against fund).
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ficult problems of conflict of laws will arise. Many of our sister states
are unfamiliar with the concept of direct action against an insurer,
although the degree of unfamiliarity appears to decline as the years
go by. Very few states have copied Louisiana's approach.26 3 An injured claimant ordinarily would like to be able to sue the insurer
directly and compel the insurer to defend the case in front of a jury.
Thus a claimant understandably seeks to emphasize whatever relationship his cause of action may have with Louisiana in an effort to
induce the forum state to give the statute extra-territorial effect.
The problem which we consider here is related to, but distinct
from, the problem of the scope of the statute itself. We are not here
concerned with the instances in which a Louisiana court will hold that
the Direct Action Statute is available to a claimant suing in a Louisiana forum."6 4 Rather, we are concerned with the degree to which
a forum state other than Louisiana will apply the Direct Action
Statute. To this extent, a "true" conflict of law question is presented
which forums in other states must resolve.
We will discover, probably predictably,. that the Direct Action
Statute is a commodity which does not export well. No state has been
so blunt as to state the issue in these terms, but it may be that
without appellate review of fact, there would be undue prejudice to
an insurer in another state, which could not be modified or corrected
on appeal. To the extent that Louisiana permits the trier of fact to
be aware of insurance, it opens the possibility of prejudice. But at
263. Some courts have urged their legislatures to adopt such statutes. See Zahler
v. Manning, 295 N.W.2d 511, 513 n.3 (Minn. 1980).
264. Some of these problems are covered in notes 54-82, supra: injury inside Louisiana, contract issued outside Louisiana; injury outside Louisiana, but policy issued
or delivered inside Louisiana. Other problems arise when the accident happened
elsewhere but a Louisiana forum is the place of litigation. See Esteve v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 351 So. 2d 117 (La. 1977) (Louisiana would not apply Direct Action Statute when
injury to Louisiana citizen occurred out of state and policy was issued out of state);
with such decisions, compare Matney v. Blue Ribbon, 202 La. 505, 12 So. 2d 253 (1943)
(wife, Texas resident, injured through negligence of husband, also Texas resident, in
Louisiana; Louisiana applied its substantive law to the controversy, affording wife a
potential recovery when Texas would not have done so); Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24 So. 2d 875 (1946) (wife and husband, residents of Louisiana, traveling in Mississippi; wife, injured through neligence of husband, sued insurer in Louisiana; court held wife's claim governed by substantive law of Mississippi,
which did not provide a cause of action to wife under such circumstances; Direct Action
Statute did not provide a cause of action where none existed under Mississippi law);
Mock v. Maryland Casualty Co., 6 So. 2d 199 (La. App. Orl. 1942) (one Louisiana citizen
was killed in Texas because of the alleged negligence of another Louisiana citizen
with whom he was riding; the policy apparently was issued in Louisiana; no wrongful
death action under Texas law exists for plaintiffs, but there would be one under Louisiana law; court held that Texas law must apply and Direct Action Statute made no
exception to that rule).
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the same time, the existence of appellate review of fact serves to
temper and in some instances negate the possible unfair treatment
of an insurer before that trier of fact. Thus the complete Louisiana
scheme may achieve a rough balancing of the interests involved. Other
jurisdictions might well fear that adopting or using only a part of
the scheme would be unfair. A court in another jurisdiction might
prove to be particularly sensitive to this situation when the insurer
is a citizen of the forum state.
The claimant who seeks to have the forum state apply the Direct
Action Statute obviously must establish sufficient connexity between
his claim and Louisiana so that it is plausible to argue that the statute
might be one of the possible choices open to the forum court. Very
commonly, the connexity is the occurrence of the accident inside the
borders of Louisiana. The claimant may well have been a tourist who
returns home to sue and is able to obtain jurisdiction over the insurer in his home state. All that may be lacking is the right to sue
the insurer in a direct action, rather than the insured (over whom
very often the forum state does not have jurisdiction).
One of the early cases was precisely of this genre.265 The plaintiff
alleged in a Mississippi court that he had been injured while riding
as a guest passenger in a vehicle which had been negligently repaired
by a New Orleans firm, insured by Globe Indemnity. It is not clear
that the incident occurred in Louisiana, but it must have. Globe was
subject to the jurisdiction of the Mississippi courts, but the New
Orleans firm was not. The plaintiff asserted a right of direct action
against the insurer by application of the Louisiana statute. On difficult facts and citing two workers' compensation cases, the court held
that the Louisiana statute was more than merely procedural in nature
and that when a statute of another state "confers a right of action
that is substantive in nature, this court will enforce it where it has
the machinery with which to do so."26' The court rejected the argument that the specific venue provisons of the statute made it procedural in nature.
Shortly thereafter, the Mississippi court returned to the problem
and overruled its first effort. In McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co., 7
the facts were essentially the same as in the earlier case. The claimant had been injured in Louisiana through the alleged negligence of
the employee of a Louisiana firm. The insurer was subject to the
jurisdiction of the Mississippi courts, but the firm was not. The court
265. Burkett v. Globe Indem. Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938).
266. 182 Miss. at 440, 181 So. at 319.
267. 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939). Mississippi has continued to adhere to this
position. Cook v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 241 Miss. 371, 128 So. 2d 363 (1961); Goodin
v. Gulf Coast Oil Co., 241 Miss. 862, 133 So. 2d 623 (1961).
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noted that Louisiana courts themselves had characterized the Direct
Action Statute as procedural and seemed somewhat relieved to be
able to overrule the earlier case and deny its application in the
Mississippi courts.
At this juncture, three rules of the conflict of laws were firmly
established. The first was that the substantive law of the place of
the tort should govern the controversy, regardless of the forum state
(lex loci delicti). 8 The second was that the forum need not apply the
procedural rules of the place of the tort, although it might apply the
applicable substantive rules unless they conflicted with some strong
public policy of the forum state." 9 Finally, the forum could determine
for itself whether a rule was substantive or procedural, but it ordinarily would be guided by the opinions of the courts in the state which
had enacted the rule. With these three rules in place, most states
which faced the question had very little difficulty in denying application of the Louisiana statute. The usual judicial response was simply
that the Louisiana rule was procedural and would not be applied extraterritorially, a result often buttressed by reference to the restrictive
venue provisions in the statute.27
The result in the federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction
was mixed, with some describing the statute as substantive but not
offensive to the state in which the federal court sat 7' and others
describing the statute as procedural and refusing to apply it because

268. See the cases collected in note 264, supra, for a demonstration of the firmness of the rule of lex loci delicti in those days.
269. See Reishus v. Maryland Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1969) (Illinois law);
Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 2d 327, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968).
270. See Noe v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 406 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1966); Morton
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 4 N.Y.2d 488, 151 N.E.2d 881, 176 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1958); Penny
v. Powell, 162 Tex. 497, 347 S.W.2d 601 (1961), rev'g 336 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960); Note, Conflict of Laws-Louisiana Direct Action Statute-Applicationby Foreign
State Courts, 35 TUL. L. REV, 637 (1961). See also involving the Wisconsin direct action
Statute, Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547 (1946) (to
some extent), based on fact that Michigan had specific statute outlawing direct action
against insurer); Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 25 Ill. App.
2d 429, 166 N.E.2d 316 (1960).
271. Shapiro v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co, 234 F. Supp. 41 (N.D. Ga. 1963), afrd per
curiam, 337 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1964); see also Collins v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 230
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1966). The decision in Collins was directly contrary to that of the
New York state court in Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 4 N.Y.2d 488, 151 N.E.2d 881,
176 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1958), just months before. For a discussion of the direct conflict,
see generally Note, Conflict of Laws-La. Direct Action Statute-La. R.S. of 1950, 22:655,
31 TUL. L. REV. 673 (1957), approving the result in Collins recognizing the direct action
statute, and Comment, Foreign Application of Louisiana's Direct Action Statute: Two
Views, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 256 (1957), also generally approving Collins.
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the state in which it sat would not do so.
These results probably remain the majority position at this
writing. But recently, perhaps spurred on by scholarly objections to
the rigidity of the rules which have produced these results, 27 3 a few
courts seem willing to depart from the past practice. Prominent among
these is the Supreme Court of Minnesota, which decided Myers v.
Government Employees Insurance Co. 274 in 1974. Again, the facts were
commonplace. The plaintiffs were Minnesota citizens, injured in Louisiana while on a trip here. The alleged tortfeasor was a Louisiana
citizen over whom the Minnesota court did not have jurisdiction, so
far as the opinion reflects. However, the tortfeasor was insured by
GEICO under a policy apparently issued in Louisiana, and the court
had jurisdiction over GEICO. The ground of dispute between the plaintiffs and GEICO was not only whether the Louisiana Direct Action
Statute could be applied by the Minnesota court but also whether
the statute of limitations of Louisiana (which had expired) or that of
Minnesota (which had not) should govern the case. The court held
that a direct action would lie against the defendant but the Minnesota
statute of limitations should apply.
Reflecting its previous adoption of a rule of "choice-influencing
considerations" as determinative in choice of law matters,7 the court
emphasized that the advancement of Minnesota's own interest in the
protection of its citizens required it to permit the direct action. The
court noted that the public policy of Louisiana was not necessarily
to limit the right of direct action to its own citizens, but rather would
grant it to non-citizens as well so long as the accident occurred in
Louisiana. Defendants had argued the traditional position that the
Direct Action Statute was procedural, rather than substantive, but
the court concluded otherwise. Having so concluded, it was forced to
resolve the true conflict of law question presented, since traditional
rules would have dictated application of both the Louisiana Direct
Action Statute and the Louisiana statute of limitations unless Minnesota public policy was to the contrary.
The Myers decision is clearly a departure from the earlier
experiences with reference to the Louisiana Direct Action Statute
when sought to be applied in other forums. Whether it will form a
new point of departure remains to be seen. The resolution of this
issue almost certainly depends upon a forum's determination with
272. Pearson v. Globe Indem. Co., 311 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1962) (Mississippi); Wells
v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 132 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1942) (Texas).
273. See Comment, Conflict of Laws in La: Tort, 39 TUL. L. REV. 96 (1964).
274. 302 Minn. 359, 225 N.W.2d 238 (1974), noted Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 328 (1978);
see also Fagnan v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 577 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1978).
275. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
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respect to the broader issue of whether rigid conflict of law rules
should be replaced with those of a more flexible nature. In some instances, an imaginative court might be induced to characterize the
Direct Action Statute as substantive and thus applicable under even
the traditional rule of lex loci delicti, but not in conflict with any strong
public policy of the forum state. Such a rationale has been rare in
the past, but it reaches the same result as would the adoption of the
more flexible current conflict of law doctrines in some states. Also it
is a possible solution for a state which is unwilling to reach the broader
question of overall conflict of law reform.
The confusion over the procedural versus substantive nature of
the Louisiana Direct Action Statute has unnecessarily clouded this
area. The truth of the matter is that the Louisiana courts have at
one time or another called the statute both, and in fact, it has aspects
of both. But the procedural versus substantive discussion is really
only an escape clause from the rigid place-of-the-tort application of
the Direct Action Statute. To the extent that jurisdictions reject the
rule of lex loci delicti, perhaps the accessory baggage of procedural
versus substantive also will disappear.
MISCELLANEOUS: POLICY LIMITS BEFORE THE JURY;
ISSUES OF RES JUDICATA
Policy Limits Before the Jury
The Direct Action Statute has had an impact on matters beyond
its specific language. This is indicated by the practice of Louisiana
courts with reference to the admission of policy limits before the jury,
although the statute seems not to be the only reason for the position
taken by our judges.
It is certainly predictable that if an insurer is permitted to be
named as a defendant and brought before a trial jury,"' ultimately
the courts will discern very little reason to hide from the jury the
amount of the policy limits. This is especially true when there is a
compulsory liability insurance statute. If it is clear to the jury that
insurance is involved, it probably does more harm than good to refuse
to provide relevant information about the insurance contract. There
is always the risk that the jury will exaggerate the amount of insurance and unfairly expose the insured to an inappropriate excess
judgment.
Thus we might have reached the conclusion that policy limits should
be admissible in a jury trial on the basis of the Direct Action Statute
276.

If the trier of fact is a judge, there is less reason to worry about potential

prejudice if policy limits are made part of the record. Presumably, the trial judge
is able to reach his decisions free of considerations of the applicable policy limits.
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alone and the idea implicit in it that we are willing to deal directly
with the existence of an insurance contract. But Louisiana has another
unusual concept which has played a role in reaching this conclusion:
admissibility of the defendant's inability to pay a judgment.
From one point of view, the ability of a tortfeasor to respond to
the judgment against him is wholly irrelevant to the question of what
damages would be appropriate to compensate the claimant for his
loss."' The only pertinent evidence should concern plaintiffs loss,
whether it be of wages in the past or future, past or future medical
expenses, or mental anguish. Whether or not the defendant would
ever be able to pay a judgment is a matter of no consequence.
However, Louisiana consistently has subscribed to another point
of view. Ever since the decisions in Williams v. McManus,2"8 Loyacano
v. Jurgens,"9 and Daly v. Kiel,28 Louisiana courts have permitted the
trier of fact to take into account the impecuniosity of the defendant
in reaching an appropriate damage award. These cases are in fact
scant authority for the proposition, as the subject is discussed there
very little at all. In the more recent cases, the rationale offered is
that it is not good policy to bankrupt one citizen to pay another, even
though the latter will receive an amount less than would actually compensate him for his loss. 8 '
Thus the defendant is permitted, if he wishes, to assert his own
inability to respond in judgment. However, if he does so, it has been
held that the plaintiff is entitled to present the contrary evidence that
he is insured and that the policy limits of the insurance contract are
whatever they may be.282 This is certainly justified on the ground that
277. See Barnett v. Vanney, 360 So. 2d 617, 620 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (Boutall, J.).
278. 38 La. Ann. 161 (1886) (defendant defamed plaintiff with some scurrilous remarks
while intoxicated; court reduced damages, commenting that the defamation was on
only one occasion, at night, and before a small crowd; in passing, the court noted that
the defendant was "a laborer of general good demeanor and of limited means").
279. 50 La. Ann. 441, 23 So. 717 (1898) (case usually cited for the rule, but all the
court actually said was that in a case involving vicarious liability for an employer,
the employer's "circumstances may not improperly be considered to a reasonable extent in estimating damages . . . . where defendant personally was not at fault." 50
La. Ann. at 444, 23 So. at 718).
280. 106 La. 170, 30 So. 254 (1901) (court remarked in passing that the evidence
of inability to respond was "meager" but the "impression made by it [was] that he
[was] a man of limited means, and it [was] likely the jury took this into consideration,
as they could do, in arriving at the amount of the verdict").
281. See, e.g., Davis v. Moore, 353 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Cole v. Sherrill, 7 So. 2d 205, 211 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). The rule is limited in Daniels v. Conn,
382 So. 2d 945-(La. 1980), which held that where one of two joint tortfeasors is solvent
and the other impecunious, the inability of the one to pay may not be raised in the
proceeding brought by the plaintiff, but only in the subsequent contribution or indemnity proceeding.
282. Suhor v. Gusse, 388 So. 2d 755 (La. 1980).
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if the defendant chooses to open the subject of inability to pay and
the trier of fact is willing to hear such evidence, it also should be willing to hear evidence of ability to pay from another source. A number
of reported decisions on the admissibility of policy limits before the
jury are situations in which the plaintiff brought forward the evidence
in response to the defendant's evidence of impecuniosity.28
Such cases do not solve a related problem, however. It may be
that the individual insured is not a defendant, probably because the
policy limits are thought to be ample to cover the potential exposure.
Impecuniosity of the defendant is not an issue, and indeed, any excess
judgment over the policy limits is not even possible. But may the
insurer refuse to divulge the policy limits to the jury on the understandable ground that its determination of liability and quantum might
be influenced by the knowledge of the policy limits?284 Here the
jurisprudential results are mixed,285 with the trend in the supreme
court clearly being toward admissibility of the policy limits even when
inability to pay is not an issue.8
Actually, the insurer might outsmart itself by pursuing the
strategy of concealing the policy limits. If the policy limit for a single
claim is $10,000 and the insurer wants to conceal that fact because
it believes the claim is probably worth about $5,000, it may take the
risk that a verdict could be returned and a judgment rendered for
more than the policy limits, say $15,000. There is authority for such
a result in a case involving an uninsured motorist claim,287 and the
argument for the same result against a liability insurer might be even
stronger. The limit in a liability policy is a term of the contract between the insured and the insurer. Once the existence of the policy
283. See Davis v. Moore, 353 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Adams v. Ross,
300 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
284. See Adams v. Ross, 300 So. 2d 192, 200 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), in which
the court opined that the jury probably had fixed quantum so that it would coincide
with the policy limits of which it had been informed.
285. In the following cases, the courts upheld the inadmissibility of policy limits:
Moffett v. Lumpkin, 382 So. 2d 278 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (apparently approving
refusal to tell jury of policy limits when defendant did not raise impecuniosity); Barnett
v. Vanney, 360 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (reluctantly approving refusal to
tell jury of certain policy limits); Ashley v. Nissan Motor Corp., 321 So. 2d 868 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 323 So. 2d 478 (La. 1975) (same, but probably subsequently
overruled). However, admissibility of the policy limits was upheld in such cases as
Case v. Arrow Trucking Co., 372 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979); Davis v. Moore,
353 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Domingue v. Continental Ins. Co., 348 So.
2d 209 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
286. Suhor v. Gusse, 388 So. 2d 755 (La. 1980); Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.
2d 1330 (La. 1979) ("In a jury trial, the jury is entitled to know all the evidence. We
know of no statute or jurisprudence which, in the absence of agreement of the litigants,
would permit admissible evidence to be withheld from the jury." Id. at 1336.); Ashley
v. Nissan Motor Corp., 323 So. 2d 478 (La. 1975) (writ denial).
287. See Williams v. Bernard, 413 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
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is known and its terms put at issue, it may be that the limit is an
affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the insurer. 288 Some
courts apparently permit the insurer which fails to plead the policy
limits to move for a new trial or to have the verdict reduced when
a verdict beyond the policy limits is returned, presumably on the
ground that the verdict is "contrary to law. 289 If such a verdict is
contrary to anything, it is contrary to the insurance contract, and the
insurer probably ought to be required to bring the terms of that contract to the jury's attention if it wants to invoke their protection.
Certainly there is the risk of an "insurance verdict," in which
either the determination of the liability issue itself or the quantum
issue is skewed by the jury's knowledge of the existence of
insurance. 9 ° But this risk is present in today's society whether the
jury is told of the existence of insurance or not. In all likelihood, the'
jury will assume that insurance is present in most cases. Moreover,
Louisiana long ago determined to accept the risk of an "insurance
verdict" by the passage of the Direct Action Statute itself, and it
has made the existence of insurance discoverable through the ordinary
processes.29'
Thus there is ample reason in the Direct Action Statute itself
to permit the admission of the policy limit without reference to the
question of whether defendant's impecuniosity is put at issue. Even
if our courts should one day rule that defendant's impecuniosity is
irrelevant to the question of quantum and thus inadmissible, there
would be no reason to insist that the policy limits are necessarily inadmissible by the same reasoning. The policy limits are not evidence
of the insurer's ability or inability to pay, but only of the limits of
its liability to pay. It makes "better sense" to be truthful with the
jury, "tell them exactly what each insurer provides, and combine with
that a cautionary instruction that the amount of insurance should not
be considered in assessing the award .... "292 To be consistent with
the philosophy of the Direct Action Statute, Louisiana hardly can take
the position that the existence of insurance or knowledge of the limits
288. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1005; Massachusetts Protective Ass'n v. Ferguson, 168
La. 271, 121 So. 863 (1929); Paz v. Implement Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 89 So. 2d 514
(La. App. Orl. 1956).
289. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1972; Hodges v. State, Through Dep't of Highways,
370 So. 2d 1274 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Goff v. Occhipinti, 349 So. 2d 1325 (La. App.
1st Cir.), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 166 (La. 1977).
290. See Adams v. Ross, 300 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Ashley v. Nissan
Motor Corp., 321 So. 2d 868, 877 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 323 So. 2d 478 (La.
1975) (Yelverton, J., dissenting);
291. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1423; Guy v. Tonglet, 379 So. 2d 744 (La. 1980).
.292. Ashley v. Nissan Motor Corp., 321 So. 2d 868, 877 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975)
(Yelverton, J., dissenting). In its writ denial, 323 So. 2d 478 (La. 1975), the supreme
court indicated its approval of Judge Yelverton's position in the dissent.
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of that insurance is information that the jury cannot
balance, the insurer is probably better off to reveal the
voluntarily and concentrate its efforts on the admissible
argument that insurance funds are derived from those
pay the premiums, probably including the jurors.
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be told. On
policy limits
and relevant
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Res Judicata
An injured party who unsuccessfully litigates the merits of a claim
against the tortfeasor may not assert that same claim against the
liability insurer in another action, nor may an unsuccessful claimant
assert a claim against the tortfeasor if he has lost on the merits against
the tortfeasor's liability insurer. This self-evident proposition appears
well established in the results of the Louisiana cases, but the precise
foundation of the rule is unclear.
The earliest analogous case is probably Muntz v. Algiers & Gretna
Street Railway Co. 9 Plaintiff's minor daughter was killed, allegedly
through the negligence of the operator of a railroad train owned by
the Jefferson Railroad Company and being operated on track leased
to it by the Algiers & Gretna Railway Company. Plaintiff sued both
railroads in solido. The Jefferson Railroad Company succeeded in
having the action dismissed and re-filed in a different venue, and that
suit was tried on the merits. A jury determined that the operator
was not negligent, and thus the Jefferson Railroad Company was not
liable to the plaintiff. That judgment became final. In the meanwhile,
the action in the court of original venue against the Algiers & Gretna
Railway Company ultimately went to the jury, after the company's
exceptions of res judicata and judicial estoppel were overruled.
The jury's verdict against the Algiers & Gretna Railway Company, however, was reversed on appeal. The supreme court held that
the liability of the lessor railroad was entirely dependent upon the
liability of the lessee operating railroad. Since the latter had been
held without fault, the former could not possibly-be liable.
The act which gave rise to the present suit was the alleged
negligence . . . of the driver of a car belonging to the Jefferson
Railroad Company, in the charge and custody of one of its
employees. It is not claimed or pretended that as a fact the Algiers
& Gretna Railway Company had anything whatever to do with
the operation of the road. Its liability was purely legal, a responsibility resting upon it for the act of a person other than itself.
• . . As the liability of the Algiers & Gretna Railway Company
was essentially and entirely dependent upon damage having
293.

116 La. 236, 40 So. 688 (1906).

1983]

DIRECT ACTION STATUTE

1539

resulted to plaintiff or his child, or to himself, from a fault of the
Jefferson Company, the moment it was finally judicially determined that the company was not at fault, the controversy necessarily ended.294
The specific result was the sustaining of the exception of res judicata
filed by the defendant, without any lengthy discussion on that
exception.
The rationale would fit the situation of a tortfeasor and a liability
insurer almost completely. The real wrongdoer is the tortfeasor, and
the liability of the insurer is "purely legal" in the sense that it arises
out of a conventional obligation between the tortfeasor and the insurer which the courts will enforce. But the lessor railroad would have
had a right of indemnity over against the lessee railroad under ordinary circumstances. Such a right would be incompatible with the
result in the earlier case that the lessee railroad was not at fault
and was free of liability.29 No such indemnity right exists between
the liability insurer and the tortfeasor.
However, there is no reason that this distinction should destro)
the analogy. The only important issue is whether the injured person
has had a fair opportunity to litigate his claim on the merits, whether
the actual defendant was the tortfeasor or someone who would respond
for him.
The Muntz opinion was cited with approval in McKnight v. State"9
a number of years later. A widow had filed suit against three state
police officers, alleging that their negligence caused her husband's
death. The litigation terminated in a judgment that they were not
negligent. The widow obtained legislative permission to sue the state
itself and argued that the permission in effect waived any defense
of res judicata. The court disagreed, sustaining the state's exception
of res judicata and noting that the plaintiff should not have been permitted to litigate a case against the state on the basis of the alleged
negligence of three state employees who had already been "judicially
exonerated." This time, the court termed its ruling "a definite exception" to the third requisite of res judicata under Civil Code article
2286: i.e., the demand must be between the same parties. But on the
authority of Muntz, it sustained the exception of res judicata.

294. 116 La. at 243-44, 40 So. at 690-91.
295. But see Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981), holding that
the release of the tortfeasor does not necessarily release his employer, despite the
fact that the employer's indemnity right against the tortfeasor would appear to be
unavailable.
296. 68 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953). See also Bowman v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 149 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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At about the same juncture, the United States Supreme Court
was deciding the case of Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert. 7
The primary focus of that decision was the diversity jurisdiction of
the federal courts in direct action suits, and the result later was
changed by statute. Nevertheless, within the opinion, the Court made
the statement that the Direct Action Statute created an "optional
right" in the claimant to sue the insurer. The Court opined, without
authority, that by "bringing the action against [the insurer], respon(lent [had] apparently abandoned her action against the tortfeasor."'2 s
This could have been taken as a shaky foundation for a rule that a
second action could not be brought because of "abandonment" by plaintiff or perhaps because of a splitting of the cause of action.
However, the Court's statement is not wholly accurate. Because
the tortfeasor and the liability insurer are solidarily liable, the claimant almost certainly is entitled to proceed to judgment against either
or both, even in separate actions if necessary. The claimant is only
entitled to one satisfaction, but he may be entitled to multiple
judgments if necessary to achieve that one satisfaction.299
Even so, this proposition does not answer our original question.
Assuming that it is generally agreed that one opportunity to litigate
on the merits is enough, what is the precise authority by which we
turn away the second attempt? We have seen that res judicata was
cited in early analogous cases as the reason, but later cases have so
narrowed res judicata that, in its literal interpretation, it can no longer
be taken to resolve the controversy.3"'
Somewhat later, the decisions seemed to emphasize "judicial estoppel" as a basis for denying a second assertion of the cause of action. 1
But this doctrine recently has been abolished as a common-law interloper in the civilian arena" 2 and must be considered unavailable
297. 348 U.S. 48 (1954).
298. 348 U.S. at 52.
299. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2095; Finn v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 141 So.
2d 852 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
300. Consider the discussions in Claitor's Realty v. Juban, 391 So. 2d 394 (La. 1980);
Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287 (La. 1976); and Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d
303 (La. 1973), the last case effectively overruled on other grounds in Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980). See also Holley v. Royal. Globe Ins. Co., 407 So. 2d
32 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
301. Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960), overruled on other
grounds probably, Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981); Cauefield v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 378 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1967) (when merits of controversy had
been determined in state court proceeding, they had exonerated actor of wrongdoing,
and res judicata would not apply because parties were not identical, estoppel by judgment would bar second suit in federal court against wrongdoer by parties in identical
position as parties in original state court action).
302. Ugulano v. Allstate Ins. Co., 367 So. 2d 6 (La. 1978), overruling California Co.
v. Price, 234 La. 338, 99 So. 2d 743 (1957).
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as authority for precluding the plaintiff from raising the merits of
33
the controversy a second time.
There are several other possibilities. In property disputes, one
finds the concept that the ayants cause (successors or privies to
4
original parties) may not relitigate issues decided in an earlier case.11
It could be argued that the insurer is in a sense the ayant cause of
the tortfeasor's liability. The fact that the court sometimes describes
the insurer's liability as secondary or derivative is analogous to the
status of a property successor as privy to the rights of the ancestor.
In addition, the doctrine of ayants cause is treated as an "exception" to or extension of the requisites of Civil Code article 2286, much
as the McKnight opinion concluded with reference to the widow's claim
against the state.
One might also argue that a plaintiff's subsequent suit against
the tortfeasor after failing to fix liability on the insurer on the merits
"splits" the cause of action in violation of article 425 of the Code of
Civil Procedure 5 Within the policy limits, there may be some strength
in such a claim. As to claims beyond the policy limits, however, there
is no cause of action at all against the insurer, and perhaps nothing
is "split" in this respect.
There is some indication that our courts may be content simply
to emphasize the secondary or accessory nature of the obligation of
an insurer, dependent upon proof of the validity of the principal obligation which underlies it.3"' The principal obligation is that of the
wrongdoer. Whether the suit is against the wrongdoer or against the
insurer, the validity of the accessory contractual obligation depends
upon the existence of the principal delictual obligation. If there has
been a final determination that there is no principal delictual obligation, there is simply no authority to enforce the accessory contrac303. See Holley v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 407 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
304. See Roach v. Craig, 124 La. 684, 50 So. 652 (1909); Hargrave v. Mouton, 109
La. 533, 33 So. 590 (1903); Delabigarre v. Second Municipality, 3 La. Ann. 230 (1848);
Hebert v. Melancon, 368 So. 2d 1198 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Succession of Marlin,
240 So. 2d 387 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
305. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 425:
An obligee cannot divide an obligation due him for the purpose of bringing separate
actions on different portions thereof. If he brings an action to enforce only a portion of the obligation, and does not amend his pleading to demand the enforcement of the full obligation, he shall lose his right to enforce the remaining portion.
Cf. Holley v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 407 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Smith-Hearron
v. Frazier, Inc., 368 So. 2d 768 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
306. See the brief discussion, although not pertinent to the decision at hand, in
Baker v. Wheless Drilling Co., 303 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974), writ denied,
305 So. 2d 544 (La. 1975). And see, by analogy, LA. CIv. CODE art. 1771.
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tual obligation. Perhaps the proper exception for an insurer to file
when it is the "second" defendant is an exception of no cause of action.
When the tortfeasor is the "second" defendant and the merits of the
controversy have been reached in a prior suit against the insurer,
perhaps a motion for summary judgment after answer is the most
appropriate vehicle to dispose of the claim. This motion would be based
upon the showing that the prior judgment denying enforcement of
the accessory obligation of necessity determined whether the principal obligation existed. Having determined that the principal obligation did not exist and that there is no genuine issue of material fact,
the court must then rule that the defendant tortfeasor is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
All of the foregoing envisions the situation in which a determination of the controversy on the merits has occurred. If the insurer wins
a first suit because of a coverage or policy defense, there is no reason
to forbid the plaintiff from asserting the cause of action against the
wrongdoer himself.
This discussion of issue-preclusion principles relates to an initial
unsuccessful claim on the merits and a second attempt at the same
claim. If the claimant should successfully sue the tortfeasor alone and
later assert the claim against the insurer, other problems are
presented. If there has been a failure of the tortfeasor to notify the
insurer until the claim is final or a failure to cooperate to the same
extreme, this might be a defense to the assertion of the claim against
0 '
the insurer. This is discussed elsewhere."
If the claimant should successfully sue the insurer alone and later
sue the tortfeasor for the excess, there are other considerations.
Clearly, res-judicata would not be available to the claimant, and the
tortfeasor might have his own cause of action against the insurer for
failure to notify him of potential excess exposure.
307.

See text at notes 117-118, supra.

